Mainstreaming climate security

Thank you Matti and Francisca, the challenges and experience of mainstreaming gender into climate change seem to be an interesting and important reference point for us in terms of climate security mainstreaming.

It would be also good perhaps to think about the policy, planning and strategy processes that we would like to influence. 

SIPRI's study of the Women, Peace and Security National Action Plans which finds that 17 of the 80 NAPs referenced climate change as an insightful read.

Thank you very much for sharing this insightful study, Catherine, and welcome everyone! It is indeed very interesting to see how NAPs are integrating the links among gender, climate change and security. 

Other areas to explore in this discussion could be migration and displacement. How can we mainstream climate security in migration policies? What are the challenges, obstacles and opportunities? 

More broadly, how can we incorporate climate security and climate change adaptation objectives into sectoral policies and plans? What environmental risks and threats should we consider when thinking about mainstreaming climate security into policy, planning and strategy?

Hi everyone.  Do you know when the UNDP study will be available? I am very curious about their typology.

If we take a step back, what do we mean by mainstreaming here?  And can we think of examples of previous attempts--successful or not--to mainstream a policy item within the UN agenda?  The one that occurs to me is Women, Peace and Security, whose mainstreaming has been a long and has been a rather slow process, for a variety of reasons that have to do, I believe, with politics, institutional arrangements, and resources. I am wondering what useful lessons we may find in other mainstreaming efforts that might be useful for climate and security. 

Hello, thank you very much for this interesting debate! I am also wondering about the notion of "mainstreaming", and the field of reflection. Is it only about the relation between climate on the one hand and peace keeping and building, or the notion of 'security' in a strict sense on the other hand ? Or the field of this work is more general?
Moreover, what would be the place of environmental law in this debate? The climate and the environment are often separated legally, although they are closely linked in practice.

Thanks again, Best regards, Pascale

Hi everyone!

Great to be part of this discussion, which has already raised some really interesting points, e.g. re looking at lessons learned (what went well and what went wrong) from the WPS agenda. The big elephant in the room is of course that we are still working very much in siloes - chasing funding that is (with a few exceptions) largely organised along sectoral lines.

So the question of 'mainstreaming' to me is one of changing the way we conceptualise climate change, development/humanitarian & peacebuilding strategies, and the way we implement them. It should be about understanding the context as a starting point (and the drivers of conflict, power relations/interests, other pressures/stresses, history, patterns of marginalisation and inequalities, etc.), and identifying solutions, possibly from the bottom-up, rather than coming in with the 'usual' interventions following blueprints that may be difficult to adapt to the local reality.

Sorry, long answer! Looking forward to more exchange on this! 

Best wishes to you all,

Beatrice

This series is interesting and relevant: https://www.climate-diplomacy.org/news/editor%E2%80%99s-pick-10-food-co…

As Matti, mentioned, we wanted to share the figure from a study he and I worked on together, which looks at how climate-related security risks are outlined in the first round NDCs. This is the synthesized version for social media purposes which presents the typology of themes in a snapshot.

Full version (still being tweaked) will be available in the report to be released next week.

We think it could offer a perspective on mainstreaming. It would be great to understand other such reference points.

Hi Adriana Abdenur , Pascale Ricard and Beatrice Mosello , thank you very much for your interesting comments and reflections about the concept of "mainstreaming". I completely agree with the need to take a step back and reflect on the very concept of mainstreaming and how it impacts policy- and decision-making. And again, in this field, debates and policies on mainstreaming gender issues across different fields might be a useful starting point both within the UN and at the local level. 

When mainstreaming climate security, the conceptualization of "security" beyond traditional definitions seems essential, building on concepts such as human security, nonconventional threats and the security-development nexus. At the same time, there are some concerns, in particular from Member States at the UN, about the "securitization" of climate change. How do we address these issues in policy processes?

This SSRC literature review on climate security might be a good starting point for the conceptualization debate, providing also a brief overview of the impact of research on international policy processes: https://www.ssrc.org/publications/view/the-field-of-climate-and-securit…;

I could not agree more! The way we conceptualise security is key. In our experience, it is common for especially governments to understand security in its 'hard' sense and this can a) raise concerns for the securitisation of climate change (as you say) but also b) reduce the scope of potential interventions to the military realm or peacekeeping/peacebuilding - also pushing away other stakeholders (e.g. CSOs, NGOs with a more climate change adaptation/development focus) to intervene. I think the language/framing we use should be adapted to the specific context we consider/operate in. In some instances, security may be well understood and provide a useful way to frame problems and then think of solutions. In others, adding the specification 'human' will be essential; in others, it may be more effective (and acceptable) to talk about conflict risks; or fragility. 

Good morning everyone, many thanks to all for the rich contributions! I thought perhaps it might be a good moment to recap how the discussion is evolving. Here's my attempt to synthesize the main questions, possible answers, as well as sources of answers expressed in the contributions. This is a "snapshot" not meant to constrain the discussion, but feel free to build on this if you think it captures things well.

What is mainstreaming? Is it about 1. incorporating climate-related security risks into sectoral efforts and plans, 2. linking climate change and e.g. peacekeeping efforts, 3. considering security in a broader sense, or all of the above?

What lessons are available on mainstreaming?

• Possible sources of lessons:
  • SIPRI’s study Women, Peace and Security National Action Plans: need to integrate separate policy communities and learn a “shared language”, define institutional anchors and planning instruments (such as National Action Plans);
  • UNDP’s typology of climate-security linkages in NDCs: overview of how countries express climate- security links;
  • Reports and risk briefs by Climate Security Expert Network;
• Successful integration seems to imply normative, structural and operational innovations;
• Important to consider various levels of governance, transboundary aspects, and diverse conflict drivers;
• Solutions should always be compatible with local circumstances.

How to conceptualize security?

• ‘Hard’ security, “human security”, or context-specific and adaptable framings? Too much attention to ‘hard’ security comes with concerns of interventionism and marginalization of stakeholders.
• Two sources identified to help conceptualization: SSRC’s literature review and case studies on food conflicts; UNDP typology also illustrates the heterogeneity of framings in NDCs;

Other relevant linkages mentioned were gender, climate and security; food security; migration and displacement; security and development.

Hello to all. Thank you for this interesting topic and discussion. I was wondering how policy processes could developp a response to environmentally induced dispacement. From what I know of the subject, States often see internal or international environmentally displaced persons both as a human rights challenge  and as a security risk. For now, the later consideration has been an obstacle to the development of a legal regime to protect environmentally displaced perons. How can best practices (and other soft laws) contribute to fill that legal void and succeed where hard law cannot exist ? How can one avoid that the threat of massive environmentally displacement in future years create a security based reaction from States ? 

This might be a useful article that I published today with the Wilson Center on climate, migration and cities with Dr Linda Lopez -  https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2020/10/climate-migration-cities-prepar…

Hi Collin and James Blake , thank you for raising important issues around the interlinkages between climate change, security and migration, including internally displaced people from rural to urban areas and the need for adaptation planning in large cities.

When it comes to displacement, it's very interesting to see how the security component is playing a major role in stopping the development of a legal regime to protect environmentally displaced people. This can lead us back to our previous discussions summarized by Matti Goldberg on the risks related to the securitization of climate change and the importance of the concept of security we retain when mainstreaming climate security in policy processes.

Building on Collin 's and Pascale Ricard 's comments, it seems also that international law could play a larger role in the debate about mainstreaming climate security when it comes to both the substance and the tools available to impact policy processes. When reflecting on the tools, as mentioned in the discussion, we could explore the potential role of what is known in the legal field as "soft" law (instruments that are not legally binding, such as GA resolutions), as opposed to "hard" law (treaties, customary law). Because they lack a legally binding force, soft law instruments can prove to be more flexible and effective in setting frameworks on emerging issues on which agreements among states are more difficult to reach.

Hello everyone, many thanks for the rich contributions during our first week of discussion! As our moderation is coming to an end, we would like to jump into the second week by summarizing the key messages, building on Matti’s post above.  

1.    Conceptualization of mainstreaming  

There is a need to take a step back and reflect about the concept of mainstreaming and the way in which we frame the discussion. Different concepts were explored that could also complement each other:

• Incorporating climate-related security risks into sectoral efforts and plans
• Linking climate change and e.g. peacekeeping efforts
• Considering security in a broader sense
• Incorporating security risks into climate change policy and planning

2.    Conceptualization of security when mainstreaming climate security 

• The discussion highlighted the role that plays the concept of security not only in academic debates but also in policy processes, stressing the diversity of conceptualizations based on the notions of ‘hard’ security, “human security”, or context-specific and adaptable framings.  
• This framing impacts UN policy processes. Too much attention to ‘hard’ security might raise questions about the “securitization” of climate change, and concerns among member states of interventionism and marginalization of stakeholders resulting from a disproportionate attention to the Security Council. The concept of “peacebuilding” could potentially help to bridge the gap, framing the discussion as climate, security and peacebuilding. Is there a role for the Peacebuilding Commission in mainstreaming climate security? 

3.    Lessons learned for mainstreaming climate security 

• Sources of lessons learned: the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda illustrates the challenges and lessons learned based on 20 years of experience in mainstreaming gender issues into the security field. Lessons learned from WPS include the need to integrate separate policy communities and learn a “shared language”, define institutional anchors and planning instruments (such as National Action Plans).   
• Successful integration seems to imply normative, structural and operational innovations; there is a need to better understand the role of the normative field in mainstreaming climate security and the potential of international environmental law to address some issues through flexible frameworks (soft law)  
• Important to consider various levels of governance, transboundary aspects, and diverse conflict drivers, bringing in other actors such as regional organizations 
• Solutions should always be compatible with local circumstances. 

4.    Some areas to look at when mainstreaming climate security 

• Gender, climate and security 
• Migration and displacement, including internally displaced people from rural areas to large cities. 
• Food security 
• Security and development

Hi everyone,

In light of the thoughtful discussion this past week, it would be useful to learn about and analyze concrete examples of climate-peace mainstreaming from the field.  Taking up the first guiding question, which peace processes and agreements have incorporated climate change, and how? 

The peace processes I am most familiar with, here in Latin America and the Caribbean, have tended not to address climate issues head-on, but rather open up, through more general language and negotiation terms, windows of opportunity to integrate climate action through priorities such as land restoration, rural development, and promoting women's rights.  In the case of the agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC, it was not so much the dedicated terms of the agreement text itself as the interpretation of the broad agreement and the transition towards peacebuilding that began establishing climate action as an important component of consolidating peace in the country. My impression is that this element then acquired greater visibility not only due to the conflict having affected very resource-rich areas and environmentally-sensitive areas, including in the Colombian Amazon, but also as a result of the discussions around the Paris Agreement.  As with the issue of gender, the issue was raised and a mainstreaming push was led by civil society rather than the negotiating parties.  But of course, economic interests aligned with older models often create tensions around climate action initiatives.  

There are earlier examples of peace processes in South America--including inter-state agreements--that embedded innovations for climate mainstreaming, although they weren't called that at the time. For instance, the 1998 agreement between Ecuador and Peru included the creation of a bi-national nature reserve in and around the previously disputed stretch of border.  This ensured that environmental considerations were at the forefront of the peacebuilding process, which has been remarkably successful given the bitter history of rivalry.  

What are examples from other contexts?  What helped to mainstream climate in the processes and agreement texts, and who drove this effort? 

This is such a fascinating question Adriana! And thanks also for sharing your insights on the peace process in Colombia and other peace processes in South America. Really interesting to hear that they did address climate factors, although not explicitly. 

I think there is a big gap in our understanding of how to incorporate environmental (and climate-related) considerations into peace processes/negotiations and agreements. This despite the fact that many global conflicts relate to the use, distribution, illegal exploitation and looting of natural resources, soil erosion, water scarcity, overfishing, deforestation, pollution, resource depletion, and population displacement... 

It would be great to hear if any of you has any experience or resources to share on this, indeed. Overall, I would flag this as an area where more evidence and research are needed!

A very good morning/ afternoon/ evening everyone! I'll moderating our conversation together with Shiloh Fetzek during the coming week. I very much look forward to it!

So much interesting content has already been shared by all of you, many thanks for your great insights and thought-provoking comments. Some of my key take-aways of the discussion so far have been:

• We know that climate change is interacting with other stresses (e.g. poverty, direct violence, migration, etc.) to exacerbate insecurity and conflict. It is especially important that we pay attention to how we conceptualise security: context-specific and adaptable framings rather than too much attention to 'hard security'.
• Therefore, mainstreaming is needed in terms of incorporating climate-related security risks into sectoral efforts and plans, and linking climate change and peacebuilding and development efforts.
• However, in practical terms, mainstreaming is difficult to achieve. Partly, this is because it is hard to communicate these complexities and linkages in a way that is understood at the policy level. But it is also because policies and programmes continue to operate in a siloed way.
• Lessons learned on mainstreaming (derived from the Women, Peace and Security Agenda) are that: it requires normative, structural and operational innovations; it is important to consider various levels of governance, including transboundary aspects, and diverse conflict drivers; solutions must be compatible with local circumstances.
• More generally, we need to understand these linkages better. One of the areas we identified where further research would be needed is on the scope, variables and patterns of climate-induced migration - data may be missing, and/or narratives may be skewed towards cross-border migration, or linked to political agendas. We also do not have enough information around massive environmental displacement, which is happening, but does not get recognised as such.
• Responses are needed at all levels, including regional organisations and subnational governments (e.g. cities).
• We also discussed the role of international law in mainstreaming climate security; especially soft law instruments, can be helpful to set frameworks on emerging issues on which agreements may be more difficult to reach.

Now let's keep the conversation going!

A reminder of our guiding questions:

1. What examples are there of mainstreaming climate change into peace processes and agreements and peacebuilding strategies?
2. What are good practices ensuring climate security into policy, planning and strategy?
3. How can we ensure that climate action is peace positive? What do the metrics look like?
4. What are good practices in fostering transboundary adaptation planning and strategy?

I would be especially interested in hearing your views on questions 3 and 4.

Any examples to share on metrics we can use to assess whether climate action is peace positive (and I would argue also the opposite: any metrics to assess whether peace processes are climate-sensitive? See also Adriana's question on pace processes and peace agreements).

And any examples of 'mainstreaming' of climate and security risks at a transboundary level?

Let me share here a couple of cross-border examples from the SG's Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) in terms of mainstreaming climate and security risks at a transboundary level- The PBF has invested in several cross-border initiatives to address the root causes of conflicts related to climate change 

The fragile border area between Mali and Niger is affected by multifaceted crises with low legitimacy of governance institutions, increased insecurity and extremism and a historic development gap driving grievances of excluded populations. Communities living on both sides of this border face similar realities with economies relying on natural resources exploitation. Climate change is making those resources scarce and raising levels of violence. PBF is empowering women to contribute to
local and cross-border conflict prevention efforts by enhancing their participation and leadership in local decision-making with a focus on the management of natural resources. With PBF resources, the UNCTs diversify livelihood opportunities including land ownership and the organization of women’s led cooperatives to reduce the impact of climate change and related tensions on local communities across the border and support inclusive mechanisms to manage natural resources.

As part of the ongoing Chad-Central African Republic cross-border initiative, the institutional dialogue between the two countries on transhumance has resumed in 2019 for the first time since 2012. In addition, a detailed map of pastoral infrastructure and cross-border transhumance activities was finalized as an important step towards consultative mechanisms and social contracts at local levels to build and strengthen community-based management systems of agro-pastoral resources and transhumance movements.

The Chad-Niger cross-border project on resilient pastoralism developed a mapping of pastoral resources, typology of conflicts and actors engaged in preventing and managing conflicts for the Diffa-Kanem region. A social pact was signed by the community for the joint management of a pastoral water point, which has reduced conflict over its use. As observed by the head of the provincial livestock delegation in Chad: "Since the PBF project was implemented in Kanem province, the communities of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists have accepted each other and there are no more violent conflicts in this province compared to other provinces of Chad. The herders on the Kanem and Diffa side accept each other and promise to facilitate their displacement and vice versa and this will improve exchanges and links between the two communities.” To accelerate the achievement of equality and the empowerment of women within communities, the project initiated advocacy days for women leaders and members of consultation frameworks for the effective involvement of women in decision-making bodies.

It is also important to note how COVID-19 is further exacerbating risks often linked with inequalities and vulnerabilities , especially in countries already vulnerable to violent conflict. For example, in the Sahel, market closures, border closures and movement restrictions to stop the spread of COVID-19 have disrupted the
structurally weak pastoral sector, already made vulnerable by conflict.

Thank you for those fascinating examples, Diane. Are there any typologies  out there of how to incorporate climate into peace agreements?   Thinking out loud there -- based on the examples we've raised I can think of at least five main ways to mainstream climate into agreements: 

a)  "Peace parks," in which transboundary protected areas are established that entail cooperation among the parties around specific territories, in some cases jointly managed; the Ecuador-Peru peace agreement might qualify as one. Maritime peace parks may be a subtype -- there are several examples here: http://ciesm.org/online/monographs/41/WM_41_27_32.pdf)

b) Climate as an Area on the Agenda, in which a peace agreement incorporates explicit language on the general theme--for instance, formally recognizing the environmental impact of the conflict and the need to address the damage or boost adaptation--and identifies counterparts (for instance, Ministries of the Environment) to cooperate on an agreed-upon list of priorities;

c) Driver-Focused, in which a major environmental driver of conflict is identified and cooperation between the parties is then built around that particular phenomenon (as in the case of transhumance or water availability; I'm thinking of the Wadi Araba Accords and the joint water committee); 

d) Preventive, in which forecasts-- for instance, of extreme weather events that may affect all parties--are dealt with through a programme for cooperation, as in the case of disaster risk reduction and response, or perhaps (one day) on climate-induced migration. 

e) Sustainability of Implementation, in which climate footprint of agreement execution is foreseen and impact mitigation is provided for-- and "boomerang policies" avoided. 

These are not (and shouldn't be) mutually exclusive. What are some other ways to mainstream climate into peace agreements?  Will we one day see a peace agreement in which climate is truly center stage, combining most or even all of these dimensions?  

Great way of framing this Adriana Abdenur! Does anyone have have any examples of categories d) and e)? 

In the case of early warning systems, UNDP does a lot of this kind of work. I would invite Thomas Pitaud to weigh in on this. 

I know WFP makes use of weather-based systems to put in place cash-based systems ahead of extreme weather incidents to bolster coping capacity, support disaster preparedness, etc. It would great to hear from our WFP moderators @Rebecca Richards and @Johanna Green on this.     

This is a really useful discussion, thanks to all for your contributions! It’s great to see examples of programming on the ground integrating climate security and peacebuilding, and to review recent analysis on these themes. 

With reference to guiding question #2, on good practices ensuring climate security into policy, planning and strategy, another thread of this discussion may be interesting to surface. 

Migration and “hard security” have been identified as areas where it’s important to tread delicately, when mainstreaming climate security risk management (or climate, security and peacebuilding) into all of the issues it will affect. 

Since climate change touches everything, including these areas (@Tobias von Lossow and others at Clingendael published a brief on this today), perhaps we could elaborate some of the practical ways to be sensitive to potential dangers and drawbacks as climate security is mainstreamed, particularly as it seems to be reaching a tipping point in terms of more widespread recognition of the risks. 

It would also be interesting to share more about how the security dimensions of climate-related migration are stopping the development of a legal regime to protect environmentally displaced people, as @Francisca Aguayo Armijo mentioned, particularly in light of how little-understood and oft-misrepresented this issue is, as @Adriana Abdenur and others have noted in this discussion. 

Are there any lessons this might offer, on missteps to avoid when integrating security dimensions of climate change into policy, planning and strategy? 
 

Thanks Shiloh Fetzek for drawing our attention to the brief by Clingendael - a really valid contribution to the debate, discussing the dangers of 'securitising' climate change, but also reminding us of the role that security does play in addressing climate change.

From the brief: "Climate-related security risks are, and could more often be, recognised in the mandates of UN and EU missions, for instance with regard to including this aspect in on-the-ground risk assessments – although they are unlikely to be the overarching reason for military intervention. Holding the military to account and not allowing military organisations to misuse extreme weather or droughts to justify intervention needs to be part of the broader debate on how to hold military interventions subject to democratic checks and balances."

I think there are 2 important points we can take away from this for our discussion:

1. Mainstreaming needs to happen in a context-specific way - hence the importance of on-the-ground risk assessments, to inform responses (of whatever nature, depending on the challenges to address). 

2. Checks and balances are needed - I would say whether they involve the military or not. It is important to constantly monitor and understand how our interventions are impacting the context, as well as how the context impacts our interventions, and remain flexible to adapt/change course of action when needed. 

@Beatrice Mosello and I hand off moderating, with thanks for all of your contributions this week. Our (mainly her!:) summary of the discussion and teeing up for our final week of this SparkBlue conversation: 

This week, the conversation focused on examples of mainstreaming climate and security considerations in peace agreements and at the transboundary level. In this context, participants highlighted some of the challenges of mainstreaming, and the additional risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Mainstreaming climate change in peace processes and agreements

• There is a gap in our understanding of how to incorporate environmental (and climate-related) considerations into peace processes/negotiations and agreements. This, despite the fact that many global conflicts relate to the use, distribution, illegal exploitation and looting of natural resources, soil erosion, water scarcity, overfishing, deforestation, pollution, resource depletion, and population displacement. When climate issues have been addressed, this has happened through more general language, e.g. when talking about land restoration, rural development, and promoting women's rights.
• A typology of ways in which climate considerations can be incorporated into peace agreement can be identified (the categories are not mutually exclusive):
  • Dedicated language: peace negotiations and agreement incorporate explicit language on climate change and environment. For example, the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC did not have dedicated terms within the agreement itself, but the transition to peacebuilding began establishing climate action as an important component of consolidating peace in the country.
  • Driver-focused: climate and environmental issues are recognized as key conflict drivers, triggering the identification and incorporation into the peace agreement of measures to build cooperation between the parties to address them. For example, the peace agreement between the government of the Central African Republic and 14 armed groups had a dedicated component on pastoral migration and conflict resolution.
  • Peace parks: the establishment of protected environmental areas that entail cooperation among the parties including at the transboundary level, and are in some case jointly managed, e.g. as in the case of the Ecuador-Peru peace agreement.
  • Preventive: a programme for cooperation is set up to deal with prospected climate impacts, based on data and information from modelling and forecasts. (No examples were presented to illustrate this typology).
  • Sustainability of implementation: the parties foresee the climate footprint of the implementation of a peace agreement, and adequate mitigation measures are  provided for. (No examples were presented to illustrate this typology).

Mainstreaming climate and security risks at the transboundary level

• Climate and security risks often manifest beyond national borders; transboundary and local responses are therefore needed. It is also important to retain that it is both about mainstreaming climate action into peacebuilding, but also peacebuilding into climate action (as reflected in Colombia's first NDC submission).
• The Peacebuilding Fund has invested in several cross-border peacebuilding processes and stabilisation efforts that address climate and environmental considerations, e.g. cross-border Chad-CAR project to strengthen dialogue and peace at the community level; a project at the border between Mali and Niger, aiming to empowering women by enhancing their participation in decision-making with a focus on natural resource management; and a Chad-Niger cross-border project on resilient pastoralism.
• There are also some examples of preventive action that support climate resilience at the local level, and frameworks for incorporating data into risk management, in the framework of the WFP’s  R4 Rural Resilience Initiative:
  • The WFP has used weather-based systems to put in place cash-based systems ahead of extreme weather incidents to bolster coping capacity, support disaster preparedness, etc.
  • WFP is also distributing a ‘hybrid index insurance’ in Malawi, which brings together Weather Index Insurance with Area Yield Index Insurance (AYII). The idea is to allow quick payouts in case of rainfall shortages through the weather index product, while at the same time ensuring coverage against a broader range of risks that damage yields, such as pests or excess rains and floods, through AYII.
  • WFP’s ‘Satellite Index Insurance for Pastoralists in Ethiopia’ (SIIPE) project integrated with the government’s Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). The index is built to trigger payouts early enough to keep the core breeding animals alive during a drought, instead of providing payouts at the end of the season when the animals might have already perished.

Challenges of climate and security mainstreaming

• Lack of sufficient evidence on how climate change strategies can address security risks: Experiences from Southern Mexico and Central America show that even when the links between climate change impacts and security challenges are evident, the evidence of whether and how 'more traditional' strategies for climate adaptation and DRR can work to address violence remains limited. In many instances, climate change adaptation programs are even reluctant to operate in insecure contexts.
• Translating research into policy action: Policy-makers still broadly understand and respond to security challenges with security measures, without acknowledging the importance of social cohesion - to which actually climate change adaptation and mitigation interventions could contribute.
• Institutional arrangements fail to incentivize and facilitate cooperation amongst sectors. Both development and humanitarian organisations and governments continue to structure their interventions along very clear performance indicators, allowing for very little deviation and hence flexibility to address interconnected challenges, and/or to coordinate with other entities at national and regional levels. For example, the LAC region, there are still few efforts to promote multi-sectorial and multi-level cooperation, especially between national and local levels, and between states in the region, to incorporate a human mobility dimension in institutional frameworks for climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction.
• To address these challenges, we need:
  • More adaptive governance systems, with the capacity to learn and adapt, are needed - similar to what has been discussed for the implementation of the Sendai framework.
  • A stronger role for regional organisations, which are important loci for mainstreaming climate and security, e.g. responses to the Venezuelan refugee crisis may offer an opportunity to formulate regional responses that are more climate sensitive, even if just by focusing on specific issues, such as water management or disaster risk reduction. 

Further challenges: COVID-19

• COVID-19 is further exacerbating climate and security risks by:
  • Adding to climate pressures, making legal livelihood opportunities sparser and less lucrative both in the short-term due to restrictions to contain the virus, and in the long-term due to the long-lasting economic and social effects; just like climate change, this might push individuals to take up illicit livelihoods or criminal activity.
  • Potentially diverting resources and efforts from ongoing climate change adaptation and environmental protection initiatives, especially for those countries that already face poverty and economic crises. This might contribute to increased conflict around land and water access.
  • Making migration a less effective adaptation and coping strategy for many. For example, they are affecting migrant workers’ incomes and, by consequence, remittances to their families in their home communities and countries, which can undermine their resilience to climate impacts, for example, by reducing financial resources that could have been used in times of disasters.
• This can pose potential dangers and drawbacks to climate and security mainstreaming, particularly as it seems to be reaching a tipping point in terms of more widespread recognition of the risks. 

Of the four guiding questions for this discussion, #3 has received relatively less attention so far, and may be worth focusing on in the week ahead: How can we ensure that climate action is peace positive? What do the metrics look like?

Hello everyone, thank you very much for the fascinating discussion over the last few days! And many thanks to Shiloh Fetzek and Beatrice Mosello for the extremely useful summary.

Although it's not directly related to question #3, I would like to jump in regarding the discussion on multi-sector and multi-level cooperation to mainstream climate security into policy processes and highlight some opportunities to increase the role of the UN by leveraging the reform launched in 2017.  

As underlined throughout the discussion, multidimensional and transboundary challenges posed by climate security require holistic thinking regarding planning and strategies at the national/sub-national, regional and global levels. Taking action at the global level seems crucial to impact global policy processes and debates that can allow and encourage action at the national level, as well as identify lessons learned across countries and regions, and at the same time, focusing on the local level is critical to elaborate context-specific, bottom-up strategies. I think the UN has a role to play in both, as has been illustrated by the funding provided by the PBF to local projects and the broader policy efforts carried by the Climate Security Mechanism at the global level. The UN reform provides opportunities regarding all these efforts and at all levels, as it aims to bring more coherence and enhance coordination within the UN system both thematically and geographically.

The reform provides opportunities for mainstreaming climate security by enhancing multi-sector coordination between the UN Development System, which deals with climate change, and the UN peace and security pillar (DPPA/DPO), which deals with security issues. In this context, there is room to leverage the UN reform to make climate action more peace positive, on one hand, and peace processes more climate sensitive, on the other hand.

I fully agree on the critical yet insufficient/absent role of regional organizations on these issues, as illustrated in LAC regarding the migration crisis. ECLAC/CEPAL was mentioned as an active organization nonetheless, and I agree that ECLAC might be the more functional regional body in LAC at this point, and maybe even the only space for dialogue among governments over the last few years. It's worth noting, for instance, that governments have still managed to adopt by consensus the annual conclusions of the Forum of the Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean on Sustainable Development, which reviews the implementation of the 2030 Agenda in the region and is held under the auspices of ECLAC. There is opportunity to think about mainstreaming climate security in this process as well as other ECLAC activities, although the framing here will be critical to accommodate strong political sensitivities on these issues in the region.

Still, the reform has brought about some political will to increase coordination, and based on the renewed multi-level and multi-sector mechanisms, there is room for the UN to engage more actively in mainstreaming climate security both within the UN system at the regional level and with external partners/regional organizations.

Thank you again for the very rich discussion!

¡Saludos a todos! Me da gusto tener la oportunidad de participar en el foro y quiero agradecer a Martín Cadena, PNUD, por la invitación.

Sobre el vínculo seguridad y ambiente, quisiera compartir unas reflexiones desde la perspectiva de las Relaciones Internacionales que es el campo al que yo pertenezco.

Como saben, en la actualidad el mundo entero está inmerso en la búsqueda de una solución eficaz contra la pandemia de la COVID-19, que lo ha puesto contra las cuerdas. Esto nos recuerda que las amenazas provienen de lugares insospechados y pueden modificar las nociones de seguridad internacional.

Por décadas, la visión “tradicional” de seguridad internacional abarcó la amenaza que provenía de un Estado a otro en términos militares, por lo tanto la respuesta natural era la escalada armamentista. Así funcionó durante gran parte de la Guerra Fría. Cuando ésta terminó, y ya no hubo justificación del costo de una carrera belicista, surgieron “nuevos temas” que fueron incluidos bajo una visión de seguridad internacional “no tradicional” o más amplia. Me refiero en particular a la Agenda para el Desarrollo, impulsada por el UNDP en la década de los noventa del siglo pasado, que demandaba redirigir los flujos financieros que antes de destinaban al armamentismo, a las carteras de combate a la pobreza, salud, género, alimentación y ambiente, entre otros, bajo el supuesto de que la seguridad internacional mejoraría de ese modo, erigiendo el binomio desarrollo-seguridad.

Tras los atentados del 11 de septiembre de 2001, la visión tradicional pareció recobrar fuerza, colocando ahora al terrorismo como el enemigo que justificaba nuevamente una escalada militar, soslayando con ello a la iniciativa del UNDP. La diferencia radica en que la fuerza inherente de los “nuevos temas” ya era tal que era imposible minimizarlos, como el cambio climático, la pérdida de la biodiversidad, el agujero en la capa de ozono, desertificación, entre otros, por centrarme únicamente en la agenda ambiental. Todos ellos entraron en los cálculos de la seguridad internacional por el potencial que tienen para generar inseguridad y conflictos. Merece aclarar que los así llamados “nuevos temas” no eran para nada nuevos, sino que estuvieron eclipsados durante décadas por la visión tradicional, es decir, la militarista. Las aportaciones teóricas de la Escuela de Copenhague son un ejemplo de que la academia proponía, ya desde inicios de los años ochenta, una revisión de los aspectos no militares de la seguridad.

Al abrir la gama de elementos que podrían constituir amenazas a la seguridad, los temas ambientales ganaron terreno en esferas no usuales a su ámbito de estudio, sino también en las áreas clásicas de la seguridad, que reconocían por fin que los efectos del cambio climático, la pérdida de la biodiversidad, entre otros fenómenos, representaban una amenaza directa a la seguridad, todo esto a partir del inicio de la segunda década del presente siglo.

Sin embargo, este avance no ha sido suficiente. Si bien es reconocida la correlación entre los problemas ambientales y la inseguridad internacional, la voluntad política no ha estado a la altura: los magros avances en cambio climático a pesar del acierto que representa el Acuerdo de París y las extenuantes negociaciones del Marco Global para la Biodiversidad post-2020 constituyen ejemplos de victorias pírricas frente a las aún altas emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero o el ritmo de extinción de especies. Recordemos que, por ejemplo, el incremento del nivel promedio del mar por el derretimiento de los casquetes polares provoca la pérdida de territorios y puede forzar la migración masiva e incontrolada de personas; o bien, la desaparición de especies pone en peligro la producción alimentaria o el acceso a componentes necesarios para la industria farmacéutica.

Los problemas ambientales son quizás el mayor reto al que se han enfrentado las ciencias políticas, en particular las Relaciones Internacionales, por su carácter intrínsecamente vinculado con la configuración de la estructura mundial, en la cual la base del sistema económico es el ambiente que, paradójicamente, es afectado de manera directa por el propio sistema. Debemos, pues, apelar a la generación de escenarios futuros en los que el panorama no es nada alentador, para que pueda ocurrir la acción política. Al fin y al cabo, estos meses de confinamiento por la pandemia nos han demostrado que las amenazas no tradicionales a la seguridad internacional están presentes y el sistema mundial parece no contar con la mejor preparación para enfrentarlas.

Hoy es un virus el que nos tiene de cabeza. Mañana puede ser el cambio climático o la extinción de especies necesarias para nuestra supervivencia. Pensémoslo bien y actuemos mejor.

Estas líneas, por cierto, las publiqué hace unos días (http://www.siempre.mx/2020/10/ambiente-y-seguridad-internacional/) y también les comparto otro artículo (que dio pie a un libro posterior sobre el tema) que les adjunto, que escribí en 2011-2012 y que, sin embargo, parece un texto que podría ser actual pues, tristemente, ha habido pocos avances.

Me encantaría recibir sus comentarios.

Voices of Mexico 92 - Artículo MDV - Voices of Mexico Issue 92 Winter 2011 - 2012 - SF.pdf364.69 KB