



WhatWorks  
TO PREVENT VIOLENCE



# **WHAT WORKS TO PREVENT VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS: RESEARCH AND INNOVATION PROGRAMME**

## **Final Performance Evaluation**

MARCH 2020

UK DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (DFID)



Specialists in strategic  
communications



## Final Performance Evaluation of DFID's What Works to Prevent Violence Against Women and Girls Programme

March 2020

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**About What Works:** The What Works to Prevent Violence against Women and Girls programme is a flagship programme from the UK Department for International Development, which is investing an unprecedented £25 million over five years to the prevention of violence against women and girls. It supports primary prevention efforts across Africa and Asia that seek to understand and address the underlying causes of violence, and to stop it from occurring. Through three complementary components, the programme focuses on generating evidence from rigorous primary research and evaluations of existing interventions to understand What Works to prevent violence against women and girls generally, and specifically in fragile and conflict areas. Additionally, the programme estimates social and economic costs of violence against women and girls, developing the economic case for investing in prevention.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The authors confirm that there were no conflicts of interest identified for this evaluation. The team were also able to work independently and freely without interference from outside sources.

# CONTENTS

Table of Figures.....	3
Acronyms and Abbreviations.....	4
Key Terms and Definitions .....	6
Executive Summary.....	8
1. Introduction and Background.....	20
1.1 Overview of the Evaluation.....	20
1.2 Overview Of The Programme.....	21
1.3 Purpose Of The Independent Evaluation .....	22
1.4 Background To the WW-VAWG Programme .....	25
1.5 Operating context and Political Economy.....	25
2. Overall Evaluation Framework, Approach and Methodology .....	31
2.1 The Evaluation Approach Overview .....	31
2.2 Final Evaluation Framework .....	34
2.3 Methodological Overview .....	37
2.4 Analysis, Synthesis and Triangulation.....	42
2.5 Evaluation Management.....	43
3 Communication and Dissemination .....	46
3.1 Introduction .....	46
3.2 Key Actors Engaged.....	47
3.3 Communication Methods.....	48
3.4 Products for Dissemination.....	49
4. Findings and Analysis.....	51
4.1 Introduction .....	51
4.2 Effectiveness .....	52
4.3 Efficiency .....	64
4.4 Sustainability.....	68
4.5 Impact.....	72
5. Learning and Recommendations .....	74
5.1 Introduction .....	74
5.2 Learning.....	74
5.3 Conclusions .....	82
5.4 Priority Recommendations .....	83
Annexes.....	87
Contents:.....	87
Thematic Study 1 – Research .....	87
Thematic Study 2 – Research Uptake .....	87
Thematic Study 3 – Innovation In WW-VAWG .....	87
Annex 1 – Updated DFID ToRs.....	88
Annex 2 – Evaluation Framework .....	105

Annex 3 – Ethics Policy .....	137
Annex 4 – List of Key Actors Interviewed .....	145
Annex 5 – List of Key Documents Audited .....	149
Annex 6 – Final Evaluation Team .....	155
Annex 7 – Relevance Section From Mid-Term Review .....	156
Annex 8 – Political Economy Analysis of WW-VAWG Programming .....	159

## TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Report Structure .....	20
Figure 2: WW-VAWG Programme Components .....	21
Figure 3: Timings of Outputs that Strengthen the Utility of the Evaluation .....	22
Figure 4: Core Activities of our Final Evaluation .....	24
Figure 5: Relevant Core Dates .....	27
Figure 6: Evaluation Stages and Focus .....	31
Figure 7: Evaluation Conceptual Lens .....	33
Figure 8: Final Evaluation Design Components .....	34
Figure 9: Final EQs according to OECD-DAC Criteria .....	35
Figure 10: Methods and Justifications .....	37
Figure 11: Overview of Thematic Papers .....	40
Figure 12: Research Quality and Uptake Anticipated Progress by FE .....	41
Figure 13: Audience Groupings .....	47
Figure 14: Annex 2: Evaluation Stages and Focus .....	105
Figure 15: Annex 2: Evaluation Conceptual Lens .....	108
Figure 16: Annex 2: Final Evaluation Design Components .....	109
Figure 17: Annex 2: Final Evaluation Questions according to OECD-DAC Criteria .....	110
Figure 18: Annex 2: Evaluation Matrix .....	112
Figure 19: Annex 2: Methods and Justifications .....	114
Figure 20: Annex 2: Overview of Thematic Papers .....	117
Figure 21: Annex 2: Research Quality and Uptake Dimension Definitions .....	118
Figure 22: Annex 2: Suggested RU Domains, Metrics and Units of Measurement for FE .....	120
Figure 23: Annex 2: Suggested Research Quality Domains, Metrics & Units of Measurement for FE .....	126
Figure 24: Annex 2: Research Quality and Uptake Anticipated Progress by Final Evaluation .....	129
Figure 25: Annex 2: Risks, Challenges and Mitigations .....	134
Figure 26: Annex 3: Ethical Review Stages .....	142
Figure 27: Annex 4: Key Actors Interviewed .....	145
Figure 28: Annex 5: Key Documents Reviewed for the Final Evaluation .....	149
Figure 29: Annex 5: Key Documents Reviewed for the Mid-Term Evaluation .....	150
Figure 30: Annex 6: Final Evaluation Team Members .....	155

# ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

APHRC	African Population and Health Research Centre
ASAZA	A Safer Zambia
ASM	Annual Scientific Meeting
ATJP	Access to Justice Programmes
CD	Capacity Development
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CoP	Community of Practice
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DVA	Domestic Violence Act (South Africa)
DVVSU	Domestic Violence and Victim Support Unit
EEA	Employment Equality Act (South Africa)
EQs	Evaluation Questions
EQuALS	Evaluation Quality Assurance and Learning Service
EU	European Union
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
FE	Final Evaluation
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
FGM/C	Female Genital mutilation/Cutting
GBV	Gender-based Violence
GGG	Global Gender Gap
GII	Gender Inequality Index
GPD	Gross Domestic Product
GPS	Global Positioning System
GWI	Global Women's Institute
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
HTAC	Help the Afghan Children
IAB	Independent Advisory Board
ICAI	Independent Commission for Aid Impact
IE	Independent Evaluation (Evaluator)
IPV	Intimate Partner Violence
IRC	International Rescue Committee
ISI	Import Substitution Industrialisation
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
KA	Key Actor
KAI	Key Actor Interviews
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoGCSP	Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection (Ghana)
MTR	Mid-term Review
NAP	National Action Plan
NGOs	Non-governmental Organisations
OECD-DAC	The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee
OSCs	One Stop Centres
PBK/L	Practice-Based Knowledge and Learning
PbR	Payment by Results
PEA	Political Economy Analysis
PEPUDA	Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (South Africa)

PIGD	Participatory Interest Group Discussion
PoCs	Protection of Civilian Camps
PPA	Positive Pathways Analysis
PSVI	Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative
RCT	Randomised Control Trial
QA	Quality Assurance
R2A	Research to Action
RED	Research and Evidence Division (DFID)
REF	Research Excellence Framework
RIF	Research and Innovation Fund
RU	Research Uptake
RUPR	Research Uptake Progress Reports
SAMRC	South Africa Medical Research Council
SDG5	Sustainable Development Goals
SHARPZ	Serenity Harm Reduction Programme Zambia
SOA	Sexual Offenses and Related Matters Act (South Africa)
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SPLM	The Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM IO	The Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition
SVRI	Sexual Violence Research initiative
TA	Technical Advisor
TL	Team Leader
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UoP	University of Portsmouth
VAWG	Violence Against Women and Girls
VFM	Value for Money
VSO	Voluntary Services Overseas
WAJU	Women and Juveniles Unit
WASH	Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene
WB	World Bank
WEE	Women's Economic Empowerment
WEF	World Economic Forum
WPS	Women, Peace and Security
WW-VAWG	What Works to Prevent Violence Against Women and Girls (Programme)

## KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Key Terms	Definitions
<b>Violence Against Women and Girls</b>	Any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or mental harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life. (UN General Assembly, 1993, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women)
<b>Intimate Partner Violence (IPV)</b>	Behaviour by an intimate partner or ex-partner that causes physical, sexual or psychological harm, including physical aggression, sexual coercion, psychological abuse, and controlling behaviours. (WHO 2013 <sup>1</sup> )
<b>Gender-Based Violence</b>	Violence that is directed against a person on the basis of gender. It constitutes a breach of the fundamental right to life, liberty, security, dignity, equality between women and men, non-discrimination and physical and mental integrity. (Council of Europe, 2012 Treaty No. 210, Istanbul)
<b>Sexual Violence/ Sexual Assault</b>	Any sexual act, attempt to obtain a sexual act, or other act directed against a person's sexuality using coercion, by any person regardless of their relationship to the victim, in any setting. It includes rape, defined as the physically forced or otherwise coerced penetration of the vulva or anus with a penis, other body part, or object. (WHO, 2012 <sup>2</sup> )
<b>Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C)</b>	All procedures that involve partial or total removal of the external female genitalia, other injury to, or alteration of the female genital organs for non-medical reasons. (WHO 2013 <sup>3</sup> )
<b>Forced Marriage</b>	Where one or both people do not (or in cases of people with learning disabilities, cannot) consent to the marriage and pressure or abuse is used to force it. It is recognised as a form of violence against women and men, domestic/child abuse, a form of modern slavery, and a serious abuse of human rights <sup>4</sup>
<b>Child Marriage</b>	Any child (under the age of 18) is considered incapable of freely choosing to marry. Complications arise when there is legal entitlement for a child to marry earlier, with parental consent (e.g. in the U.K) <sup>5</sup>
<b>Adaptive Management</b>	The “intentional approach to making decisions and adjustments to programmes, projects and other interventions, in response to new information and changes in context” <sup>6</sup> .
<b>Accountability</b>	“The obligation of an individual or organization to account for its activities, accept responsibility for them, and to disclose the results in a transparent manner. It also includes the responsibility for money or other entrusted property” <sup>7</sup> . Accountability is a two-way process, upwards and downwards: “duty bearers”, and people and organisations with power, are also obliged to demonstrate accountability to their citizens and constituents. “Ordinary” people have responsibilities towards each other, and towards the State.

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/violence-against-women>

<sup>2</sup> [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/77434/WHO\\_RHR\\_12.37\\_eng.pdf?sequence=1](https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/77434/WHO_RHR_12.37_eng.pdf?sequence=1)

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/violence-against-women>

<sup>4</sup> <https://rightsofwomen.org.uk/get-information/family-law/forced-marriage-law/>

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/about-child-marriage>

<sup>6</sup> <https://usaidelearninglab.org/library/discussion-note-adaptive-management>

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/accountability.html>

<b>Research Uptake</b>	All activities that facilitate and contribute to the use of research evidence by policy-makers, practitioners and other development actors.
<b>Intersectionality</b>	An analytical approach used to understand issues of social inclusion and exclusion that uses multiple dimensions in order to understanding and appreciated the extent to which specific factors come together at any given time. Race, ethnicity, gender, age etc. form intersectional strands that supports in depth analysis. <sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> For more information see Yuval-Davis 2005 European Journal of Women's Studies 1350-5068 Vol. 13(3): 193–209;



# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## WHAT WORKS TO PREVENT VAWG PROGRAMME

In 2013, the UK Government's investment of £25,420,000 in the Prevention of Violence Against Women and Girls: Research and Innovation Fund (WW-VAWG), solidified HMG's commitment to prevention of, and bringing an end to, Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG). It set the bar for donor engagement and marked the UK as a brand-leader in the field.

The WW-VAWG Programme (2014-2020) was a UK Department for International Development (DFID) programme implemented in 16 countries across the world. It was intended to build the evidence base on what works to prevent VAWG in low-middle income settings. The programme had the following aims:

- **Impact:** Improved policies and expanded programmes to reduce the prevalence of VAWG and increase the number of women and girls receiving quality prevention and response services in at least 10 DFID priority countries.
- **Outcome:** Improved investment in VAWG policies and programmes across the Global South.

When DFID began work to elaborate a Business Case for WW-VAWG (c. 2011/12), Intimate Partner Violence was not high on the development agenda. But it was a time of change. DFID's commitment in 2012 of £35 million to end Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C) was the first time such significant investment had been made into a "difficult" women's rights issue. The separate WW-VAWG investment thus came at the right time; the moment was right to take action – to build a new, robust evidence base to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of interventions to end VAWG by better understanding what works and why.

To deliver its objectives, the programme had three separate but interrelated components, with learning between them, led by the South Africa Medical Research Council (SA-MRC). The three components all fed into wider goals around reducing poverty and social inequalities, which are known to trigger VAWG (though poverty is not an automatic driver). Component 1 (C1), led by the SA-MRC and housing the programme Secretariat, funded and rigorously evaluated 15 approaches to test new, innovative approaches to prevent VAWG across 12 countries in Africa and Asia. Component 2 (C2), led by the International Rescue Committee (IRC), conducted six in-depth research studies on the drivers, prevalence, trends over time, and effective prevention and response mechanisms for VAWG in conflict and humanitarian emergencies. Component 3 (C3), led by National University of Ireland (NUI) - Galway, tested new methodologies to assess the economic and social costs of VAWG, through three empirical studies.

In the three main Components, the WW-VAWG researchers, implementers and structural pillars (i.e. DFID and organisations representing and advocating for the programme through the Independent Advisory Board [IAB]) represented some of the best-known and well-respected members of the VAWG community globally. This group are well-known for their activism and commitment to promoting positive social change for the benefit of women and girls, based on robust evidence. The voices and findings of the WW-VAWG community sought and found an audience that already trusted their counsel.

## INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OVERVIEW

### Purpose

To support this extensive work, Component 4 provided Independent Evaluation (IE) and fulfilled an accompaniment and mentoring "critical friend" role for the programme. In 2016, IMC Worldwide were commissioned in partnership with the University of Portsmouth (UoP), CommsConsult and CR2

Associates Ltd. to design and deliver the mid-term and final evaluations of the multi-year, DFID-funded WW-VAWG programme between 2016-2020. Supporting accountability throughout the programme has been a core principle of the IE. Through our Inception, Mid Term Report (MTR), Research Uptake Progress Reports (RUPRs), and support to programme adaptation and development we have generated learning on which the programme could act. The purpose of this Final Evaluation (FE) was to:

- Evaluate the **performance** against overall programme outputs and outcomes;
- Assess the **quality** of the research outputs, as this can impinge significantly on uptake;
- Assess to what extent evidence is now being used (in policy and practice) to inform decisions to invest in end-VAWG policies and programmes in the Global South, and to maximise **uptake** (all processes and pathways which contribute to influence and change, and to evidence use).

### Intended Audience and Scope of Influence

There are several target audiences for the evaluation: implementing partners at the secretariat, component, and project level; DFID and the Independent Advisory Board (IAB) of WW-VAWG, country level project advisory groups, and component-specific technical advisory groups; the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) and other accountability bodies; and Potential future co-funders of WW-VAWG, and Research and Evaluation organisations, civil society organisations, and think-tanks.

### Final Evaluation Scope and Evaluation Questions (EQs)

The scope of this FE has been on generating key lessons for the first phase of WW-VAWG. Our Evaluation Questions (EQs) focused on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability, while questions surrounding relevance were addressed in the MTR. Our questions are broadly realist and have a research uptake focus, aiming to cover the full research to impact pathway. Additionally, we consider equity and intersectionality as key, cross-cutting issues across all EQs. We aimed to generate relevant programmatic and operational recommendations for future programming, including shaping the next phase of WW-VAWG. To do this, we reviewed programme research and paths towards research uptake and the eventual outcomes of this work. We also assessed factors which we consider key to the programme's success, but which were given insufficient weight in the original programme logic: innovation, capacity development and partnership. We broadened the view on innovation in the programme to capture: a) creative problem-solving on key issues (capacity development and partnership), and b) new Positive Pathways to Research Uptake (RU) and VAWG prevention.

Our evaluation hypothesis is: *“Good quality research is an essential foundation for Research Uptake, but it is not sufficient to ensure that decisions, policies and programmes will be shaped by evidence”*

## INDEPENDENT EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

### Approach and Realist Evaluation Lens

Our evaluation approach was intersectional, gender-focused, and rights-based. Across all evaluation phases we captured experiences and voices across WW-VAWG, and at all levels, wherever possible, the participants of the interventions. To organise and make sense of the data collected through our work, data was assessed with a realist perspective: concentrating on what is working, where and how. We tracked the programme as an ongoing process rather than intermittently.

### Methods

Our FE took place between August 2019 and February 2020. During this time we undertook a mixed-method approach to data-collection, combining qualitative primary data (key actor interviews, Participatory Interest Group Discussions, observational approaches) and secondary data (document

review and programme monitoring) and political economy analysis across a number of the focus countries. Our IE method consisted of **six** key components:

1. **Evidence and Literature Review:** Of all programme products and other relevant literature and websites. Documents were thematically coded according to the EQs and also in response to issues that repeatedly emerged from the documents. The analysis was triangulated through the Key Actor Interviews (KAIs) and the academic literature reviewed. In addition, we critiqued the WW-VAWG programme's digital platforms, engagement strategies and resulting analytics.
2. **KAIs, Consultations and field-level enquiry:** With stakeholders from all levels, with field-visits in several countries (Nepal, Kenya, South Sudan, Zambia, Ghana, Pakistan and South Africa); and we also attended the Sexual Violence Research Forum (SVRI) in October 2019, where WW-VAWG had a major presence. An earlier evaluation visit was made to Nepal after the 2018 Annual Scientific Meeting (ASM) there which also fed into the FE.
3. **Case Studies to Produce three Thematic Papers:** We used combinations of KAIs, document review, Political Economy Analysis (PEA), and the adapted Research Excellence Framework (REF) to gather evidence for inclusion, each paper had a specific focus and aimed to give a more detailed assessment and analysis than could be presented in the main report – these were: Research, Research Uptake, Innovation, Capacity Development (CD), and Partnership.
4. **Political Economy Analysis –** Included six detailed PEAs (Ghana, Nepal, South Sudan, Pakistan, South Africa, and Zambia). The choice of PEAs was based on potential for Component cross-over, fragility of context, stability of context, and regional representation. The inclusion of PEA as an analysis tool allowed us to measure why uptake may have been more possible in some contexts than others, even when the evidence is at the same robust level.
5. **Adapted Research Excellence and Uptake Framework (REF) –** Developed by the team for the MTR, adapted from an existing REF, to assess WW-VAWG outputs across the research design to impact pathway.
6. **Positive Pathways Analysis (PPA)–** The concept of PPA was introduced at MTR. Since then, WW-VAWG has begun to make its own assessment on pathways which lead towards achievements in VAWG prevention. Positive Pathways Analysis (PPA)<sup>9</sup> has been designed and developed in response to a growing need for a better understanding of effectiveness and VFM in end-VAWG policy and programming. It aims to track progress towards successful RU and social changes, identifying essential, desirable factors for success.

### Communication and Dissemination

Our Communication Strategy set out our understanding of audiences and scope for influence and outlined the types of dissemination products needed: reports, slide deck presentations, and infographics.

### Ethical Approach and Data Protection

Our work is in line with the 'do no harm' protocol in adherence with international best practice and standards, including DFID's latest ethical approach outlined in 'DFID's ethical guidance for research, evaluation and monitoring activities' (2019), and in accordance to DFID's Supplier Code of Conduct. All processes and products have been supervised by University of Portsmouth's Ethics Committee.

## FINDINGS

By gathering evidence from many varied sources, we have triangulated findings and ensured that the voices of different people, across the programme, have been listened to and heard. We have been sure to note the relative power of people whose opinions and experiences we are gathering, and to correlate this with interpretations they give, and their potential biases. There were no unexpected

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<sup>9</sup> Copyright CR2 Associates Ltd.

achievements, other than that the programme exceeded targets set in its log-frame and scored A+s in Annual Reviews. In the FE, we have not rehearsed successes already noted in Annual Reviews and the draft Programme Completion Reports. Instead, we focus on drawing out positives and highlighting opportunities for future improvement.

### Effectiveness

1. **The research methods selected and designed by each Component supported a process of rigorous data collection that has led to world leading evidence.** The global evidence base has grown significantly as a result of WW-VAWG. We now understand more, in terms of the prevalence of VAWG in contexts that have, to date, been invisible in global data. We understand the triggers for VAWG with greater depth, and we understand considerably more about what works to prevent VAWG. As with all good research, the success of the programme can be seen in the new questions that have emerged as a result of solid foundations set by WW-VAWG Phase 1.
2. **The programme has made a game-changing contribution to understanding and research methods for VAWG prevention. It has greatly enhanced the possibilities for effective VAWG research, and implementation, over the coming years.** Research of WW-VAWG has contributed towards better understanding of different forms of violence and their triggers for VAWG, and how best to gather data in different contexts and locations. The findings have supported a deepening of feminist theoretical perspectives on VAWG linking it to social patriarchal norms which has in turn informed prevention activities that the research has proven work. Component 1 has contributed to greater theoretical understanding of masculinities and violence.
3. **The programme has developed and implemented systems and processes to ensure the availability, accessibility and usability of evidence, in a range of ways.** It set up and managed a range of communication platforms that ensured easy access to information about the programme and its findings. The [website](#) has been an effective shop window for multimedia content. C2 tended to use its own distributive networks and platforms. These reflect a focus on humanitarian programming and were designed to reach C2's relevant audiences most effectively. Overall, information has been made accessible in two ways: firstly, by tailoring findings to different target audiences, e.g., through Evidence Briefs, infographics, videos, press articles etc., and secondly, by publishing academic outputs through open access routes.
4. **The programme's systems for monitoring ensured adherence to a number of principles for effectiveness around research uptake.** The programme showed itself to be cognisant of, and responsive to, context in some specific country contexts e.g. where opportunities for influence opened up; where sensitivities around specific findings required a nuanced response to communication; where problematic partnerships became a reputation risk etc.
5. **Across the portfolio of WW-VAWG there are positive and challenging examples of working in partnerships, and in particular across the Global North and South.** The ethos of the programme components, by the mid to end terms, stressed the importance of developing Southern research capacity and supporting national researchers to build their profiles through publications. Owing to the time it takes for new data to be gathered, co-publishing did not begin until a few years into the programme. This meant at the start of the programme we saw a much greater dominance of outputs authored by research leads in the Global North. As partnerships and relationships grew, this picture shifted.
6. **The programme has shaped discourse and attitudes around violence prevention, and influenced both policy and practice in many different dimensions.** It has prompted promises of more investment in research on GBV and informed the architecture of future programming in ways that hold potential for future impact. South Africa, South Sudan and, to a certain extent, Ghana, are examples of this. The evidence has helped DFID to increase its convening power across government and opened doors to talking about social violence more broadly. There was a feeling that C2 work on peace and security (especially in South Sudan)

helped to bring nuance and subtlety to the UK's ongoing work on the National Action Plan on VAWG

7. **The ability to think creatively and innovatively, to address problems as they arose, and to respond to different needs in different contexts, has greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the programme.** The ability to be innovative, to think, and work, “outside the box” is crucial to all development interventions. In recent years, as programmes have worked more explicitly with an adaptation focus, innovation has been viewed in different ways. Innovation is about a combination of drive, motivation and conviction that pushes approaches in such a way that transformation (for example, reduction in violence, increased gender equity), that was previously thought impossible, happens. This is strongly evidenced in the programme.
8. **The architecture of the programme has not been without challenges, but it has allowed the programme to explore different approaches to prevention of VAWG, to gather a wealth of compelling evidence, and to spread information and understanding to a wide audience.** The staggered start-up dates for the different components (C1, C2 and C3), initially made good coordination between components, more challenging. A major advantage of the WW-VAWG design (and its implementation) is that it has allowed the programme to make effective contribution to all the spheres of work now known to promote social change: improvement in the regulatory environment, catalysing action, and focused models showing what works.

#### Efficiency

9. **The governance and management structures have supported VFM, and enabled adequate attention to be devoted to the equity aspects for VFM.** DFID's mandate to reach the poorest and most marginalised people, to fulfil rights and address discrimination, means that issues of equity are fundamental to all development work and VFM analysis. In WW-VAWG, C3 has begun to give us information through which we can understand the costs of VAWG to families, communities, and national economies. Projects in C1 have begun to show that VAWG can be prevented and we now know much more about what it will take to prevent it, and the costs of prevention. C2 has shown the huge social and developmental costs of violence in humanitarian and conflict settings. However, many questions remain, not least the issue of “what price would we ethically and reasonably set on achieving freedom from violence for a woman or a girl?”
10. **Negotiations with DFID allowed for flexibility in the budgets, to meet emerging needs as well as those predicted in early budget planning.** The programme budget was high. The successes of the programme, however, were partly behind programme organisations investing their own time and resources into ensuring that final products were of the best quality. Components generally felt that they had adequate budget to do what they needed to do in terms of their contractual commitments, and that they were allowed considerable levels of fungibility and flexibility. But, programme management organisations also subsidised some late costs. Positively, this willingness to subsidise ensured that final products were of the highest possible quality, and satisfied the rigorous, peer review mechanisms in place. It also indicates successes and sustainability of achievements: organisations generally do not invest resources unless they can see the benefits in terms of tangible results. In a sense this “spontaneous” investment shows the extent to which prevent-VAWG initiatives are now embedded within organisations.
11. **Across the programme, the ability to develop good, working partnerships, between research institutions and implementers has been vital.** When a research institution is in the country of operations and/or senior researchers spend considerable time in the context of work, VFM is improved. In future work, synergies will be increased by extending relationships with other organisations/programmes working in the area. The benefits of an ethical commitment to working in equal partnership have been demonstrated. Where partnerships have been less-well developed, it can lead to lack of clarity over the purpose and end use of research data.



## Sustainability

12. **At this stage, close to the programme end, it is hard to judge reliably whether gains made will be sustained over the longer term.** More will be known in 2-3 years if the planned follow-up visits are made to test the level to which positive change has been sustained. In Tajikistan, follow-up at 30 months (15 months after the end of implementation) show that changes have been maintained over this period. However, this is not long enough to indicate prolonged social change away from violence. Some contexts and societies are more likely to sustain positive change than others. In some places, for example Rwanda, experiences from other programmes suggest that there is a good deal of community support to maintain change.
13. **Innovation has been essential across the work of the programme. The ability to be innovative, and to use creative approaches to problem-solving, has been critical to optimising possibilities for sustainability of achievements.** Programme components have developed ways in which to work with women and girls in exceptionally difficult circumstances. The projects have been able to encourage and maintain participation by people who might not normally sustain their interest in project activities, including those who are poorest and most marginalised (for example, those living with a disability).

## Impact

14. **Generating impact outside of the WW-VAWG community within the timeframe of the programme was an impossible ask.** C1, however, feels it has had impact on Spotlight, RESPECT and UNTF which lie outside of the programme. In a small sample of interviews with researchers working on VAWG but not part of the WW-VAWG programme, it is clear that the programme has had impact, such as a body of work that now must be referred to.
15. **The programme's RU strategy was a useful tool in guiding and informing the actions of the programme, but it was not the primary driver of its success in achieving RU and Impact.** Each of the separately contracted components generated a RU strategy which reflected the contexts in which they were working, their institutional capacities and experience of uptake, and – to a limited extent - the nature of the research they were undertaking. These were aligned with the global RU Strategy that was endorsed by the IAB in September 2017.

## LEARNING

The lessons given here are relevant to many different stakeholders working to prevent VAWG, including policymakers, decision-makers, practitioners – researchers / implementers – and those who audit them.

1. **Prevention of VAWG is possible:** Evidence that VAWG can be prevented is not simply a question of demonstrating a decrease in the prevalence or incidence of VAWG (in absolute terms, or in terms of intensity). It is also an issue of whether a critical number of decision-makers and practitioners can be shown to have the commitment to make change *and* make it happen. The learning from randomised control trials (RCTs) and qualitative enquiries coming out of WW-VAWG points to successes, yet rates of decrease in violence vary widely from place to place, with highs of 55%+ reported from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Ghana, and more modest figures from Nepal, Zambia and South Africa (20-30%).
2. **Knowing and understanding the context of WW-VAWG is crucial to developing the right approaches:** For example, work carried out with and through religious leaders in DRC would not be appropriate in some other countries where religion shapes more conservative gender values that in turn impact on political systems. Importantly, whilst we know that VAWG can be prevented, we still do not know how equal the positive impact of interventions may be and why they might work. WW-VAWG 2 needs to be designed and developed to help answer these questions.
3. **Good quality research is an essential foundation for research uptake, but is not sufficient to ensure that decisions, policies and programmes will be shaped by evidence. Positive Pathways towards change are never linear or simple:** Our hypothesis was correct: there is

good evidence of prevention coming from work across the WW-VAWG programme, but it takes more than this to kick evidence into action. WW-VAWG is not an advocacy programme that is informed by evidence, rather, it is a research programme with ambitions to influence policy. For sustained social change, evidence from research must be connected with and used by others, such as activists, movements, women's organisations, as ammunition for advocacy. Evidence is not enough.

4. **Investment in people is needed from the outset of the programme - assumptions about the capacities of organisations and their personnel are often misguided:** An extended Inception period, based on co-creation, and building in adaptive management systems throughout the programme, would have been highly valuable. We believe this is an approach that will be beneficial in any future WW-VAWG programming. The approach taken to developing capacity was smart, and was tailored to the particular needs of the organisations involved. The mentoring approach (where Technical Advisors (TAs) supported organisations) generally worked well.
5. **The gains from Annual Scientific Meetings (ASM) and Learning Events far outweigh the costs of staging them:** A further key learning related to capacity development is the success of the ASMs and the immediately preceding capacity development workshops for project practitioners. The outcome of these workshops and meetings far exceeded what had been hoped for. Participants found them highly enjoyable and important forums for learning, sharing and caring. Crucially, they offered excellent opportunities for practitioners to present alongside researchers, and to share information and experiences, and allowed for a wide range of stakeholders to meet on an equal footing.
6. **Contract all major components at the same time, when the aim is to build synergies between components in a programme, and to make the “whole greater than the sum of the parts”:** Early co-ordination between the programme components were not optimal because of the staggered approach to contracting. All components were fully employed in undertaking their own work, and the C1 Secretariat mandate to promote coordination was not, at first, strong enough to encourage full coordination and synergies. Around the time of MTR, this situation changed, and co-ordination became much stronger. It is worth the resources (and potential difficulties) of contracting all major components at the same time. Design of multi-component programmes with potential coordination synergies, and harmonisation of components in mind, and embed requirements, resources and possibilities for coordination, is needed from the tendering stage. The best coordination cannot be achieved without a strong understanding of programmatic requirements and an awareness across all organisations that the effort of coordinating will bring benefit.
7. **Contract high quality research, using mixed-methods and building partnerships between researchers and implementers, offers the greatest chances for uptake:** WW-VAWG has shown that RCTs can generate high-quality, scientific evidence that carries policy clout, but only when accompanied by a range of qualitative methods, woven through the process from the start. Qualitative research is essential and needs to be properly budgeted for, undertaken, and used to support the orientation and design of the research methods. Positive equitable partnerships are essential for the generation of rigorous research data and for the analysis of it. An action-led approach to managing research relationships and assessing capacity needs can ensure a consistently inclusive approach. This involves using local knowledge for the contextualisation of the research. Where possible, senior Global South n researchers should be used in order to drive contextual understanding, and ensure research quality. In addition, when interventions have been proven to work through research, this needs information to be made available as an open access global good. Qualitative approaches and mixed methods are critically important to learning, and to providing nuanced understanding in different contexts.
8. **Existing indicators on prevention and reduction of VAWG are relevant and meaningful. But do they adequately capture the process of VAWG prevention from women's perspectives?:** Existing indicators on violence reduction and inter-partner well-being have been

very helpful in offering a framework by which to measure reduction in VAWG. Nevertheless, they are not always easy to use in social enquiry, and they may elicit different answers (to similar questions) depending on whether it is a woman or a man who is being consulted. For example, we need to take into account the fact that staying in a violent relationship often seems like a lesser risk to women than leaving it does. Yet, whilst still experiencing violence, women may also be building their own resilience, and developing the agency, self-esteem and skills that will allow them to get free of violence, if they choose to, in the longer term. This process takes time, and will not show up in end-of-project, quantitative questionnaires. We need rigorous, qualitative and participatory studies, over time and reaching meaningful numbers of women and men, to allow us to understand women's experiences in gradually moving away from violence.

9. **Innovation is a way of thinking and operating. It will always be needed in all work to stimulate change in social norms and social change. Donors need to be encouraged to understand the ongoing benefits of innovation:** WW-VAWG has provided a great deal of learning in relation to VAWG on all aspects of the innovation statement above. In meeting challenges, working to adapt VAWG-prevention approaches needs to be ongoing and responsive to context. Donors tend to be risk averse and may feel uncomfortable with too much innovation as the risks seem too great. But, innovation permeates all aspects of the programme from its original design through to results, and this is needed. Especially when addressing highly sensitive, yet entrenched, social norms, values and practices – the ability to be flexible, to adapt to changing circumstances and to find creative solutions to problems, as they arise, is vital. The ability to work for and *maintain* achievements, depends, at least in part, on thinking and acting innovatively in response to dynamic contexts and circumstances. There must be flexibility *within* the approach, as well as adaptations and innovations to make it appropriate to peoples, groups, and communities in differing circumstances, and from different backgrounds.
10. **Prevention of VAWG is about Social Change. Change in social norms and behaviours are steps along the way, but are they enough for achievements to be sustained?:** Experience in other programmes, dealing with aspects of VAWG, suggest that the deep, social change is essential if women and girls are to be protected in the longer-term against violence. For example, it is relatively 'easy' to promote short-term change away from FGM/C – with communities declaring against it and avoiding cutting during the usual 'cutting season'. It is quite another problem to ensure that people do not find other times, places and ways to cut their girls, or revert to cutting in the following year's ceremonies. A learning is that, if we are to identify the most cost-effective and sustained routes to VAWG-prevention at programme level, we cannot make our judgements only by short-term, or even short-to-medium term, successes or the lowest cost options. We need to look at the triggers which "trip up" success and lead to renewed violence.
11. **Success in short-scale (five year) programmes may rely heavily on reputational assets:** Five years is, in principle, too short a time for any programme as complex and ambitious as WW-VAWG to generate robust evidence and bring about change that is visible. Yet, the programme has managed this. The programme has achieved impressive outcomes, at least partly because of the pre-existing reputation of the people involved and the networks, credibility, and reputation that they brought with them. These 'reputational assets' are often underestimated in the design and configuration of a programme but are important factors in whether and how it achieves visibility, engagement, and traction around evidence generated.
12. **Success reading across components to find thematic evidence and learning is a specialised and vital task:** The job of 'reading across' the raft of different projects, to identify thematic evidence and lessons learnt, needs to be done from the outset to optimise lessons for others and internal learning. The field of whom to engage with will change over time, as will the range of products which will attract their interest. This approach needs to be part of programme DNA. The reading across needs to complement, but also go beyond identification of synthesis products.



## CONCLUSIONS

1. **The Time is Now.** WW-VAWG happened at the right moment: a time when global attention was finally turning towards prevention and ending of VAWG. But, through its work, it also helped to further create and sustain that moment, and is ensuring that end-VAWG efforts remain on the agenda and gain greater support from governments and people across the globe.
2. **WW-VAWG set the bar for donor engagement in VAWG prevention and marked DFID-UK, and the UK Government, as brand leaders in the field.** The investment of £25,420,000 in the Prevention of Violence Against Women and Girls: Research and Innovation Fund (WW-VAWG) in 2013, solidified UK government's commitment to prevention of, and bringing an end to, violence against women and girls.
3. **WW\_VAWG has attracted, and benefited from engagement of some of the best-known and well-respected members of the VAWG community, globally.** The WW-VAWG researchers, implementers and structural pillars (i.e. DFID and organisations representing and advocating for the programme through the Independent Advisory Board (IAB)) are well-known for their activism and commitment to promoting positive social change for the benefit of women and girls, based on robust evidence.
4. **At MTR, our assessment was that WW-VAWG was on-track to be a “game-changer” and to change the face of VAWG-prevention.** It has done this. Although WW-VAWG is still best known within the VAWG-prevention sphere, its influence continues to grow and to spread more widely. WW-VAWG has strong reputational assets, which is largely down to the work and dedication, not only of the programme management within component partners, but also to the strong champions among DFID management, who have supported the programme throughout.
5. **For a start-up complex, multi-component programme, WW-VAWG has done well to ‘get the message out there’.** The programme has significantly expanded the range of influence, bringing VAWG to the attention of governments and people which, and who, previously chose to ignore it. It could have done more, but it did reach into the population of people who did not even know that the moment to address VAWG was coming.
6. **DFID and the IAB played an important role as broker, champion, advocate, and facilitator for the work across key influence targets such as UN agencies, World Bank (WB), DFID and HMG more broadly.** Individuals were asked to play strategic roles as brokers / advocates for WW-VAWG in their respective organisations, and they played these roles actively and effectively in a way that raised both the profile and credibility of programme evidence and contributed to influence outcomes.
7. **In spite of the many gains of WW-VAWG, there will, undoubtedly, be losses in a next phase and in future work.** In whatever form a new phase of WW-VAWG rolls out, there will be losses. The bidding process, and the development of new consortia and partnerships, mean that some people who have been key to the success of Phase 1, will be left out of the WW-VAWG Community of Practice. Any new phase will need to build in structures, systems, and mechanisms to mitigate against this loss. We need to ensure that there is no lapse in the progress generated by Phase 1 and that the momentum continues to grow.

## PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS

Our recommendations are directed at DFID, other donors, programmers, researchers at all levels, and at the designers *and* implementers of interventions. They offer a portfolio of key recommendations, at high level to inform programming of future VAWG-prevention work.

1. **Ensure that all programming takes a rights and gender based approach and that, where possible, partners are already embedded in this way of operating.** To increase the rights and gender perspective, we recommend increasing the meaningful involvement of women's organisations— especially in the countries where work takes place. Currently, however, not all women's organisations work in a fully gendered and rights-based way. This issue needs to be

factored into capacity development strategies when it is considered to be cost-effective and likely to stimulate better results.

2. **Embed VAWG prevention in all relevant sectors.** VAWG prevention needs to be an intrinsic part of all policy and programming in a full range of sectors. We have been working to mainstream gender throughout development for over three decades, and we have still not (fully) succeeded. The only way we can hope for more success in terms of VAWG prevention, is to make sure we seize the moment and refuse to let VAWG slip from the political and development agenda. We now have the evidence, from the education sector and economic sector approaches to convince governments and sector departments to embed VAWG-prevention across the board. This is one area where the active involvement of women's organisations is critical: building the voice to kick-start political commitment to change.
3. **In a multi-component programme, build in requirements for, and possibilities of, strong coordination between all components, from the design stage.** We need to recognise that good coordination leads to synergies, which leads to stronger results. Coordination is driven by incentives: immediate or anticipated benefits for those who actively coordinate and collaborate. Good coordination takes dedicated time, resources and budgets. It needs to be mandated in programme concepts and earliest planning, and be required from the outset. It also tends to work best when someone is given the specific role of promoting coordination. The coordinator role does need someone who will be trusted and respected by all.
4. **Future programmes wishing to capitalise on all reputational assets, should be sure to draw also on the "social capital" of their stakeholders at all levels.** Programmes need to provide opportunity for everyone to play their full part – for VFM reasons, if nothing else. The programme drew on an impressive community of Southern researchers, implementers and activists, who became committed over time to the WW-VAWG 'family' and its mission. The knowledge of context of these actors, as well as their capabilities as researchers, policy entrepreneurs and advocates, was not always used to its full extent. This was sometimes contractual, with prominent academics feeling they were being used 'only' as data gatherers. Sometimes it was intentional, with local staff not having the time or interest in being involved in RU activities that they felt were 'beyond their mandate'. It was also sometimes practical: the programme did not have enough money to utilise everyone to their full potential.
5. **In future programme design, build on Phase 1; do not abandon Phase 1 partners.** It is unfortunately the case that many small implementing organisations are heavily reliant on single funding sources to survive. In future work, it is not possible, or desirable, to continue funding to all Phase 1 implementing organisations. But, there are other ways to involve them in continued learning, sharing and mentoring of new implementing partners. A balance needs to be found between operating in the manner of many UN agencies and working only with new organisations, which may have little experience in the field. It is not indicative of an ethical approach if organisations "go under" post-funding. This was nearly the case in South Africa before the South African Government's decision to roll-out Stepping Stones-Creating Futures.
6. **Find out more about what drives successful, ethical scale-up and scale-out. An extended Inception period, based on co-creation, and building in adaptive management systems throughout the programme will be highly valuable in any future WW-VAWG programming.** There will be demands for future programming to scale-up approaches that have worked in Phase 1, and to encourage government financial commitments to this. There have been at least 20 instances of scale up that have been claimed by C1. The issue is that we still do not know enough about what, when, why, where, how, and with whom, to work for scale-up. If they commit at all, governments (and donors) will always try to go to scale as cheaply as possible. But, we need to set strong ethical boundaries and to ensure that we fully understand how to scale up initiatives that have worked well with smaller constituencies. We cannot make compromises that may endanger people's rights and safety. Some things are easier to scale than others (though none are easy).

7. **Do more to promote reciprocal learning between the Global South and the North, and to intensify Southern ownership and authorship of research.** All components felt that there is more to be done in future in ensuring that learning is not just a North-South process, but that there are adequate resources for intensified South-South learning and for research agendas driven by the South (C2). We fully agree with this assessment. To achieve this, DFID and other donors need to commit to a capacity development approach, particularly in complex operational environments. This includes encouraging the elaboration of realistic capacity development approaches and budgets from the tendering stage onwards. Linking capacity development from the outset *directly* to desired outputs and outcomes, which explicitly include Southern ownership of research agendas, could make this acceptable to funders.
8. **Ensure that RU is part of the DNA of any programme.** RU is not simply something that happens after research has been done. An RU lens needs to inform all planning and implementation. In programmes, we need to think more broadly from the start about what RU is and what it can do. WW-VAWG programme documentation has included concerns that RU, if carried out too early, will raise false expectations and hopes when there is nothing yet to offer. But, this overlooks the fact that RU happens at all levels and in different ways. It needs to be an on-going part of programme logic of Theory of Change (ToCs) and Logframes. It is a means to achieving many different results. RU needs to be part of the research process, not a reaction to it.
9. **Make more use of in-country Research Institutions, or those willing to invest fully in person-time in-country and building relationships of trust with implementers.** In WW-VAWG the best researcher-implementer relationships came when the research institution was either located in-country, or when researchers spent extended lengths of time in-country and got to know the context well. Conversely, distance or lack of in-country time, led to more difficult relationships. We recommend that in future work, national research institutes be used or, at the very least, a requirement made for in-country researcher time. We also recommend that 'local knowledge' is used actively in the design of research. We would expect, by now, that participatory design of implementation projects is carried out as Standard Operating Procedure (SOP).
10. **Always follow standard good practice in relation to qualitative and participatory research.** Making the best use of qualitative research does not detract from the importance of high-quality quantitative research. But, as we have discussed, we will never be able to programme correctly or understand our results if we do not have a nuanced and qualitative understanding of people, processes, and products. Resources need to be invested in getting qualitative research embedded as a SOP. Formative qualitative research needs to be done in the area of programme operation. Qualitative research needs to be done with rigour *before* other work, and to inform development of quantitative research. It needs to be undertaken *during the lifetime* of the intervention, and also *after* it is completed. Mixed research methods should always be used, not just in terms of quantitative and qualitative research, but also in the *types* of qualitative research. For example, longitudinal ethnographic work can be combined with participatory action research with meaningful numbers of people. It should not be a 'tack-on'. A rigorous approach to qualitative research is cost-effective and need not be resource-heavy.
11. **Make better use of Digital Platforms:** Evidence provides facts with which to challenge norms around VAWG, but conversation is the mechanism by which to persuade, advocate, and build a common cause around it. Digital communication is a powerful tool to reach audiences that are not directly known and cannot be easily mapped, and engage these audiences in conversation. Purposeful use of digital platforms is a VFM approach that can play an important role in influencing discourse and framing global debates. It showcases evidence; raises the profile of researchers and implementers; and has potential to 'ride the coattails' of important media events around global issues in a way that builds reputation and brings nuanced evidence to debates.
12. **Expand the type of indicators used to assess progress towards VAWG prevention.** More, good quality, participatory qualitative research will give us a more nuanced understanding of the

process by which VAWG is reduced and ended. We need to give space to greater understanding of how, why, and when women develop the kind of agency that enables them to choose not to put up with violence. This can enable us to develop new sets of indicators, which can follow women's positive pathways to empowerment and being violence-free.

- 13. Continue to identify and assess Positive Pathways to the prevention of, and ending VAWG.** In WW-VAWG we built on previous experience and understanding and learned a great deal about what it will take to prevent and end VAWG, particularly IPV. But this is only the beginning. We have not yet been able to identify as much as we would have liked to about the Positive Pathways that lead to prevention. We know much more about the factors that are needed within implementation projects, but it will take another phase to get close to full confidence in how to: (I) programme; (II) bring programming to scale; and (III) encourage governments to work for VAWG prevention as a matter of everyday business.

# 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

## 1.1 OVERVIEW OF THE EVALUATION

This report comprises the Final Evaluation (FE) Report of the multi-year DFID-funded What Works to Prevent Violence Against Women and Girls (WW-VAWG) Research and Innovation Fund. The IE phase began in August 2019 and ended in February 2020.

The IE itself builds on our Inception Report (December 2016), Revised Mid-Term Review (MTR) Report (May 2017), six-monthly Research Uptake Progress Reports (RUPRs)<sup>10</sup>, team visits to the Secretariat and project-level in South Africa, Zambia, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Kenya, and South Sudan as well as a series of remote Key Actor Interviews (KAIs), political economy analysis (PEA), and document reviews. The revised DFID Terms of Reference (ToR) can be found in **Annex 1**.

**‘The task of the independent evaluation team is to assess to what extent that evidence is being *used* to inform decisions to invest in VAWG policies and programmes in the global south.’**

Evaluation ToR, DFID Nov 2016

### Report Structure

This IE report is broken down into several sections. A short description for each is set out below in **Figure 1**.

**Figure 1: Report Structure**

Section	Description
<b>Section One</b>	Introduces the WW-VAWG Programme and the IMC-led Performance Evaluation in the current context.
<b>Section Two</b>	Sets out our approach and methodology that were used for this final performance evaluation. Key activities are described along with a reflection on our limitations.
<b>Section Three</b>	Provides our key findings and analysis for the evaluation. Findings are analysed and organised according to the five OECD-DAC evaluation criteria, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, with equity issues running throughout. Relevance was addressed at the Mid-Term Review.
<b>Section Four</b>	Outlines our communication and dissemination approach, including our Use and Influence Plan.
<b>Section Five</b>	Draws together our learning over the past three years, evaluating the WW-VAWG programme, as well as providing key recommendations for future DFID programming.
<b>Thematic Papers</b>	Three stand-alone papers were developed as part of the Final Performance Evaluation, these focused on Research, Research Uptake, and Innovation on the programme.
<b>Annexes</b>	Provides the annexes that will be relevant for the audience of this report, including, but not limited to, the Revised ToRs, key actors and documents consulted.

<sup>10</sup> Please see our Inception Report (2017), MTR (2017) and the RUPRs (2017, 2018 and 2019) for more details on the purpose, methods and findings for each.

## 1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE PROGRAMME

The WW-VAWG Programme (2014-2020) is a Department for International Development (DFID) programme implemented in 16 countries across the world. It is intended to build the evidence base on what works to prevent VAWG in low-middle income settings. The programme had the following aims:

- **Impact:** Improved policies and expanded programmes to reduce the prevalence of VAWG and increase the number of women and girls receiving quality prevention and response services in at least 10 DFID priority countries.
- **Outcome:** Improved investment in VAWG policies and programmes across the Global South.

The delivery of these objectives were carried out through three separate but interrelated components, with learning between them led by the South Africa Medical Research Council (SA MRC). The three components all fed into wider goals around reducing poverty and social inequalities, which are known to trigger VAWG (though poverty is not an automatic driver). **Figure 2** below gives a description of each of the programme components.

**Figure 2: WW-VAWG Programme Components**

Component	Description	Budget
<b>Component 1 (C1)</b>	Prevention of VAWG led by SA MRC which funds and rigorously evaluates 15 approaches to test new, innovative approaches to prevent VAWG across 12 countries in Africa and Asia, plus conducting research on VAWG and disability, and costing studies to generate evidence on the VFM of VAWG prevention programming. SA MRC also serves as the Secretariat for the overall programme to ensure coordination and synergy between components.	£18 million
<b>Component 2 (C2)</b>	VAWG in conflict and humanitarian emergencies, led by International Rescue Committee (IRC) to conduct in-depth research studies on the drivers, prevalence, trends over time, and effective prevention and response mechanisms for VAWG in conflict and humanitarian emergencies. The work comprised six research projects: South Sudan, Kenya, the Philippines, a study on state-building and peacebuilding (Nepal, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan), and one other research study on the impact of cash transfer programming on women's protection outcomes in acute emergencies.	£5.1 million
<b>Component 3 (C3)</b>	Economic and social costs of VAWG in developing countries led by National University of Ireland (NUI), Galway. This component tested new methodologies to assess the economic and social costs of VAWG, through three empirical studies in South Sudan, Ghana and Pakistan, and was expected to create synergies with C1 and C2.	£1.8 million

To support this DFID commissioned our consortium to undertake an independent performance evaluation of all three components of the WW-VAWG programme.

Component	Description	Budget
<b>Component 4 (C4)</b>	Mid-term and end-term FE led by IMC Worldwide, with consortium partners University of Portsmouth, Comms Consult and CR2 Associates.	Under £400k

	This component includes an accompaniment and mentoring role, including support to refine the ToC and Logframe, and in the definition of approaches to RU, as well as an annual check-in with implementing partners on how their Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) systems to capture research uptake are operating.	
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### 1.3 PURPOSE OF THE INDEPENDENT EVALUATION

In line with our original technical proposal, the MTR and Research Uptake Progress Reports (RUPRs), generating accountability and actionable learning have remained the core principles of this FE, the purpose of which is to:

- Evaluate the programme's **performance** against the overall programme outputs and outcomes at the mid-term and end of the programme;
- Assess the **quality** of the research outputs, as this can impinge significantly on uptake;
- Assess to what extent evidence is being used to inform decisions to invest in end-VAWG policies and programmes in the Global South, and to maximise **uptake**.

The evaluation team understands there to be a distinction between 'evidence being used in policy and practice' to mean the explicit, visible and instrumental use of evidence in policy and practice, whereas research uptake includes all of the intermediary processes and pathways that contribute to these broader changes. This includes influencing discourse; challenging attitudes and practice etc. The timing of this evaluation has strengthened the utility of the evaluation, as outlined in more detail in **Figure 3** below.

**Figure 3: Timings of Outputs that Strengthen the Utility of the Evaluation**

Evaluation Output	Timing	Strengthening Utility of the Evaluation
<b>Inception Report</b>	Dec 2016	The Inception Report was completed in three months to allow the team to move onto conducting the MTR.
<b>Revised Mid-Term Review</b>	May 2017	The MTR was conducted under a compressed timeframe at the request of DFID (Mar 2017), whilst this did limit the field-work possible, it provided programme utility as it ensured DFID had information to inform their Annual Review, as well as future programme design.
<b>RUPRs</b>	Oct 2017, Oct 2018 and April 2019	The Research Uptake Progress Reports were timed to align with key deliverables and publications coming out of the WW-VAWG Programme.
<b>Final Evaluation Report</b>	Feb 2020	The timing of the final evaluation was amended to align appropriately with the end of the programme implementation and the submission of the final project completion reports, ensuring the evaluation covered the entirety of the programme.

#### 1.3.1 The Core Evaluation Team

In 2016, IMC Worldwide were commissioned in partnership with the University of Portsmouth (UoP), CommsConsult and CR2 Associates Ltd. to design and deliver the mid-term and final evaluations of the multi-year, DFID-funded WW-VAWG programme<sup>11</sup> between September 2016 and March 2020.

The core evaluation team consists of Dr Sheena Crawford (Team Leader – IMC/CR2 Associates), Professor Tamsin Bradley (Research Lead – UoP), Megan Lloyd-Laney (Research Uptake Lead – Comms Consult). The evaluation is managed by IMC Worldwide, with Bryony Everett as Technical Director, and Lauren Atherton, as Evaluation Manager and Research Support. IMC has assembled a team of technical and research specialists to assist the core team, including Catherine Lowery (Quality Assurance Lead- IMC). The full team is outlined in **Annex 6**.

### 1.3.2 Revisions to the TOR

A number of revisions to the ToR were agreed over the course of the evaluation, these include:

- **Timing of the FE:** The original IE was due in July 2019, however, as the programme implementations were extended, DFID extended the evaluation deadline to 31<sup>st</sup> January 2020. This was later extended to February 2020 due to the extensions given for the draft final programme completion reports. This allowed the team appropriate time to feed in lessons from the final project completion reports.
- **Refocused Evaluation Questions (EQs):** The team revised the evaluation questions to ensure that they would sufficiently drive the gathering of comprehensive data proving a nuanced and in depth picture of the achievements of WW-VAWG as well as the challenges, short comings and lessons learnt. Questions relating to relevance were not included as it was felt (by the team and DFID) that this was thoroughly demonstrated and evidenced at the MTR.
- **Deepening of the Research Uptake (RU) Lens:** It was agreed that RU activities would receive deeper attention than was previously anticipated. As such, this end-term evaluation will closely evaluate the programme's achievements at outcome level (including RU) and will examine any emerging trends towards RU impact.
- **Value for Money Approach (VFM):** The ToR set out a few, top-line VFM points in the draft evaluation questions. This report will focus on VFM from a largely efficiency perspective, rather than an in-depth budgetary analysis as it is difficult to source figures on the Payment by Results (PbR) elements.
- **From Case Studies to Thematic Papers:** It was initially planned that the final evaluation would include up to six individual case studies that each focused on one country and illustrated the specific conditions for successful uptake. At the MTR it was agreed to shift the focus to producing a smaller number of thematic studies that would better demonstrate the programme's progress in developing the What Works (WW)'s approach to innovation, research, and research uptake across a range of countries. These three Thematic Papers will draw on the initial research and country visits conducted in Pakistan, Kenya (Dadaab) and South Africa for the MTR. They will build further by the inclusion of additional country examples: South Sudan, Ghana, Zambia, and Nepal during the IE phase. The thematic approach means the review can present a much more detailed analysis of the impact the whole programme has had across levels from national to global.

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<sup>11</sup> Hereafter, the WW-VAWG Programme.



### 1.3.3 Intended Audience and Scope of Influence

To increase accountability, ensure wide lesson learning, and strengthen future WW-VAWG programming, there are several target audiences for the evaluation:

- WW-VAWG implementing partners at the secretariat, component, and project level;
- DFID and the Independent Advisory Board (IAB) of WW-VAWG, country level project advisory groups, and component-specific technical advisory groups;
- Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) and other accountability bodies;
- Potential future co-funders of WW-VAWG, and Research and Evaluation organisations, civil society organisations, and think-tanks.

### 1.3.4 Core Final Evaluation Activities

The core Final Evaluation activities are noted in **Figure 4** below.

**Figure 4: Core Activities of our Final Evaluation**

Timeline	Core Activity	Activities
<b>Aug 2019 - Jan 2020</b>	Key Actor Interviews (KAIs) and Consultations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Scheduling and undertaking of KAIs</li> <li>• Discussions held with DFID, WW-VAWG Secretariat and Component Staff, as well as Project Level Staff across our six focus countries.<sup>12</sup></li> </ul>
<b>Ongoing</b>	Engagement with WW-VAWG Secretariat and DFID and	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ongoing contact with DFID and WW-VAWG Component Representatives.</li> <li>• Core evaluation team attending Management Committee Meetings.</li> <li>• Final evaluation planning meeting with DFID in July 2019.</li> </ul>
<b>Ongoing</b>	Review of Academic Outputs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• REF assessment table developed and kept up to date as academic outputs emerged.</li> </ul>
<b>Apr 2019</b>	In-Person Team Workshop	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Final evaluation planning meeting to design EQ's for the review and agree approach and methods.</li> </ul>
<b>August 2018 – May 2019</b>	RUPRs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Last ones conducted in Aug 2018 and Mar 2019</li> </ul>
<b>Nov 2019</b>	SVRI Conference	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Evaluation Team Leader attended the Sexual Violence Research initiative (SVRI) Conference in Cape Town.</li> </ul>
<b>Dec 2019</b>	3-Day Team Planning Workshop	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sharing initial findings across the team in a Workshop at the UoP.</li> <li>• Finalised the Report Contents.</li> <li>• Planning for the upcoming months.</li> </ul>
<b>Jan 2020</b>	Review WW-VAWG Uptake	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Website Audit.</li> </ul>
<b>Jan 2020</b>	Document Review and PEAs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inventory of all available programme management/M&amp;E documents, quarterly and annual reports.</li> <li>• PEAs undertaken based on literature review.</li> </ul>

<sup>12</sup> See **Annex 4** for list of key actors consulted / interviewed.

<b>Feb 2020</b>	2-Day Final Write-Shop	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Finalising write-up of the IE Report with the core evaluation team at the UoP.</li> </ul>
<b>Mar 2020</b>	Final Dissemination Events	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evaluation team attended and took part in three final dissemination events held in London.</li> </ul>

## 1.4 BACKGROUND TO THE WW-VAWG PROGRAMME

This Section situates the WW-VAWG programme within the wider context of VAWG. It looks at the current end-VAWG environment and situates the programme within the DFID development agenda. This is followed by an outline of the programme itself.

### “The Time is Now”

When DFID began work to elaborate a Business Case for WW-VAWG (c. 2011/12), IPV was not high on the development agenda. Attention, on women’s rights, health and well-being was largely around planned parenting and safe motherhoods and building global commitment to ending FGM/C and child marriage<sup>13</sup>. But, it was a time of change. DFID’s commitment in 2012, of £35 million to end FGM/C was the first time such significant investment had been made into a “difficult” women’s rights issue. The investment of £25,420,000 in the Prevention of Violence Against Women and Girls: Research and Innovation Fund (WW-VAWG) in 2013 solidified UK government’s commitment to prevention of, and bringing an end to, violence against women and girls. Alongside UK commitments to ending Modern Slavery<sup>14</sup>, it set the bar for donor engagement and marked the UK as a brand-leader in the field.

The WW-VAWG programme was definitely *in the moment* when, globally, the moment was right to get action from citizens and some governments to work to prevent VAWG. WW-VAWG seized this moment, but it also helped to create the impetus and dynamism to ensure that prevention of VAWG has stayed on the agenda. The evidence which WW-VAWG has generated and, now the uptake which is beginning to build on that evidence, are significantly changing the field of VAWG prevention. As this Final Evaluation report will show, WW-VAWG has contributed greatly to the contention, stamped out in the strapline for the November 2019 Sexual Violence Research Initiative (SVRI) conference in Cape Town, South Africa: “The Time is Now”, to work together and make an end to violence against women, a real possibility.

## 1.5 OPERATING CONTEXT AND POLITICAL ECONOMY

What Works to end Violence against Women Girls was firstly designed in order to trigger a new robust evidence base to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of interventions to end VAWG by understanding better what works and why. Secondly, to generate greater understanding into the drivers of VAWG (in particular this was the remit of C1) in contexts so far not studied in VAWG research, and in order to gain critical global knowledge on the extent of the issue. Lastly, to produce approaches and models to leverage greater policy and donor commitment to resourcing end VAWG activities. Arguably each of the three components contributed, to differing degrees, to these areas. The activities of each component need to be contextualised within the global VAWG context and then the specific countries they worked in, which this section intends to do.

<sup>13</sup> See, for example, the DFID-funded programmes on these, the work of UNICEF and, later, the Girl Summit, in London, in 2014

<sup>14</sup> <https://www.globalslaveryindex.org/resources/downloads/>

This section provides an overview of the operating context to the WW-VAWG programme. Using the ecology model<sup>15</sup>, we have undertaken a PEA in Nepal, Pakistan, Ghana, South Africa, Zambia and South Sudan. The PEAs form a background document which served to orientate the evaluation team supporting the assessment and mapping of WW-VAWG activities (see **Annex 8**).

### 1.5.1 Overview of Approaches to Ending Violence

This moment in history feels particularly important for end VAWG programming with the visibility of global campaigns such as #MeToo and 16 days of activism, the momentum to really drive change feels real and more sustainable than at any point in the past. With that said, the translation of this 'moment' into practical transformation in countries with exceptionally high prevalence rates is dependent on the specifics of that context.

#### Operationalising Gender in VAWG Programming

Part of the impact of global campaigns is the mainstreaming of not just a gender lens but also a VAWG one in order to really drive the deep structural change needed to end VAWG.

Interventions to prevent and end VAWG are informed by a set of theoretical approaches that link gendered power dynamics to household and community relationships. Gender mainstreaming as an approach in development has been around since the 1980s and was, at its inception, heralded as a way to understand and respond to social inequalities. The term outlines an approach to achieving gender equality. It is a process to ensure that actions within and across different sectors are taken to promote gender equality.<sup>16</sup>

Gender is now broadly considered to be a necessary part of the design of all development programmes, as well as the monitoring and evaluation of them, but the extent to which 'mainstreaming' truly happens is questionable<sup>17</sup>. Whether gender is now mainstreamed or not, gendered violence persists. Feminist theory has enabled us to understand how gender relations and the power that weaves through them legitimises VAWG. Feminist models to explain VAWG go back to the late 1970's<sup>18</sup> and focus on patriarchy as the foundations for male oppression of women. The term the 'personal is the political' was used to emphasise the need to address VAWG (and specifically IPV) at the level of policy and not see it as a private domestic matter. Policy and legal remedies have been used as mechanisms to make violence public.<sup>19</sup> Walker, in 1979, stated that no single route was adequate in responding and ending VAWG, instead a multi-level systematic approach was needed. This approach should combine legal responses with safe exit options and campaigns to challenge the gender stereotypes that render women submissive and inferior to men.<sup>20</sup> Logically, a gendered perspective is fundamental to VAWG programming both to inform design and also to monitor structural shifts in patterns of inequality. The WW-VAWG programme has demonstrated how critical the linking of VAWG and gender are, not just to understand the 'why', but to shape programming that can maximise opportunities to end VAWG. Gender then is a unit of analysis which supports deeper understanding of the multifaceted realities of VAWG. Heise, in her ecology model presents a way of

<sup>15</sup> The ecology model was developed by Lori Heise who describes it as follows "An ecological approach to abuse conceptualizes violence as a multifaceted phenomenon grounded in an interplay among personal, situational, and sociocultural factors." (Violence against Women: An Integrated, Ecology Framework', Violence Against Women 1988 4(3)): 262-90.

<sup>16</sup> For more details on DFID's [http://www.bridge.ids.ac.uk/sites/bridge.ids.ac.uk/files/Docs/gadn\\_dfidgenderpolicy.pdf](http://www.bridge.ids.ac.uk/sites/bridge.ids.ac.uk/files/Docs/gadn_dfidgenderpolicy.pdf)

<sup>17</sup> Mukhopadhyay, 2016. [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-137-38273-3\\_6](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-137-38273-3_6)

<sup>18</sup> Dobash, R. E., & Dobash, R. P. (1979). Violence against wives. New York: Free Press.

<sup>19</sup> Maguigan, H. (2003). Wading into Professor Schnieder's "murky middle ground" between acceptance and rejection of criminal justice responses to domestic violence. American University Journal of Gender, Policy, and the Law, 11, 427-446

<sup>20</sup> Walker, L. (1979). The battered woman. New York: Harper & Row

mapping the interplay between the personal, situational, and socio-economic actors.<sup>21</sup> The emergence of intersectionality critically highlighted that different groups of women will experience violence and vulnerability to many factors including class, age, ethnicity, and disability.<sup>22</sup> The feminist response to VAWG now incorporates a multi-dimensional approach in an attempt to reach more marginalised groups than previously achieved.<sup>23</sup>

## 1.5.2 Programme Context

Globally, movements to improve the lives, health, and well-being of girls and women have grown in power over recent years. The voices of Southern women have always been strong in this struggle, but gradually they are now being better heard – by their own communities and governments and by foreign governments, donors and organisations. Increasingly, the movement against all forms of VAWG is Southern-led. The UK, and other “Western” countries have much to learn from the Southern movements. There has been a growing agenda within, and externally to DFID, to hold duty-bearers to account on supporting interventions that tackle VAWG. The table below provides an overview of some key dates and related activities (**Figure 5**).

**Figure 5: Relevant Core Dates**

DFID VAWG – Relevant Core Dates	
<b>2011</b>	DFID’s Business Plan 2012-2015 identifies VAWG as a priority and commits DFID to establish a research and innovation fund by December 2012
<b>2012</b>	DFID Theory of Change on Ending Violence Against Women and Girls
<b>2013</b>	DFID Strategic Vision for Girls and Women (new version)
<b>2013</b>	DFID Business Case: Violence Against Women and Girls Research and Innovation Fund (February 2013)
<b>2013-2019</b>	DFID’s What Works to Prevent Violence Against Women and Girls: Research and Innovation Fund is launched and runs until end-2019 (with extension).
<b>2014</b>	Girl Summit (with UNICEF, on FGM/C and Child Marriage), London
<b>2014</b>	ICAI released on ‘How DFID learns’ (DFID 2014)
<b>2016</b>	ICAI – DFID’s Efforts to Eliminate Violence Against Women and Girls (DFID May 2016) and DFID’s Response to ICAI – DFID’s Efforts to Eliminate Violence Against Women and Girls (DFID May 2016)
<b>2017</b>	Theory of Change for Research Uptake developed for WW-VAWG (February 2017)
<b>2017</b>	The #MeToo Movement goes viral garnering global support, following first founding by Tarana Burke in 2006.
<b>2018</b>	DFID’s Strategic Vision for Gender Equality: Her Potential, Our Future <sup>24</sup>
<b>2018</b>	UK HMG National Action Plan (NAP) on Women Peace and Security (WPS) 2018 – 2022
<b>2019</b>	RESPECT Women: Preventing Violence Against Women (UNWomen) launched.
<b>2019</b>	ICAI - The UK’s Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative

<sup>21</sup> Heise, L. L. (1998). Violence against women: An integrated, ecological framework. *Violence Against Women*, 4, 262-290.

<sup>22</sup> Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color Author(s): Kimberle Crenshaw Source: *Stanford Law Review*, Vol. 43, No. 6 (Jul., 1991), pp. 1241-1299 Published by: Stanford Law Review

<sup>23</sup> For a concise review of VAWG programming see

[https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/337615/evidence-review-interventions-F.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/337615/evidence-review-interventions-F.pdf) and here

[https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/337622/evidence-review-response-mechanisms-H.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/337622/evidence-review-response-mechanisms-H.pdf)

<sup>24</sup> DFID (2018). <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/dfid-strategic-vision-for-gender-equality-her-potential-our-future>

<b>2019</b>	DFID's announcement of £67.5m Phase 2 of the WW-VAWG Programme: Impact at Scale (November 2019).
<b>Annually</b>	16 Days of Activism <sup>25</sup> against VAWG 25 <sup>th</sup> Nov – 10 <sup>th</sup> December each year.
<b>Biennially</b>	Sexual Violence Research Initiative (SVRI) held every two years. First conference held in 2009. The strapline: "The Time is Now", was created for 2019.

### 1.5.3 Links to other relevant programmes

DFID engaged early in work on prevention of violence against women. In the last nine years, attention has returned to ending VAWG, and DFID is now recognised globally as a leader in this space. DFID is considered a thought leader in VAWG research and has invested significantly in research programmes around VAWG, in addition to smaller-scale evaluations across its portfolio. Beyond the WW-VAWG programme, DFID has funded<sup>26</sup> *inter alia* the £35m Towards Ending FGM/C in Africa and Beyond programme (and has announced a second £50m phase), the £12m Sudan Free from FGC programme (and has moved into a second £14.4m phase), the £3m Child, Early and Forced Marriage programme, the £31m Gender and Adolescence: Global Evidence (2014-2024), DFID's support to the Global Fund to End Modern Slavery (£20m from 2018-2022), as well as country office programmes working on VAWG including DFID's £18.7m Malawi VAWG programme (2018-2024), the £5m Stopping Abuse and Female Exploitation (SAFE) Zimbabwe Programme (2019-2023).

The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) lead the cross-departmental, Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI). The recent ICAI report on the UK's PSVI Programme (Jan 2020)<sup>27</sup> notes that there "has been little attempt to create an evidence-based approach" to VAWG programming in PSVI, before going on to give the WW-VAWG Programme as one example of such evidence-based programming good practice.

### 1.5.4 Programme Architecture

The architecture of the programme has had a significant effect (mostly positive) on the effectiveness of the programme.

The WW-VAWG Programme business case was approved in February 2013 (DFID 2013). The programme was designed to be carried out through a combination of three related but distinct research components, each addressing evidence gaps identified by DFID. A set of ToRs were drawn up against the business case. C3 was due to start after components 1 and 2<sup>28</sup>. In the event, all three components had different start-up times.

Contract amendments took place in 2016. These amendments extended the timeline for C3 in line with C1 and C2, and increased resources for C1 (for cross-component work) and for C2 (to undertake cross-component RU activities). The inception phases finished at different times during 2014, and between C1 and C3 there was no overlap in inception periods, so no time for planning of cross-working before full implementation began. In terms of management by DFID, C1 and C3 are managed by the DFID Inclusive Societies Department, while C2 is managed by DFID's Research and Evidence Division (RED). This means there are separate DFID Senior Responsible Officers (SROs) for the

<sup>25</sup> Annually undertaken since 1991. See [www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/take-action/16-days-of-activism](http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/take-action/16-days-of-activism) for further details.

<sup>26</sup> The following list presents a brief snapshot of DFID VAWG related programming rather than an exhaustive list.

<sup>27</sup> ICAI (2020). The UK's Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative: Joint review, January 2020. Retrieved from <https://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/The-UKs-preventing-sexual-violence-in-conflict-initiative.pdf>

<sup>28</sup> It is not clear why start times were staggered. However, as with other multi-component programmes, it makes programming sense to ensure that the major component (in terms of spend) can start effectively before committing funds to other components.

components, and there was initially a high level of staff turnover in the first few years. This has meant that an amount of institutional memory was lost and time was needed to ensure that new staff were up to speed. After mid-term, these initial difficulties were resolved.

The programme components were designed to be operationally and contractually separate. This was to allow for adequate concentration on the three distinct areas of research. Cross-working between components was a key consideration in programme design in order to ensure that “coherence across components reduces duplication and enables synergies for synthesis and cross-learning” (DFID 2013: 34).

The risk of lack of coherence across the programme, as a result of the contracting method, was identified in the design phase. The potential for duplication, inability to synthesise across the programme, and loss of opportunity for building on lessons and emerging findings, were recognised as risks. In order to mitigate these risks, cross-learning was built into each of the component ToRs, with the Secretariat holding overall responsibility for learning and synthesis across the three components. The aim was to ensure that component budgets were sufficient to allow for cross-learning. The IAB and Secretariat were tasked with providing guidance, and DFID was to support and promote cross-learning through monitoring and management processes.

In this event, the staggered start times, and lack of clear coordination systems and mechanisms at outset, had implications for synergy-building. Since mid-term, great efforts have been made to ensure coordination between all components, including C4 (Independent Evaluation).

We present our findings on this in **Section 4** below, and our learnings and recommendations in **Section 5**.

### **1.5.5 WW-VAWG's Contribution to DFID's Agenda**

WW-VAWG is the central flagship programme driving the global evidence base on what works to prevent VAWG. The information, evidence, and understanding it has produced also supports the work and activism of other key international programmes ( see **Section 1.5.3**). New programming to end VAWG in different forms including modern slavery and harmful cultural practices are now drawing on the WW-VAWG portfolio. The outputs of What Works have been important in offering direction to new programming and steering a much more robust argument for what and why interventions to end VAWG are so needed. WW-VAWG then has and does support DFID's ambitions to grown its global reputation as leaders in the field of ending VAWG in all its forms.

### **1.5.6 Reputational Assets of What Works**

The established status and experience of those involved in delivering any programme are 'reputational assets' whose value is often underestimated. These advance the chances of both generating robust evidence about issues, for which there is a meaningful demand, and achieving uptake in the short lifespan of programmes. They can provide a 'shortcut to influence'.

The WW-VAWG researchers, implementers and structural pillars (i.e. DFID and organisations representing and advocating for the programme through the IAB) represent some of the best-known and well-respected members of the VAWG community globally, well-known for their activism and commitment to promoting positive social change for the benefit of women and girls, based on robust evidence. Already well-known at national and global levels, as well as in the VAWG sector, the voices and findings of the WW-VAWG community – individuals and organisations - sought and found an audience that already trusted their counsel. As predicted at MTR, the programme has capitalised on the UK's investments in a 'difficult' subject. It has generated and advocated around a body of evidence

that is robust enough to support the claim that prevention is possible, and leveraged further investment and replication in both research and programming.



## 2. OVERALL EVALUATION FRAMEWORK, APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

### 2.1 THE EVALUATION APPROACH OVERVIEW

The evaluation approach was originally designed as part of our inception approach revised in 2017<sup>29</sup>. Prior to beginning the Final Evaluation (FE), our team reviewed and updated (where needed) the final evaluation framework, approach, and methodology and agreed this with DFID in 2019. The IE period ran from August 2019 to February 2020, and included in-country fieldwork in South Africa, Zambia, South Sudan, Nepal and Pakistan, with interviews with key actors at all levels (including remotely), and an evidence and literature review.

As discussed in **Section 1** of the IE report, there have been a number of core stages in the wider evaluation process prior to this FE- from the initial Inception Phase, closely followed by the Mid-Term Review (MTR), and then three Research Uptake Progress Reports (RUPRs). Each stage has had a separate focus (**Figure 6**), and we build on this and the evidence each stage has generated for use in this FE.

**Figure 6: Evaluation Stages and Focus**

Evaluation Stage	Core Focus
<b>Inception (2016-2017)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evaluation design, including questions, methods and data collection and analysis approaches;</li> <li>• Embedded research uptake as a core evaluation theme.</li> </ul>
<b>Mid-Term Review (2017)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focused on relevance, approach, and processes.</li> </ul>
<b>RUPRs (Oct 2017, Jul 2018 and Apr 2019)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reporting on progress against research uptake logframe indicators and validating reported progress;</li> <li>• Identification of 'potential influence' cases and reflections on tactical approaches to response;</li> <li>• Interim critique of academic outputs to date.</li> </ul>
<b>Final Evaluation (2019-2020)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focused on effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact of the programme to inform future programming;</li> <li>• Thematic focus on the three programme strands: innovation, research quality, and research uptake.</li> </ul>

Please note that a more extensive IE evaluation approach, framework, and methodological approach is provided in **Annex 2**, and should be read in conjunction with this shorter chapter.

#### 2.1.1 Purpose, Objectives and Scope Overview

##### Purpose and Objectives

The core focus and purpose of our wider evaluation process has been to generate lessons learnt and support accountability of the WW-VAWG programme. The key objectives still hold from the original ToRs, our original technical response, and the MTR stage, these are laid out in **Section 1**.

<sup>29</sup> Please see the What Works to Prevent Violence Research & Innovation Programme, Mid-term and End-term Performance Evaluation Inception Report (2017) for further details regarding the initial evaluation design.



## Final Evaluation Scope

The scope of the IE shifted from the MTR focus, with this evaluation focusing on generating key lessons for the first phase of WW-VAWG. We considered that questions regarding the overall relevance of the programme, as defined in the OECD-DAC criteria, had been fully answered at MTR. Therefore, we did not include relevance as part of this FE, and instead the assessment we made of relevance at MTR is given as **Annex 7** to this report. In this FE, we have focused on effectiveness, the equity aspects of VFM, sustainability, and impact<sup>30</sup>, and also aimed to generate relevant programmatic and operational recommendations for future programming, including shaping the next phase of WW-VAWG. To do this, as guided by DFID, we focused on reviewing programme research and paths towards research uptake, and the eventual outcomes of this work. We also assessed factors which we consider key to the programme's success, but which were given insufficient weight in the original programme logic: innovation, capacity development, and partnership.

Our evaluation hypothesis is given in **Box 1**.

### Box 1: Evaluation Hypothesis

Based on our original ToRs, and discussions with DFID and WW-VAWG components, a core focus of the evaluation team's work through the whole evaluation, from the MTR, to the six monthly RUPRs, has been the impact of the research itself, and research uptake (RU). A core evaluation assumption for the team has been that good quality research is essential and necessary, but not enough to achieve change. The evaluation hypothesis used at MTR still holds:

"good quality research is an essential foundation for research uptake, but is not sufficient to ensure that decisions, policies and programmes will be shaped by evidence"

We built this focus into core assessment tools we adapted for the evaluation, including the research excellence framework<sup>31</sup>, which we enhanced to capture specific RU dimensions of change.

The IE also takes into account the revised ToC for each component and revised programme logframe. The logframe has been a living document, but this and the revised, unified programme ToC, were initially reviewed in October 2016 during an all-component and DFID workshop, facilitated by the Evaluation Team, as part of our inception phase activities. This IE has focused on drawing out key lessons and capturing the legacy of the programme, with analysis not focused on providing a critique of the ToCs and logframe, but rather assesses the extent to which each component achieved the goals they set themselves (as depicted through the ToCs and logframe). The approach considered whether new ToCs are emerging, now that WW-VAWG Phase 1 has been completed.

## Redefinition of the Logframe

During the MTR, the evaluation team noted that the programme was operating with a very narrow concept of innovation. In November 2016, the WW-VAWG ToC and logframe were reworked and now include core focus areas of Research, RU, innovation, partnerships, and capacity development.

At MTR, we realised that there were important aspects of the programme's work which were not being captured or assessed: Innovation, Capacity Development, and Partnership. We therefore adopted new approaches to gathering data and understanding on these aspects. We broadened the view on

<sup>30</sup> In agreement with DFID, the IE contract was awarded on the understanding that it would have only a very light touch approach to the OECD-DAC criterion of Efficiency. This is why we have focused on equity in relation to value for money.

<sup>31</sup> Please see [www.ref.ac.uk/about/what-is-the-ref/](http://www.ref.ac.uk/about/what-is-the-ref/) for further details on the REF.

innovation in the programme (previously limited to innovation grants to implementing projects in C1), to capture:

- Creative problem-solving on key issues (capacity development and partnership)
- New Positive Pathways to RU and VAWG prevention

The IE team worked to identify and assess innovation as it happened throughout WW-VAWG, and to analyse it in relation to the work of all three components. We also used an innovation analysis lens when assessing the programme, and across research and research uptake. Assessing innovative problem-solving, as evidenced in relation to capacity development and partnership, for example, was a critical approach to assessing the effectiveness and sustainability (and impact) of WW-VAWG.

As with the other evaluation components, RU remained a core feature of the FE. Records of uptake successes were reviewed as an on-going process, as assessed in the three RUPRs. All academic peer reviewed outputs were read and fed into the adapted REF framework, as they were posted onto the programme website, or communicated directly to the academic lead. Through regular conversations and KAIs, successes, challenges, and innovations were logged. This on-going set of activities fed into and informed our RUPRs, which have been produced every nine months since the MTR, and have been a rich evidence source for this evaluation. Yet, for the IE we have sought to go beyond evidencing examples of uptake, and to demonstrate if, how, and when, WW-VAWGs had impact on processes of social norm change and social change. This focus was critical for understanding the likely sustainability of the impact generated, and to inform the second phase of WW-VAWG.


### Participation, Inclusion and Mainstreaming Intersectionality

Our evaluation approach was intersectional, gender-focused and rights-based. Across all evaluation phases, we ensured that we captured experiences and voices across WW-VAWG, and at all levels, including: senior component leads and researchers, in-country research teams, data collectors, implementers, advisory members at national and programme levels, other stakeholders and academics outside of the programme and, where possible, the participants of the interventions. Those who we sought to interview, and the analysis of transcripts, was guided by an intersectional approach that aimed to include a range of interviewees across gender, (dis)ability, ethnicity, and status levels.

### Evaluation Conceptual Framework

The Evaluation Conceptual Framework was also designed during MTR, **Figure 7** (below), sets out the conceptual framework that we used to test the RU hypothesis given above. Uptake, as the central goal of the programme, is placed in the centre, surrounded by the differing dimensions of the enabling environment. A number of key factors influenced this pathway. WW-VAWG research needed to be of high enough quality to withstand scrutiny, and to give lobbying confidence (those using it to push for change need to feel empowered by rigorous evidence). Capacity needs to exist at all levels in order to generate data, operationalise interventions, and drive uptake. Linked to capacity, are strategies that are designed for particular contexts, and are flexible enough to be opportunistic. Most significantly for uptake, the political economy factors at country level (see disaggregated factors underneath country headings) will impact greatly on the likelihood that robust evidence, sufficient capacity, and well-designed strategies will drive, or stimulate, the political will to change (see our learnings, in **Section 5**). Finally, we sought the answer to the key question: can we see evidence of VAWG prevention?

### Figure 7: Evaluation Conceptual Lens



### Paris Declaration, Rights and Working with Vulnerable People

All DFID development work follows the OECD Paris Declaration themes of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results, and mutual accountability<sup>32</sup>. The approach taken, throughout the IE, has been fully in-line with this declaration. Rights approaches, and respect for Human Rights, underly all aspects of our approach to meeting our objectives, to our processes, and products. We have taken a strong ethical approach to working with all stakeholders. We ensured that all team members are fully aware of, and able to comply with, IMC's safeguarding policy. Mechanisms were in place to ensure that any ethical/safeguarding concerns could be addressed (none arose). Risk assessments were made, and confidentiality protocols observed.

Taking a rights perspective, we used a gendered approach throughout our work. We ensured that all data we collect were disaggregated, wherever possible— by gender, age, social background, and (dis)ability. We used our extensive experience to ensure that the rights of vulnerable people were fully respected, and that the poorest and most marginalised people were able to participate. We used this rights lens when making our assessments of WW-AVWG interventions.


The methods and tools we used in the field have been pre-tested, in various contexts, to ensure their appropriateness and effectiveness in reaching the different groups of people.

## 2.2 FINAL EVALUATION FRAMEWORK

Our IE design comprises four main components (**Figure 8**): ToC, evaluation questions, evaluation methods, and data analysis and synthesis. Further details on the framework approach are found in **Annex 2**.

**Figure 8: Final Evaluation Design Components**

<sup>32</sup> <https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm>



For the Final Evaluation, we worked with the ToC we had helped to refine at MTR stage. The logframe continued to be refined – largely in terms of targets – until June 2018. Components either met, or exceeded their set targets (as captured in Annual Review and Components Completion Reports). We accept these achievement statements and have used them in our analyses of programme progress and success.

## 2.2.1 EVALUATION QUESTIONS

Our evaluation questions (EQs) (**Figure 9**) were initially discussed and agreed with DFID during our inception phase for the MTR that would follow. Prior to starting core IE activities, these questions were refined by the evaluation team in April 2019 and agreed by DFID. The EQs focus on four of the five OECD-DAC evaluation criteria (effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability) because questions surrounding relevance, the fifth criteria, were addressed in the MTR. As with the MTR, our questions are broadly realist, and have an RU focus, and they aim to cover the full research to impact pathway. Our full evaluation matrix is found in **Annex 2** and builds on our EQs, with data collection methods, and type of analysis and synthesis used.

**Figure 9: Final EQs according to OECD-DAC Criteria**

OECD DAC	Evaluation Questions
EFFECTIVENESS	1. Have the research methods selected and designed led to the rigorous collection of data that in turn has generated world leading new evidence?
	2. How is WW-VAWG contributing to the understanding, research methods and theory, and to the use of these for VAWG prevention. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Are the research methods considered innovative by those working to end VAWG outside of the programme?</li> </ul>
	3. Has WW-VAWG developed and implemented systems and processes to ensure the availability, accessibility and usability of evidence, and to enable it to adapt and learn? If so, how? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has the programme been able to adapt in response to monitoring information?</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How have the programme's internal monitoring systems allowed them to be responsive to needs and gaps in use?</li> </ul>
	<p>4. Has the programme been effective in developing capacities, of partners and relevant stakeholders, that are sufficient to achieve outcomes?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Is there evidence that in country research capacity has been built through the programme e.g. are outputs systematically co-published with Southern partners? Is there evidence of ongoing training?</li> <li>What was the contribution of the programme's 'CD for RU' approach to achieving uptake?</li> </ul>
	<p>5. Has the evidence influenced policy and is it changing investment levels in WW-VAWG countries and beyond?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Where there are signs of positive shifts, what is the evidence of the programme's unique contribution?</li> <li>Where positive shifts are not yet visible, where is the potential for uptake and how has the programme optimised the chances for this to happen?</li> </ul>
	<p>6. To what extent has the programme used innovative approaches effectively?</p>
	<p>7. To what extent have the architecture and modalities of the programme contributed to its effectiveness in preventing VAWG?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To date, what has been the impact on effectiveness of the staggered start-up dates for components?</li> </ul>
EFFICIENCY	<p>8. Are the governance and management structures of the components, and of the overall programme, efficient in line with DFID's '4Es' approach to measuring VFM?</p>
	<p>9. Was there adequate budgetary flexibility to allow programme adaptation in response to change in needs?</p>
	<p>10. What lessons can be learned across the three components to improve value for money of research and innovation programmes?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Choice of research institutes</li> <li>Synergies with other research programmes and partners</li> </ul>
SUSTAINABILITY	<p>11. What evidence is there that the gains made/positive outcomes achieved by WW-VAWG will be sustained over time?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Test the claims being made by the research</li> <li>Evidence that the gains made by WW-VAWG (e.g. 50% reduction violence) will be sustained</li> </ul>
	<p>12. Has innovation contributed to the sustainability of interventions to prevent VAWG, including amongst the poorest and most marginalised women and girls?</p>
	<p>13. Is there evidence that the research has influenced wider academic discourses on VAWG beyond the programme?</p>
IMPACT	<p>14. To what extent has the programme's Research Uptake strategy been effective in achieving uptake?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Including positive change in policy and programmes</li> </ul>
	<p>15. What lessons are being learned on how to design and manage innovation and research programmes that promote change in policy and practice?</p>

### Equity and Intersectionality: Cross-Cutting Issues

The review team considers equity and intersectionality as key cross-cutting issues across all EQs. In considering equity in relation to each of the questions, we assessed the extent to which the interventions, research, and evaluations carried out under the programme were designed, implemented and assessed, with full and explicit attention to questions of inclusivity. For example, in the design, targeting, and analysis of the programmatic outputs, are the different perspectives of people of different ages and genders taken into consideration? Are younger people included in design,

implementation, and analysis of research where the research concerns their lives? In what ways are they included – as respondents or as active participants? Are research populations adequately disaggregated by gender, social background, ethnicity, age, disability etc.?

## 2.3 METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW

### Realist Evaluation Lens

To assist in organising and making sense of the data collected through all the review methods, data was assessed with a realist perspective: concentrating on what (currently) is working, where, and how. A realist lens simply means that we tracked the programme as an ongoing process rather than dipping in and out intermittently. This meant we were able to capture the adaptations needed (ToC and logframe, reporting on RU, etc.), challenges that emerged, and successes as they happened. When possible, we conducted critical KAls to capture the motivations, views, and experiences of people in real time. Owing to everyone's time and budget constraints, in practical terms this meant checking in biannually in preparation of the RUPRs. We also consulted stakeholders during the quarterly Management Committee Meetings. Our approach increased its veracity by recording views at the time rather than relying on memory, which can easily become distorted or influenced by a range of factors.

### Methods and Justifications

As outlined in our original proposal, we took a mixed-method approach to data-collection, combining qualitative primary data (KAls, 'check ins', Participatory Interest Group Discussions (PIGDs), observational approaches), and secondary data (document review, programme monitoring), and political economy analysis across a number of the focus countries. Further details are found in **Annex 2**. Following a similar approach to that used at MTR, our IE method consisted of **six** key components as outlined in the table below (**Figure 10**):

**Figure 10: Methods and Justifications**

Method	Tool	Description / Justification
<b>Evidence and Literature Review</b>	Evidence Tables	Including an audit of selected WW-VAWG documents, and review and analysis of key programme documents, and VAWG literature. This intensive review of key products helped us fair understanding across all programme components.
<b>Key Actor Interviews (KAls) and Project Level Fieldwork</b>	Interview Instrument	<p>KAls were undertaken with a range of actors (see <b>Annex 4</b>). A Participatory Interest Group Discussion (PIDG) was also undertaken with seven men and seven women in eThekweni, Durban<sup>33</sup>.</p> <p>During the ASMs and the 2019 SVRI, we also conducted numerous formal and informal interviews with programme stakeholders. In addition, we attended Management meetings and IAB meetings over the course of the programme. In preparation of the 6-monthly RUPRs we consulted a range of actors. All these enquiries also fed into our IE assessments and analyses.</p> <p>This enabled us to provide snap-shot qualitative, participatory data testing the sustainability of achievements, and to compare with understanding gathered at mid-term.</p>

<sup>33</sup> We were unable to do planned field level work in Ghana, owing to the last-minute ill-health of the team member in charge of enquiry there.



<b>Case Study Approach to produce Thematic Papers</b>	Document Review, KAls, Snap-shot enquiry	As agreed with DFID, after MTR, we have produced three thematic papers on the distinct, but inter-connected key aspects of the programme: Research, Research Uptake, and Innovation (including capacity development and partnership). This helped provide an in-depth analysis of key elements of the programme underpinning the ToC and log-frame.
<b>Political Economy Analysis (PEA)</b>	Document and web review, KAls, snap-shot enquiry	Included six detailed PEAs (Ghana, Nepal, South Sudan, Pakistan, South Africa, Zambia). The choice of PEAs was based on similar criteria as the MTR country case studies (which were Pakistan, Kenya, Nepal, South Africa), and included component potential for cross-over, fragility of context, stability of context, and regional representation. This enabled us to gain an in-depth understanding of contexts in which WW-VAWG has worked, and to underpin our analysis of interventions.
<b>Research and Research Uptake Assessment</b>	Adapted Research Excellent Framework (REF)	Developed by the team for the MTR, we adapted the REF as a basis for assessing WW-VAWG outputs across the research design to impact pathway. This provided a mechanism for rigorous assessment of WW-VAWG research products.
<b>Positive Pathways</b>	Positive Pathways Analysis (PPA) <sup>34</sup>	PPA has been designed and developed by the Team Leader (copyright CR2 Associates Ltd) in response to a growing need for better understanding of effectiveness and VFM in end-VAWG policy and programming. PPA is a way to synthesise understanding, gained through innovation, and research/evaluation programmes/ projects, and to identify approaches, and combinations of components, which are most likely to lead to sustained positive change. This helped us develop methods by which to understand steps which lead to VAWG prevention success.

The methods and tools we used in our work have been tried and tested at MTR, and were found to be appropriate and effective in reaching different groups of people.

## 2.3.1 Evidence and Literature Review

### Document Sampling and Sources

During the FE, our team reviewed numerous WW-VAWG programme documents. A list of the key documents reviewed is supplied in **Annex 5**. Documentation sources included: project documentation, wider VAWG literature, and grey literature.

- **Research:** The document review conducted was comprehensive and covered all reported outputs from each component. The documents were thematically coded according to the EQs and also in response to issues that repeatedly emerged from the documents. The analysis was triangulated through the KAls and the academic literature reviewed. The review for this final report built on the ongoing process put in place post-inception. The ongoing review of academic literature was overseen by the Academic Lead, whose own research is on VAWG, and so no separate review was required, but instead key academic sources were identified

through the programme as and when they were published. The ongoing review of academic literature was also supported by the review team's advisor Professor Ruth Pearson.

- **Research Uptake:** We drew on the initial **RU Literature Review** that was produced as part of our Inception Report 2016, to reference current theories and practices on how evidence informs policy and practice, and to review the programme's internal monitoring documents. We updated the Evidence Table that had been produced as part of our MTR to show the nuanced research uptake themes that had emerged by the end of the programme. This was systematically applied to all WW-VAWG programme documentation produced since the MTR. In addition, we **critiqued the WW-VAWG programme's digital platforms, engagement strategies and resulting analytics** (where data was made available) for the What Works website and digital platforms (Facebook and Twitter specifically), using benchmarked 'best practice' for engagement on these sites. We also drew on the evaluation team's **three interim RUPRs**, themselves based on KAls and reviews of all monitoring reports, which shortlisted as potential cases based on early signs of uptake.

### 2.3.2 KAls and Project Level Fieldwork

Between August 2019 and January 2020, the evaluation team undertook several field-visits to conduct interviews with key actors as part of the FE. The remainder of the interviews were carried out remotely. Country visits were made to South Africa and Zambia. Whilst in South Africa, the Team Leader (TL) attended all of the Sexual Violence Research Initiative (SVRI) conference in Cape Town. WW-VAWG researchers and implementers participated – as presenters and panellists – in many of the sessions, and the TL was able to gain valuable insight into the programme's progress and success. This was supported by in-depth interviews with WW-VAWG personnel at SVRI, interviews with project researchers and constituents in Durban, group and individual meetings with Secretariat staff, and a full day's consultation with the Programme Director. A visit to Ghana was planned but later was cancelled owing to health reasons. In-depth KAls were held via skype with stakeholders from Ghana. An earlier evaluation visit was made to Nepal after the 2018 Annual Scientific Meeting (ASM) there, which also fed into the FE.

Due to budget constraints and appreciation of VFM best practice, the number of trips was small, but we had already formed very positive relationships with WW-VAWG researchers and implementers across the portfolio, which made it easy for remote calls to be arranged. Additionally, the team as a whole, and through the life of the evaluation have made visits to many of the WW-VAWG contexts, either as part of the evaluation or on other project work, and know many of the country contexts well. The countries covered by field trips over the programme's duration include: South Africa, Zambia, South Sudan, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, India, and Kenya. The team attended each scientific meeting (Dubai – 2016; Pretoria 2017; Kathmandu 2018). We were also able to extend our IE KAls in Pakistan, Nepal and South Sudan, by contracting national staff, already known to us, to conduct interviews in person.

All interviews followed a semi-structured approach, with pre-designed and pre-tested questions for each stakeholder grouping. This ensured their appropriateness and effectiveness in reaching the different groups of people, differing operational contexts, and compliance with our strict ethical standards.

### 2.3.3 Thematic Papers

The biggest change from MTR to IE design was the agreed change from a case study approach as a core evaluative method, to thematic papers. We proposed to DFID (and they agreed), that evaluation resources should focus on three thematic papers instead of the previous country-focused case study design of the MTR. The reason for this shift was to ensure that we captured a comprehensive picture



of the programme as a whole. Limiting ourselves to a number of country level case studies would have meant that we might miss key programme-wide successes and learning. The three papers themselves, as previously mentioned, reflect the key areas of the review and the concerns of the programme as a whole: research, uptake, and innovation.

### Focus of Thematic Papers

Using combinations of KAIs, document review, PEA, and the adapted REF to gather evidence for inclusion, each paper had a specific focus (**Figure 11**).

**Figure 11: Overview of Thematic Papers**

Paper	Focus
<b>Research</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To draw out the important lessons across each component in relation to research design, data collection, ethical protocols, data analysis, and the identification of key findings.</li> <li>To understand and map the legacy of the WW-VAWG programme.</li> <li>To offer a realistic account of the challenges and the lessons learnt from them.</li> <li>To understand how the WW-VAWG evidence base may contribute to the research of academics outside of the programme, but within the VAWG space, and working in developing contexts.</li> </ul>
<b>Uptake</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent has the programme's Research Uptake strategy been effective in achieving uptake including positive change in policy and programmes?</li> <li>Is there evidence that in country research capacity has been built through the programme, e.g. are outputs systematically co-published with Southern partners? Is there evidence of ongoing training?</li> <li>What was the contribution of the programme's 'CD for RU' approach to achieving uptake? Has the evidence influenced policy and is it changing investment levels in WW-VAWG countries and beyond?</li> <li>Where there are signs of positive shifts, what is the evidence of the programme's unique contribution?</li> <li>Where positive shifts are not yet visible, where is the potential for uptake and how has the programme optimised the chances for this to happen?</li> </ul>
<b>Innovation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To define innovation in relation to WW, and to identify its relevance to the programme and to VAWG prevention.</li> <li>To draw out the important lessons, across components, on why innovation is essential in all efforts to prevent VAWG.</li> <li>To understand and map the legacy of the WW-VAWG programme, in relation to innovation in capacity development; partnership and intervention approaches.</li> <li>To offer a realistic account of the challenges arising from innovation, and the lessons learnt from them.</li> <li>To make recommendations on which successful innovations can be institutionalised and how this can be achieved.</li> </ul>

## 2.3.4 An Adapted REF Approach – From Research Quality to Use Assessment

At the MTR stage, we adapted the existing REF commonly used to assess research outputs of UK universities, and expanded it to include four specific RU dimensions. This enabled us to assess and capture change across agreed factors that need to be in place for RU to occur within a research programme. These included: presence of a robust and comprehensive RU Strategy, capacity around RU, engagement, and a strategic communications approach. We developed definitions and a metric for each of these four RU areas and indicators across the research quality into use spectrum (**Figure 12**). We also developed clear scoring criteria and definitions across each dimension. These can be found in **Annex 2**.

**Figure 12: Research Quality and Uptake Anticipated Progress by FE**

Dimension	Anticipated Final Evaluation Progress
<b>Research / Evidence Significance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A significant number of peer reviewed articles.</li> <li>• Deliberate inclusion and support of Southern researchers with some outputs now led by Southern authors.</li> <li>• Evidence of readership outside of the immediate WW-VAWG community (citations).</li> </ul>
<b>Evidence Reach</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Publications in a range of journals</li> <li>• Most publications are open access.</li> </ul>
<b>Research / Evidence Rigour</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Flagship publications containing the most impressive data either forthcoming (in press) or published.</li> </ul>
<b>Evidence of Impact</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Outputs are numerous and now represent a critical mass of knowledge which cannot be ignored by others in the VAWG field.</li> <li>• Outputs targeting practitioners are known about by key non-academic stakeholders with some evidence of usage.</li> <li>• Evidence that all opportunities to channel the findings into processes of change and influence have been taken.</li> <li>• Successes have been monitored and documented.</li> <li>• WW-VAWG evidence (includes both process and findings) has influenced policy and practice as evidenced by: increased appetite and demand for evidence, discursive changes, procedural changes, content changes, attitudinal changes, behavioural changes, and impact and scale up.</li> <li>• Programme can evidence its contribution to the changes witnessed (pathways to uptake).</li> </ul>
<b>RU Capacity</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sufficient capacity across the team (across all RU skillsets) to effectively engage and influence priority stakeholders.</li> <li>• Evidence of built capacity being used to effectively engage and influence outside of the WW-VAWG programme.</li> <li>• Existing capacity for uptake is recognised and deployed effectively to achieve influencing objectives.</li> </ul>
<b>RU Strategy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strategy updated and used as a 'living document' to guide programme uptake activities.</li> <li>• Learning from strategy implementation has been captured and used to guide programme activities (including prioritisation and resource allocation).</li> <li>• Stories of positive impact and lessons learnt captured and communicated.</li> </ul>
<b>Engagement</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Appetite and demand for evidence identified and effectively satisfied with high quality products and activities.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Programme shows understanding of the information needs and evidence gaps of its target stakeholders, and involves them in framing final evidence products and events.</li> <li>• Patterns and results of engagement have been captured.</li> </ul>
<b>Strategic Communications</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence framed and crafted to suit target audiences.</li> <li>• Evidence effectively communicated and used to engage stakeholders in most appropriate formats.</li> <li>• Range of techniques used (e.g. digital and face-to-face) to raise profile and engage audiences in meaningful conversations that contribute to outcomes.</li> </ul>

### 2.3.5 Positive Pathways

Positive Pathways Analysis (PPA) has been designed in response to a growing need for better understanding of effectiveness and VFM in end-VAWG policy and programming. The concept was introduced at mid-term and since then, WW-VAWG has also begun to make its own assessment on the pathways which lead towards achievements in VAWG prevention. Based on PPA, we assessed the WW-VAWG programme's contribution to the on-going debate on how best to intervene for prevention and ending of VAWG. Instead of looking for the negative outcomes of VAWG (which are being clearly defined through the work of the three WW-VAWG components), we aim to identify positive pathways. Positive pathways are those which lead away from VAWG towards improved social, economic, and well-being outcomes for women and girls, and for wider society. Through PPA, we hoped to identify the junctions along a pathway where different methods and approaches to protecting women and girls and ending VAWG are linked to different contexts and cultures. We also sought to identify which aspects of any approach are most likely to be essential, which are desirable, and which might be considered "extra" (see **Thematic Paper 3**).

## 2.4 ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS AND TRIANGULATION

In addition to the REF and PPA analysis described above, for this IE we used the following approaches to analysis and synthesis.

### 2.4.1 Evidence Coding and Disaggregated Analysis

All qualitative data, KAIs, and participant observations were thematically coded into a data table, which we then drew finding from. The codes related to the key focus areas of the review, but also emerged through a grounded reading of the transcripts (i.e., patterned themes that emerged). They were analysed and coded against specific evaluation questions and themes, with issues that emerged with high frequency being added to the coding as we progressed. The data was disaggregated according to the type of participant (e.g. internal or external to WW-VAWG, stakeholder working in VAWG, academic, etc), this enabled bias in responses to be captured and accounted for in the identification of findings.

The findings from the document and the interview coding tables point to a number of 'positive pathways'(see **Section 4**) that demonstrated how successes have been able to emerge, and also the barriers and challenges to positive outcomes.

## 2.4.2 Political Economy Analysis

In considering our uptake hypothesis we acknowledge that the main factor when it comes to successful uptake is the political and economic appetite for change (see **Section 5**, and **Thematic Paper 2**).

The inclusion of PEA, as an analysis tool, allowed us to measure why uptake may have been more possible in some contexts than others, even when the evidence is at the same robust level. For the inception and MTR, we focused on a number of case countries in order to conduct deep dives and draw out the complexities of the environments in which WW-VAWG was operating. This approach helped us to contextualise the challenges, and understand the ways in which WW-VAWG has adapted and been responsive to shifts and changes in the operating environment. Moving into the FE, we needed to be able to capture the programme as a whole. We shifted from the deep dive case study approach to a combined PEA of a number of contexts, with an overarching assessment across the whole portfolio.

In total, we conducted six detailed PEAs (Ghana, Nepal, South Sudan, Pakistan, South Africa, Zambia). The choice of PEAs was based on similar criteria to those used in the original case studies (which were Pakistan, Kenya, Nepal, South Africa). These criteria were: component cross-over, fragility of context, stability of context, and regional representation. The PEAs have been critical in our assessment of the uptake hypothesis, which is that, even with high quality research, change will be hard to achieve if actors within the political and economic environment have no appetite for it.

## 2.4.3 Adapting the Ecology Model

We focused on deepening our understanding of the political-economy of the stakeholder environment at various levels – global, national, state and local – in order to support the RU analysis through use of the ecology model. The national political economy is shaped by a number of intersectional dimensions including religion and culture, economic growth rates, strength of infrastructure, education, and health provision. All these dimensions feed together to influence the strength and commitment of governments to take coordinated decisions around VAWG, shape policies to bring about transformation, and to implement them. Taken collectively these dimensions could be seen as shaping the ecology of policy and programming. Understanding this ecology is critical if uptake strategies will have any chance of making meaningful inroads into influencing governments.

## 2.4.4 Triangulation of Data

Findings from each of the data sets were compared in order to triangulate the findings to ensure robustness, and that the full richness of data was explored and drawn on.

# 2.5 EVALUATION MANAGEMENT

## 2.5.1 Quality Assurance Processes

As with the MTR phase, the IMC Project Manager coordinated IMC's standardised quality assurance (QA) process. Our QA aims to keep consistency with the Evaluation Quality Assurance and Learning Service (EQUALS) that was established by the DFID Evaluation Unit as DFID's external technical service providing independent technical support and QA for evaluations. The Evaluation Team passed the report to the Team Leader (TL), who conducted a first quality review on all sections. This step ensured that the report is up to the stringently high standards that IMC expects from its staff and partners. In addition to this, Professor Ruth Pearson worked closely with the Research Lead to assess the quality of the WW-VAWG outputs and the processes through which they are generated, including

the ethical review. The Project Director also provided strategic oversight of the IE phase when any key issues arose.

Finally, the QA Lead, who provided key QA support on the evaluation questions and report outline, quality assured the final report according to EQUALS criteria. The final report was then reviewed and signed off by the Project Manager and Project Director ready for DFID and EQUALS submission. DFID and Component Leads had time for comments, feedback, and fact checking, which we have fed into the final version as much as possible. In cases where the evaluation team had differing opinions from DFID or the Component Leads, we have maintained our independence and made an appropriate call on which revision to take.

## 2.5.2 Ethical Approach and Data Protection

We conducted all IE activities in line with our ethical approach as detailed in **Annex 3**, and in line with the 'do no harm' protocol which is in adherence to international best practice and standards. This includes DFID's latest ethical approach as outlined in the 'DFID ethical guidance for research, evaluation and monitoring activities' (2019), and in accordance to DFID's new Supplier Code of Conduct. All processes and methods were reviewed and approved, prior to use, by the UoP Ethics Committee. All data collection, engagement, and management were conducted in accordance with IMC's Safeguarding Policy. In adherence with DFID's data protection policies, all data generated for this IE has been anonymised and kept on a password protected online platform, to which only the core review team has access.

## 2.5.3 Risk Management

Throughout the entire IE process, the team have drawn upon the evaluation's risk matrix as a useful tool to identify and reflect upon key risks. Our Risk Management Strategy follows the guidance provided in the ISO 31000 Risk Management Systems and capitalises on IMC's experience in delivering complex programmes in challenging contexts. The Evaluation Manager was responsible for updating the risk register on a regular basis, working with the IE team to put in place appropriate mitigation strategies. This included reporting to the IMC Project Director monthly on any key emerging risks.

A simplified version of our risk matrix is found in **Annex 2**, where the risks, challenges and mitigation strategies, applied for both contextual and methodological issues, are discussed. In recognition of the sensitive nature of VAWG, we identified the 'safeguarding' and 'do no harm' related risks to be of paramount importance and these have been comprehensively drawn out and addressed below. Further, due to the sensitive nature of the data that will be gathered, we have given specific attention to the mitigation measures applied to maximise security and confidentiality of such data.

## 2.5.4 Limitations

A number of limitations have restricted our methodological approach, which should be understood when reviewing the findings and recommendations set out in this report, these span limitations centred on practicalities of researching social change, data gaps in our analysis, resourcing limitations, and potential for bias. These are outlined in more detail below:

- **Not All Change will be Visible:** We were limited by the fact that RU can be unpredictable (see **Section 3** and **5**). It can happen suddenly, and it can take time to influence policy and practice, which can be longer than the programme timeframe. This means that not all potential influence may yet have been realised and or identified. In addition, shifts in attitudes and increased appetite to use evidence in decision-making are neither easily seen, nor always

acknowledged. Again, this means that all potential influence of the programme might not be captured.

- **Scant Data on National Level RU and Demand Activities:** We were limited as we do not have full data, at national level, of all the presentation and uptake activities carried out by organisations, nor a complete record of all demands made for information and evidence. It is a huge task to monitor these issues fully, and beyond the capacity of the programme in Phase 1. However, where, stakeholders/projects have been able to think back along uptake trajectories, we can see that closer monitoring could have been useful in identifying Positive Pathways to uptake and fulfilment of outcomes.
- **Final Evaluation Scale and Resourcing:** Similar to the impact resources had on our ability to undertake more case studies during the mid-term evaluation, there were also finite resources for the final evaluation. This has obviously meant that we have had to focus resources and not had the breadth that we would have liked to truly capture a multi-component programme with WW-VAWG scale and ambition. For example, we were not able to plan for in-depth work in countries, and extensive training of research teams in-country. Our overall FE budget was 2.36% of the WW-VAWG Programme. In addition, the FE was only allowed the same number of days as the mid-term review, but there was far more content to review at endline. For the future, IEs of WW-VAWG Phase 2 should also allocate funding for the whole core team to attend the ASMs as this was a key point of information sharing where further interviews could have been gained (for this Phase only the TL could attend).
- **Availability of Key Interviewees:** Despite a number of attempts to ensure we engaged with all key partners and their team members, some were unavailable for interview. This may have had a (minor) impact on our ability to triangulate findings across evidence sources.
- **Potential for Bias:** The programme has fostered a strong and close community all of whom are committed to seeing funding to end VAWG sustained and increased. This unifying motivation may unintentionally bring bias into how key actors answer questions specifically around impact and legacy. There may be an element of over claiming the reach of results. The review team are aware of this and triangulation of the interview and document review findings has minimised this risk and allowed for verification of findings. The review team can also confirm they worked independently and free from interference. The review teams adviser also checked to ensure the findings reached were robust and well evidenced.
- **Participatory Enquiry:** The main gap in our analysis is that we were only able to carry out snap-shot, Participatory Enquiry in one area (Durban, South Africa). This was for a number of reasons: 1) we did not have resources for an extensive schedule of in-country visits, 2) we did not have time or budget to train our in-country colleagues, and 3) we did not have research clearance for formal, participatory research. In South Africa, we were cleared through the NGO (Project Empower) we were visiting.
- **Ghana Visit Cancellation:** We had intended to do snap-shot enquiry in Ghana. Owing to visa problems and the ill-health of the team member in charge of the Ghana analysis, the country visit had to be cancelled. We were fortunate to be able to set up a number of individual and group meetings with KAs in Ghana, which made up for, to a certain extent, the lack of field visits. We do not, however, underestimate how much more might have been gained with a fuller schedule of on-the-ground enquiry. We have had to make do, with the field-at-second-hand, through our discussions with NGO implementers and researchers.

## 3 COMMUNICATION AND DISSEMINATION

### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

The evaluation team developed a Communication and Dissemination Strategy that drew on the core team's reflections of good practice for communicating evaluations, and on DFID's guidance on RU<sup>35</sup>. This is outlined in full in below, including our aims, target audiences, communication methods, and dissemination products.

#### 3.1.1 Purpose of the Strategy

The evaluation team developed a Communication Strategy that drew on the core team's reflections of good practice for communicating evaluations, as well as on DFID's guidance on RU. The purpose of the strategy was twofold: first, to communicate evidence of what works to tackle VAWG in different contexts; and second, to communicate lessons learnt about research and RU approaches, and the extent to which they informed and influenced decisions around ending VAWG.

We aimed to communicate our emerging findings in a way that is catalytic and active. This involved, for example, facilitating discussion across the community of WW-VAWG partners we are evaluating as an integral part of the process of the evaluation. The strategy identified a range of audiences for this learning, including the WW-VAWG programme and its funders, and committed us to communicating lessons learnt 'in real time' as part of the 'critical friend' approach we adopted. The evaluation team made special efforts to understand what people would find useful from the evaluation; responded to people's requests in a timely manner; participated in regular WW-VAWG Management quarterly conference calls to report on evaluation progress; and packaged data in accessible slide deck formats for the regular monitoring reports on research uptake (RUPRs).

#### 3.1.2 Communicating Strategy Principles

The strategy was informed by a set of principles based on good practice in communication. These principles are:

- Be a 'critical friend', communicating openly and transparently. The success of the evaluation depended on effective communication through open two-way channels with implementing partners. Using a positive criticism approach, we worked closely with programme implementers to reflect on findings and lessons learnt from the programme's influencing activities in a way that would strengthen capacities, and optimise RU processes as the programme evolved.
- Prioritise two-way communication over one-way dissemination. We established strong relationships with the programme early on. These allowed us to move beyond the extraction of monitoring data and lessons learnt, to effective dialogue and discussion. This also allowed the lessons we identified to be shared across programmes and teams, creating an environment that helped people learn from each other through peer exchange.
- Make findings interesting. We pledged to present quantitative data about research supply (e.g., reach of the research through conferences and publications.) as well as evidence of demand (e.g., website downloads, requests for more information, invitations to workshops), and using data visualisation and infographics as far as possible.

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<sup>35</sup> [Research Uptake: A guide for DFID-funded research programmes](#), April 2016

- Communicate often and in manageable chunks. We produced summarised evaluation findings at each major stage of delivery (e.g., Inception and Mid-Term, and this is also planned for the FE) that were suitable for both internal and external audiences.
- Identify VFM communication approaches. We identified and used established communication channels and communities of practice to reach and engage with people we thought would be interested in the evaluation findings. These included the programme's researchers and implementers; the WW-VAWG Community of Practice, the evaluation team's own networks, and Research To Action (R2A).
- Recognise that ending VAWG is a political act and not everyone will be receptive to the evidence. Our strategy was informed by what we know about the politicised nature of the field, from our own experience, and from the WW-VAWG stakeholder survey findings. For example, the key factor influencing decisions on which services or prevention interventions to provide, fund or recommend, is whether the intervention is locally developed or adaptable. Academic and private sector respondents are most likely to place a higher value on scientific evidence, rather than on other issues (such as familiarity, local product, recommendation by a respected person).


## 3.2 KEY ACTORS ENGAGED

### 3.2.1 Audiences

We mapped stakeholders at the beginning of the evaluation, identifying professional groups such as evaluators, the VAWG community that was already engaged and targeted by the programme, research uptake professionals, and funders of VAWG programming. We were guided by the WW-VAWG programme's initial stakeholder survey. This produced detailed information on the types of information target audiences most wanted to hear about, for example, detailed and nuanced findings from rigorous impact evaluations, funding and policy recommendations, knowledge on what does not work, and lessons learned about how to influence policy using evidence.

We segmented our audiences and used a framework for deciding which ones to prioritise (**Figure 13**). We identified three broad groups, and ranked them in order of importance, as follows: first, WW-VAWG implementers across the three components; second, DFID, IAB, and other funders; and third, policy audiences interested in evidence about what works in ending VAWG (including evaluators). We identified suitable mechanisms and channels to reach and engage with these audiences.

**Figure 13: Audience Groupings**



With limited resources for communicating the evaluation findings, we focused on targeting communities already engaged by the programme and by the evaluation team. We also engaged via digital platforms that would reach professionals interested in the topic.



### 3.2.2 Outcomes of Communication

We identified a set of core audiences for our communication, and targeted each of them with the most appropriate and relevant evidence from the evaluation to meet their specific needs. We engaged face-to-face as far as possible, supported by short, to the point documents such as slide decks and executive summaries of reports. The outcomes of communication for each audience were as follows:

- **Implementing partners of WW-VAWG (all components):** to sharpen their M&E systems for tracking outcome-level indicators during programme implementation.
- **DFID, IAB, country level project advisory groups, and component-specific technical advisory groups:** to provide evidence of the programme's progress towards stated objectives and any lessons learnt.
- **DFID and any future co-funders of WW-VAWG:** to evidence programme performance that can inform decisions about course corrections, scale-up, or closure of the WW-VAWG programme. In this case, we have liaised closely with DFID over the course of the evaluation and the findings have fed into the design of the WW-VAWG phase 2.
- **Research and evaluation organisations, civil society organisations and think-tanks:** to share lessons learnt about how to translate evidence into action; monitor progress towards these ambitions; and build capacity to achieve policy influence.

We worked as 'critical friends' to the WW-VAWG programme, sharing draft reports and periodic RUPRs ahead of formal submission, and incorporating their comments and feedback as far as possible for an Independent Evaluation team.

## 3.3 COMMUNICATION METHODS

### 3.3.1 Meetings with programme Personnel

We met with the programme researchers, implementers and management, face-to-face, as often as the budget allowed. We recognised that these opportunities held the most potential for learning. At least two members of the evaluation team attended each of the ASMs, in Dubai (2016), Pretoria (2017), and Kathmandu (2018). We participated in the presentation of findings and used the opportunity to have side meetings and discussions with WW-VAWG researchers and implementers, as well as with members of the broader Community of Practice attending. We also participated in the IAB meetings and Management Meetings that followed each of the ASMs.

We participated in capacity development sessions that were planned around the ASM, and in Pretoria on July 4th 2017, we designed and ran a dedicated session, an 'Advanced Policy Briefs Workshop' for researchers and implementers.

We participated in the programme's regular quarterly Management Committee meetings, most of which were held virtually by conference call. We used these calls to give critical feedback specifically on RU progress reported in the quarterly and milestone reports submitted to DFID (RUPRs). In addition, we facilitated a face-to-face meetings of all component leads and selected Secretariat members to produce a revised joint ToC and, consequently, a revised logframe, for the programme.

We participated in a number of the Community of Practice (CoP) online discussion sessions/webinars at the invitation of the programme. The participants were both researchers and implementers who had self-selected to take part in the calls. We joined those that focused on RU, at the invitation of the programme.

### 3.3.2 UK Evaluation Society Presentation

We gave a presentation to the UK Evaluation Society's annual conference, which had as its theme The Use and Usability of Evaluation: Demonstrating and Improving the Usefulness of Evaluation, in London on 10th May 2017. Our session was entitled: *Lessons Learned from the Evaluation of DFID's What Works to Prevent Violence Programme*. The purpose was to share the evaluation approach, and to report on both progress made, and emerging findings from both the Inception Report and MTR. The team comprised Tim Conway (DFID RED), Dr Sheena Crawford (Evaluation Team Leader), Megan Lloyd-Laney (RU lead) and Kate Conroy (IMC MEL Technical Support). We presented the methodology, including, an evidence framework; the adapted REF framework for assessing academic outputs; the development of RU indicators and a strategic approach that sought to become 'critical friends' of the programme implementers. We shared findings on evaluating RU, stakeholder engagement, and ways of connecting implementation and research partners. The participatory session was delivered to more than 80 participants who signed up voluntarily to the session.

### 3.3.3 Sharing Findings in the Field

During a visit to South Africa, in November 2019, the Team Leader (Dr Sheena Crawford) presented an overview of the evaluation process, and some of our key findings, during Participatory Interest Group Discussions (PIGDs) with two groups (one male, one female) of former Stepping Stones-Creating Futures participants. This was an opportunity for them to learn about other aspects of the programme, and to give their feedback on what they think is needed in future project interventions.

## 3.4 PRODUCTS FOR DISSEMINATION

### 3.4.1 User-Friendly Products

The Inception Report and MTR (and the FE) were produced with Executive Summaries to enable those readers who are short of time to learn the key findings, impact assessments and recommendations quickly. We presented headline findings of each report to DFID and the programme, using a slide deck that can be shared easily with others.

We produced an 'easy to view' slide deck for each of the three RUPRs that were produced in September 2017, October 2018, and March 2019. The decks were used as a prompt for conversations, with both the programme and DFID, about progress made on informing and influencing the programme's target audiences, and the challenges encountered. DFID used the slide deck to raise visibility of the WW-VAWG and its emerging findings, across DFID and in their VAWG-prevention mainstreaming efforts.

We wrote a series of blogs on Research to Action (R2A), a website that caters for the strategic and practical needs of people trying to improve the way development research is communicated and used. The blogs focused on the challenges of evaluating VAWG prevention programmes, and the evaluation's learning about influencing policy and practice using WW-VAWG evidence. We promoted the posts via R2A's active social media platforms, which reach more than 10,000 followers on Twitter and the more than two thousand people/organisations that have "liked" the R2A Facebook page.

We produced short, accessible documents including, a leaflet distributed to more than 80 people who attended UK Evaluation Society session on evaluating the programme, called: 'Five Minute Read' of the MTR.

The evaluation team discussed how to evaluate the impact of the programme for a podcast recorded by IMC Worldwide and broadcast on their channel on 16th January 2018. The podcast drew on the

evaluation team's experiences of the WW-VAWG to explore the challenges of evaluating research, and communicating that information to decision makers.

### **3.4.2 Sensitive Information**

There is always a tension between reporting with accountability and transparency on sensitive data, and protecting the identity of individuals and groups, where necessary. Our ethical guidelines have ensured that we have followed WW-VAWG protocols regarding confidentiality of sensitive data.

### **3.4.3 Final Evaluation Products**

Aside from this report, we produced three accompanying Thematic Papers (outlined in **Figure 11**, and in more detail in **Annex 2**, including the EQs each relate to). All of which have been shared with DFID and Component Leads for comments, feedback, and fact checking which we have fed into the final version.

We are also producing several infographics and an annotated slide-deck to be used by DFID and other stakeholders in sharing the evaluation outcomes.

If we receive the go-ahead from DFID, we will seek to host a webinar for Phase 1 researchers and implementers to share the evaluation outcomes and discuss its implications.

## 4. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

In this Section we give answers to each of the evaluation questions, set out in our framework in Section 2. Findings are not exhaustive. The programme has produced a vast amount of work and has, as attested by all stakeholders consulted for the final evaluation (FE), made a profound contribution to the prevention of VAWG programmatic field. The assessment given here is indicative of what the programme has achieved. It does not, however, represent the fullness of its accomplishments, nor all of the challenges it has faced.

#### 4.1.1 Focus of Our Enquiry and Evidence Base

##### Sources of Evidence: Formal and Informal

The findings given here draw on all the sources for enquiry outlined in Section 2. They also make extensive use of our Practice-Based Knowledge and Learning (PBK/L). This is knowledge and understanding gained throughout the process of our involvement with WW-VAWG. It includes our own team processes of informal sharing on thinking and experience, and the many “conference coffees and corridor conversations”, which took place during the ASMs, Dissemination Events and during country visits. The inclusion of the IE Team (C4), in the ASMs was vital as it enabled us to review, reflect and critique our impressions and learning, and to gain a valuable overview on WW-VAWG experiences and progress. It also allowed us to feed back our expertise as Critical Friends. An example of this was the RU workshop on Policy Briefs, which we gave at the Pretoria ASM.

In late 2019 and early 2020, we held a team Analysis workshop and a Writeshop (both hosted by UoP). These were excellent opportunities for team members to finalise ideas and to ensure coherence in presentation and analysis of findings. They helped to ensure that this report is truly a team product.

The evidence we have gathered and used in this report is both formal and informal. We reviewed published literature (individual publications and websites, notably [www.whatworks.co.za](http://www.whatworks.co.za)). As in MTR, formal evidence derived for WW-VAWG and internal grey literature (Monitoring reports etc.) has been organised and coded into an Evidence Table. Evidence derived from KAIs has also been organised and is held in a confidential Interviews Coding Table. Importantly, the term “Key Actor” refers to any person who has a significant role to play in the programme. It includes, therefore; project constituents, project implementors, and NGO management, “local” and research institution researchers and data collectors, Programme Secretariat and programme staff, Component 1, 2, 3 and 4 management, the IAB, the donor, and specific policy and practice target stakeholders etc. We were able to extend the range and number of our KAIs by employing colleagues based in-country (in Pakistan, Nepal, and South Sudan) to carry out interviews under the guidance of the main IE team (all researchers are listed in **Annex 6**). We also built on data gathered and analysed at MTR<sup>36</sup>.

The small amount of evidence generated through snap-shot Participatory Enquiry, in eThekweni, Durban, is held in separate, computerised notes.

##### Triangulation and Reliability of Findings

By gathering evidence from many and varied sources, we have been able to triangulate findings and ensure, to the fullest extent possible, that the voices of different people, across the programme, have been listened to and heard. In all our enquiry, we have been sure to note the relative status and power

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<sup>36</sup> This has also fed in to the Thematic Papers on Research, Research Uptake and Innovation.

of the people whose opinions and experiences we are gathering, and to correlate this with the interpretations they give, and their own potential biases. In the end, we believe that it is because of the time, commitment, and effort that everyone has put into development of our role as a WW-VAWG Critical Friend (see **Section 2** and **Annex 2**) that our findings are a faithful representation of reality.

The first draft of this report will be reviewed by all components and well as by DFID and EQUALS. In light of comments, Version 2 will be prepared and submitted for final approval.

### Unexpected Findings

The programme exceeded targets set in its log-frame and scored A+s in Annual Reviews. So, we can say that these were “unexpected” achievements. At the beginning of the programme, and also at mid-term, it was hard to predict with accuracy, what could or would be achieved by the programme. No programme of this scope or scale had been attempted previously in relation to VAWG-prevention research and evaluation. In our assessment here, we have not rehearsed the successes already noted in Annual Reviews and the draft Programme Completion Reports (which are detailed). We focus, instead, on drawing out positives and highlighting improvement opportunities for future work.

The following sub-sections, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact, give our key findings.

## 4.2 EFFECTIVENESS

**OECD-DAC definition: EFFECTIVENESS: IS THE INTERVENTION ACHIEVING ITS OBJECTIVES?**

The extent to which the intervention achieved, or is expected to achieve, its objectives, and its results, including any differential results across groups. The relative importance of results may be noted.

### 4.2.1 Question 1

**Q1: Have the research methods selected and designed led to the rigorous collection of data that in turn has generated world leading new evidence?**

**The research methods selected and designed by each component supported a process of rigorous data collection that has led to world leading evidence.** The global evidence base has grown significantly as a result of WW-VAWG. We now understand more, in terms of the prevalence of VAWG in contexts such as South Sudan that have, to date, been invisible in global data. We understand the triggers for VAWG with greater depth and, perhaps most significantly, we understand considerably more about what works to prevent VAWG. As with all good research the success of the programme can also be seen in the new questions that have emerged as a result of the solid foundations laid by the WW-VAWG Phase 1.

The RCTs were successful, but hugely complex to design and to implement. As the interviews with researchers revealed, there were multiple challenges, from how to select suitable sites, to how to create static control and trial groups. The interview responses from those researchers involved in C1's research using RCTs clearly revealed that context is a driving factor in terms of the success of the approach. For example, in Rwanda the researchers involved were positive about the application of the RCT, and mentioned a 98% retention of their groups. The specific political economy of Rwanda, with traditional systems of participation and strictly imposed post-genocide government policies on community participation, led to commitment from participants. In South Africa, by contrast, the focus on a disadvantaged peri-urban setting, made the operationalisation of a randomised approach more complex, not least because of the fluid nature of people's lives (see also, below).

A number of the interviewees questioned whether RCTs were applied in a strict sense or were, in fact, adapted into more of a quasi-experimental approach: “For us, it was a Randomised Control Trial, but

the question of the units of randomisation, which were not many, brought on discussion as to whether we should refer to it as a quasi -experimental study.” (RCT Researcher, interview conducted August 2019). C1 has said that it was not always possible to conduct an RCT, and so the approach was adapted according to context. This distinction is not, however, a mark of less rigour, but a reasoned response- to build and shape a method, in a grounded way, that is sensitive to the specific field location.

The specific country and urban/rural context had a significant impact on how an RCT could be approached. For example, one researcher said; “One challenge in the design of our What Works trial was the clustering in a peri-urban/slum setting. The challenge was that the approach required the clusters to be separate so that you can have an intervention in some of the neighbourhoods, but not in all of the neighbourhoods. But in our peri-urban settlements we had a lot of interchange with people moving from one neighbourhood to another. So it is a challenge to know if the cluster-randomised design was clean.” (Interview conducted in August 2019).

Whilst qualitative research was conducted in all contexts apart from the Help the Afghan Children (HTAC) evaluation, the extent to which it happened in parallel or in a truly mixed manner is not clear. Since 1995, it has been accepted as good practice that qualitative research should be done first to inform the development of quantitative surveys. Further qualitative research should be carried out to deepen, and give nuance to, answers arising in surveys. As is often the case, resources to work in this way were not available. When qualitative approaches were used, particularly more open ended methods, researchers felt a level of richness was added to the analysis and findings: “Actually I really liked the design and we had an ethnographic process evaluation that went alongside it that utilised a lot of qualitative research and in-person participant observation”.

The success of C2’s research in South Sudan is particularly striking, firstly because of the complexity and fragility of the context in which they were working, and secondly because of the high regard with which the data were received on dissemination. A number of those involved in the data collection noted that: “The quality was of a very high standard and the lead researchers refused to compromise on this” (interview conducted in January 2020). Interviews with IRC staff in country highlight that, at least in part, success was down to the amount of time devoted to working with the data collectors, ensuring they were equipped with the tools and right approach to work on VAWG. C2 used a survey, and then qualitative methods, which allowed not just for data on prevalence to emerge, but clear understanding of the “why” of VAWG in each context. The link between IPV and bride-price, for example, emerged quite clearly in the analysis.

Data collection in Syria, around cash transfers, in Dadaab, and the GBV case management intervention offered insights and learning around what kind of tools work best in such complex contexts. In Syria the use of mobile phones to collect data was used and has contributed to greater understanding of how such data can be gathered in conflict situations, when more conventional, on-the-ground data collection is not possible. Similarly, in Dadaab, it was not possible to carry out an RCT for ethical and safety reasons. Instead, a cross-sectional survey and qualitative interviews with the case workers were used. The approach revealed the extent to which case workers are highly vulnerable, and the daily challenges they face. Whilst the data cannot evidence the impact of the interventions in terms of reducing VAWG, they do give new insights into the levels of vulnerability women, and men, suffer in refugee contexts. The outcomes point to the need to respond to these vulnerabilities in even more holistic and sustained ways.

C3 also set out to conduct mixed method data collection in Ghana, Pakistan and South Sudan. In South Sudan, the plans for qualitative data collection had to be stopped due to the re-emergence of conflict and associated ethical concerns over interviewing vulnerable women in even more heightened times. The goal of C3 was to provide evidence, through the development of a new costing model, on

the extent to which VAWG brings an economic burden. Whilst costing models on VAWG exist (for example Walby 2009), they focus on industrial settings. The intention of the C 3 team was to show that, even in more fragile contexts, VAWG carries significant economic costs and should be addressed. C3 has, to some degree, achieved this goal. The component has developed a societal level costing tool that is now being taken up by women's organisations, even outside the contexts the research was conducted in.

#### 4.2.2 Question 2

**Q2:** How is WW-VAWG contributing to understanding, research methods, and theory, and to the use of these for VAWG prevention.

- *Are the research methods considered innovative by those working to end VAWG outside of the programme?*

**The programme has made a game-changing contribution to understanding and research methods for VAWG prevention. It has greatly enhanced the possibilities for effective VAWG research, and implementation, over the coming years.** The research of WW-VAWG has contributed towards better understanding of different forms of violence and their triggers for VAWG<sup>37</sup>, and how best to gather data (which methods work best in different contexts and locations). The findings have supported a deepening of feminist theoretical perspectives on VAWG, linking it to social patriarchal norms which in turn has informed prevention activities that the research has proven work. C1 has contributed to greater theoretical understanding of masculinities and violence<sup>38</sup>.

In terms of the degree to which the methods are considered innovative by those that work to end VAWG outside of the programme, there is limited evidence of this so far. The research is mainly being used by researchers who are part of the WW-VAWG community who argue it is highly innovative. The reach of the findings outside of the WW-VAWG network is hard to assess and indeed it may be too early to see. The thrust of what works on uptake and applied impactful data means the focus of the outputs was rightly placed on policy makers and programming. That said, the number of citations documented in final reports, particularly of C1, is highly impressive and indicates the visibility and acknowledgement of the body of work WW-VAWG represents, which cannot be ignored by others in the field. A number of non WW-VAWG researchers were interviewed to test the reach of the research. Not everyone had heard of the programme but dissemination is still ongoing, and publications take a while to be picked up at discourse level. Other researchers who were engaged commented "I have definitely heard of it, it is important and exciting", and that "As a body of work it has helped me conceptualise my work in a more global way" (interviews conducted in August 2019).

C 2 has published guides on how to conduct prevalence studies in fragile contexts, and this is likely to have significant influence in shaping the approaches taken in the future.

In terms of the gaps left by the programme, more could still be done in developing a more integrated mixed approach that applies a political economy lens. The work in C2 has gone a considerable way to doing this in South Sudan, where prevalence data was collected through a mixed approach that was

<sup>37</sup> Gibbs A, Said N, Corboz J, Jewkes R Factors associated with 'honour killing' in Afghanistan and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: Two cross-sectional studies. PLoS One. 2019 Aug 8;14(8):e0219125

Corboz J, Gibbs A, Jewkes R (2019) Bacha posh in Afghanistan: factors associated with raising a girl as a boy. Culture, Health and Sexuality epub 17 June 2019.

Jewkes R, Corboz J, Gibbs A (2019) Violence against Afghan women by husbands, mothers-in-law and siblings-in-law/siblings: risk markers and health consequences in an analysis of the baseline of a randomised controlled trial. Plos One Feb 7;14(2):e0211361.

<sup>38</sup> Jewkes R, Morrell R, Hearn J, Lundqvist E, Blackbeard D, Lindegger G, Quayle M, Sikweyiya Y, Gottzen L (2015) Hegemonic masculinity: combining theory and practice in gender interventions. Culture Health and Sexuality. 17:sup2, 96-111, DOI: 10.1080/13691058.2015.108509, Jewkes R, Morrell R. (2018) Hegemonic Masculinity, Violence and Gender Equality: using latent class analysis to investigate the origins and correlates of differences between men. Men and Masculinities 21 (4), 547-571.

able to offer greater nuance into the specific societal context, thereby explaining the findings. The majority of the outputs present a descriptive narrative of what the data tells us about prevalence, prevention, and cost, and much less about how the wider political economy and cultural environment may have impacted on the findings. There is a level of framing and analysis that is missing because the analysis stopped short of engaging with the different theoretical approaches to contextualisation. That has implications when it comes to understanding how to scale-up and whether it might be possible and sustainable in the very long term (beyond 1-2 years). It is perhaps unfair to say the programme has missed opportunities, but in some of the KAls, it was commented that local knowledge was not drawn upon as much as it could have been. Closer and more systematic partnerships with local women's organisations would help to overcome most contextual blindness and should become an embedded part of all VAWG research.

### 4.2.3 Question 3

**Q3:** Has WW-VAWG developed and implemented systems and processes to ensure the availability, accessibility and usability of evidence, and to enable it to adapt and learn? If so, how?

- *Has the programme been able to adapt in response to monitoring information?*
- *How have the programme's internal monitoring systems allowed them to be responsive to needs and gaps in use?*

**The programme has developed and implemented systems and processes to ensure the availability, accessibility and usability of evidence, in a range of ways.** It set up and managed a range of communication platforms that ensured easy access to information about the programme and its findings. The [What Works website](#) has been an effective shop window for multimedia content. The majority of website content was from C1, which is the biggest component and has the most content emerging, but the website provided access to a repository of evidence from all three components. C2 tended to use its own distributive networks and platforms. These reflect a focus on humanitarian programming and were designed to reach C2's relevant audiences most effectively. Overall, information has been made accessible in two ways: firstly, by tailoring findings to different target audiences, e.g., through Evidence Briefs, infographics, production of videos, and securing press articles, and secondly, by publishing academic outputs through open access routes.

There are several ways in which the programme has shown it can adapt and learn in relation to evidence:

1. The evolution of one of the most important mechanisms for communicating the results of programme work to global audiences, **the Evidence Briefs**. The programme produced a bank of Evidence Briefs. These became more streamlined in design and consistent in tone and style as the programme progressed. The common structure and design allow the materials to be recognised clearly as part of the WW-VAWG programme library of resources, wherever they are found. The Evidence Briefs are tightly written, use graphics and infographics appropriately, and include quotes to both strengthen and personalise quantitative evidence. Negative/null findings are well explained and contextualised where relevant, with some analysis as to why those findings may have not seen positive change. The documents' implications and recommendations sections tend to be somewhat superficial, with many generalisable statements that may be of less practical help to their intended audience. Summaries of findings are clear, but could benefit from the inclusion of key statistics from the research project, to avoid becoming generic statements. The briefs did not always state the specific target audience for which they were written.
2. The way the programme has responded to challenges faced through **tailored and responsive capacity strengthening activities**. During programme design, assumptions were made about the capacities of (I)NGOs to a) manage an organisation, b) develop,



implement, monitor and evaluate projects, and c) understand and assess VAWG in the context of their work. These assumptions proved to be over-optimistic. A key adaptation approach was used early in the programme when it was realised that some implementing organisations did not have the organisational expertise they thought, a proven project design, or fully adequate experience in VAWG prevention programming. This meant that C1 programme management had to think outside the programme “box” in order to deliver the support to implementers needed in the timeframe available. When they recognised the needs, the programme developed and implemented an extensive system of capacity strengthening and mentoring<sup>39</sup>. The programme designed and used specific capacity development mechanisms, C1 TAs, for example. These Advisors were able to develop and maintain close relationships with project researchers and implementers. This allowed them to reflect on progress and adapt their RU plans in light of who was being reached and where interest for evidence was visible.

This allowed WW-VAWG to fulfil its mandated activities and fund the requisite number of projects (see below, and Thematic Paper 3).

3. **Development of partnerships between researchers and implementers, and between implementers themselves.** Capacity challenges also meant that projects needed support in dealing with RCTs at the same time as trialling new approaches to implementation. This was a challenge both to implementors and research institutions. One fortunate advantage that stemmed from the need for intensive capacity development support was the way that partnerships grew between WW-VAWG implementors. Organisations (for example, VSO Nepal, and partners in Tajikistan and Ghana) joined together for capacity strengthening activities.

**The programme’s systems for monitoring ensured adherence to a number of principles for effectiveness around research uptake.** The programme showed itself to be cognisant of, and responsive to, context in some specific country contexts, such as, where opportunities for influence opened up; where sensitivities around specific findings required a nuanced response to communication; and where problematic partnerships became a reputation risk. The programme started with a testable theory around RU, paid attention to principles of learning, adaptation and reflection, provided real-time feedback, and identified different levels of outcomes, including early or interim outcomes rather than just ‘big win’<sup>40</sup> outcomes. We did not, however, witness systematic use of the RU Strategy as a ‘living document’, one that is fully owned by components and regularly reviewed, and where the implementers are feeding back the results of their approaches with regular monitoring of data and learning through ‘sense making’ reflections.

The programme monitored progress against their RU objectives<sup>41</sup> in their reports to DFID, but there was large variation in both quantity and quality of reporting across the three components. Monitoring did not make visible the levels of reflection, analysis of progress, and any ‘course correction’ that occurred as a result of the programme reflecting on progress made. The RUPRs, a mechanism introduced by C4 in the second half of the programme to monitor progress against a more detailed set of influencing ‘staging posts’, and to critique RU approaches against the global strategy, provided additional external focus on progress being made. RUPRs allowed us to interrogate the assumptions made in the programme’s monitoring reports and to identify gaps and opportunities.

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<sup>39</sup> See WW-VAWG paper and **Thematic Paper 3**.

<sup>40</sup> ODI Working Paper 395

<sup>41</sup> Output 5 in the Logframe

#### 4.2.4 Question 4

**Q4:** Has the programme been effective in developing capacities, of partners and relevant stakeholders, that are sufficient to achieve outcomes?

- *Is there evidence that in country research capacity has been built through the programme, e.g., are outputs systematically co-published with Southern partners? Is there evidence of ongoing training?*
- *What was the contribution of the programme's 'CD for RU' approach to achieving uptake?*

**Across the portfolio of WW-VAWG there are positive and challenging examples of working in partnerships, and in particular across the North and the South.** The ethos of the programme and across components, by the mid- to end-point, stressed the importance of developing Southern research capacity and supporting national researchers to build their profiles through co-authored or single authored publications. Due to the time it takes for new data to be gathered co-publishing did not begin until a few years into the programme. This meant that at the start of the programme we saw a much greater dominance of outputs authored by research leads. As partnerships and relationships grew and data emerged this picture shifted.

In contexts where teams of researchers managed to work closely and did so from the start, the impact and results are clearly stronger and have far more likelihood of leaving lasting legacy in the form of increased research capacity. For example, in Rwanda one researcher commented;

*“on the qualitative side I worked very closely with four different Rwandan qualitative researchers and we worked together. They conducted most of the data collection and were involved in analysing the data with me and were also involved in co-authoring papers. We strove to involve Rwandan programme partners in co-authoring papers which for all of them was the first time to be involved with publications. An important element was really building capacity especially on research writing. Our southern researchers, for instance, asked the team for capacity training sessions on writing blogs and on understanding randomisation so they could speak to local leaders on qualitative sampling.”*

(Researcher interviewed August 2019)

The interviews brought to light differences in approach to capacity development used in the programme, and the model of capacity development was slightly different across components. Some component researchers felt uncomfortable with the pressure to document that capacity had been built. In some contexts senior in country researchers took responsibility to build the capacity of their team. As one senior researcher shared; *“It felt very uncomfortable to then ask Southern senior researchers who had conducted training of colleagues if they felt they had seen their capacity built”* (Interview conducted in January 2020). In some contexts, interviews revealed a mixed response, with evidence of capacity development in many forms, but perhaps with a missed opportunity for more. Some of the workshops, according to some KAs, *“lacked depth”*. Lessons emerging from the planning of capacity development focus on ensuring that a full reflexive audit is conducted of where researchers feel their strengths and weaknesses lie, and to identify their priorities for professional development. These should then form the basis of a capacity development programme. With that said, there are some very positive examples of local researchers and implementers who felt they had benefitted from working with more senior and experienced researchers and technical experts. For example, in Nepal the data collectors from Equal Access spoke of the growth in their methods as a result of working with the researcher from Emory University. It was acknowledged that relationships between researchers, data collectors and implementers is always potentially fraught; *“It always remains difficult between a researcher who comes from a research background, research institute, an implementer, and a*

*development worker. We should work on how to equalise that power dynamic”* (Interview conducted in January 2020).

It should be noted that very few of the Northern and senior researchers talked in interviews about how their capacity had been impacted by the experience, yet clearly it will have been dramatically, not least through new knowledge on cultural context. In terms of breaking down unhelpful and uncomfortable power dynamics, embedding an action learning approach that encourages the whole team, regardless of seniority, to reflect on learning and learning needs as part of an ongoing process may go some way to achieving this. This approach could also be used as a mechanism to check in on the health of the partnership and respond quickly to any challenges, problems, and tensions.

The programme approached capacity strengthening for RU in a range of different ways that are compliant with best practice in the field. This included tailored support by TAs who were assigned to specific C1 projects over the first three years and meaningful inclusion of Southern researchers in high profile engagement events. For example, C2 researchers from South Sudan were involved as key players in 16 Days of Activism workshops held in London in December 2017 (with support given to strengthen presentation/writing skills ahead of the event). Researchers were funded to attend the SVRI conference in Rio de Janeiro September 2017 and October 2019, bespoke capacity development sessions/workshops in Tajikistan (focus on data analysis), Rwanda (on blog writing), and Bangladesh (on data and data analysis). Inclusion of early career and Southern academics as authors in journal articles is in itself a capacity strengthening activity.

The positive results are evident in the growing confidence of researchers and implementers in the ASMs, and in their increasingly visible role in the sessions. It is also seen in the review of CD support provided by C1, which showed increased confidence in RU, second only to project reporting (self-reported by participants), and in the increased number of dissemination outputs, including blogs and media interviews produced by the researchers and implementers. As discussed in Thematic Paper 2, on RU, the ASMs were ground-breaking. The 2018 Pretoria capacity development workshop was a shining example of this: after two days of intensive CD on RU, implementing partner representatives impressed the ASM audience with concise, accessible, informative and engaging mini-presentations on their work. They also produced blogs for dissemination and RU.

Nevertheless, the programme did not always engage Southern partners in a way that optimised uptake in local contexts. For example, Southern researchers were sometimes contracted with a limited remit, such as overseeing data collection and conducting preliminary analysis, but not to help frame and communicate findings in ways appropriate for uptake by local/national audiences, or to help identify and engage local policy audiences. This limited both RU and potential for learning about the demand for evidence on this topic.

#### 4.2.5 Question 5

**Q5:** Has the evidence influenced policy and is it changing investment levels in WW-VAWG countries and beyond?

- *Where there are signs of positive shifts, what is the evidence of the programme’s unique contribution?*
- *Where positive shifts are not yet visible, where is the potential for uptake and how has the programme optimised the chances for this to happen?*

**The programme has shaped discourse and attitudes around violence prevention, and influenced both policy and practice in many different dimensions. It has prompted promises of more investment in research on GBV and informed the architecture of future programming in ways that hold potential for future impact. South Africa, South Sudan and, to a certain extent, Ghana, are examples of this.**

The evidence has helped DFID to increase its convening power across government and opened doors to talking about social violence more broadly. In particular, there was a feeling that C2 work on peace and security (especially work on South Sudan) had helped to nuance and bring subtlety to the UK government's ongoing work on the National Action Plan on VAWG. It has been explicitly incorporated into other organisations' guides and procedures, including the 2019 RESPECT publication produced by World Health Organisation (WHO) and UN Women that is aimed at country-level prevention programmes. Preventing Violence Against Women: A Framework for Policymakers, was developed based on the UN framework for action to prevent violence against women and drew on new evidence that included WW-VAWG findings and includes a mechanism for new evidence from WW-VAWG to be incorporated as it becomes available.

The programme has achieved visibility and prominence amongst key stakeholder groups. It has successfully 'built demand' from the communities it seeks to influence e.g. invitations to present findings at a donor Round Table in Denmark, and workshop at Sida's headquarters in Sweden; half-day workshops at the World Bank; briefings to USAID; and a series of webinars for UN Women country offices. There is also evidence it has influenced the design of new programmes e.g. informed the design of EU/UN Euro500m Spotlight programme; feeding into GIZ Euro8m to UNFPA Eastern and Southern Africa programme; Informed the DFID-funded £18m stand-alone prevention and response programme in Malawi; and evidence being used to inform the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Office of Development Effectiveness (ODE) as part of Australia's ongoing commitment to end VAWG. Evidence has been explicitly incorporated into other organisations' guides and procedures e.g. The UN RESPECT framework published by WHO and UN Women.

The programme's final synthesis products have the most potential to influence both VAWG policy and practice audiences and, importantly, those working outside the VAWG sector such as education and health, and on issues that cross all sectors, for example, disability. As these products are not yet officially launched, it is not possible to comment meaningfully on how well they have been received, by whom, and what shifts in attitude, discourse, behaviours they may trigger. This is a practical constraint of the programme design that saw the most authoritative and compelling outputs – the final synthesis products – produced at the end of the programme cycle when most of the country-level participants were no longer in contract, and there was very little time for engagement and influential conversations around them.

In the boxes below (**Box 2** and **Box 3**), we give examples of the route to uptake. We have chosen South Africa and South Sudan as illustrations. These are not the only countries where governments are working towards policy change (Ghana is discussed in **Thematic Paper 3** and, for example, Governments in Pakistan and Rwanda have expressed interest).

#### Box 2: Policy Influence in South Africa

Dating back to 2015, SAMRC's engagement in violence prevention work was consolidated in 2018 when the President convened the **National Gender-based Violence and Femicide Summit**. WW-VAWG staff were represented in the planning and organising of the Summit, and evidence from the programme informed the **President's speech**. Civil Society and women's organisations were very active in pushing for change. Subsequently, the **National Strategic Plan (NSP) (Outcome Indicator 2)** was drafted using WW-VAWG evidence to shape the prevention pillar. In 2019, the What Works team were deeply involved in drafting of the ZAR1.2 billion (approx. £64 million) emergency budget (**Outcome Indicator 3**), announced by the **President in Parliament** on 18<sup>th</sup> September to address the scourge of GBV in the country. One of the priorities for the fund is the national roll out of the VAWG prevention interventions to 44 out of 52 districts, which should include Stepping Stones Creating Futures. A key informant interviewed by the Independent Evaluation Team (IMC), Dr Chandre Gould from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) South Africa, noted that *"there is an enormously important 'policy moment' happening in*

*South Africa currently. What Works are very present in the conversation and are driving it hard with evidence”*

(Source: RUPR, March 2019).

None of the engagement outlined in Box 2 would have happened were it not for the reputational assets accrued by SAMRC. Particular members of staff were well-known for their activism and commitment to promoting positive social change for the benefit of women and girls. Their opinions were trusted by the people in power, and forceful enough to champion change (for further discussion on this, please see **Section 5**, on Learning and Recommendations).

The research in South Sudan has reached and influenced a wide, international audience:

### **Box 3: No Safe Place: VAWG in a Conflict Setting in South Sudan**

The programme’s prevalence study in South Sudan has positively influenced the development of a series of major global policies, including the UN’s renewed mandate in South Sudan, and the UK’s 2018-2022 National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security. The No Safe Place research has been cited by politicians from all three major political parties, and in both houses of the UK parliament. A ‘campaign’ of dissemination around the study’s publication resulted in increased demand for evidence, including Chris Trott, the UK’s Special Representative for Sudan and South Sudan and head of DFID Sudan Unit, asking to be sent the full reports in advance of his participation in the South Sudan peace talks, in Addis Ababa in 2017.

In addition, Lord Bates referenced the study in a call to action issued to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting on April 25<sup>th</sup>, and Mark Lowcock (UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Head of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) cited the study in a speech to the UN Security Council. High level, informal discussions have been held, with key actors in the country’s peace process, including the US Ambassador to South Sudan, on how to implement the recommendations of the study.

The findings have been incorporated into the humanitarian response plans of the GBV Sub-Cluster in South Sudan, and have significantly enhanced the debate on how to recognise and tackle VAWG in the country. DFID officials emphasised that the findings “stimulated discussion” with other government colleagues, particularly on the need to have a more nuanced understanding of the types of violence that affect women and girls during conflict and crises. The IPV findings, in particular, have helped to:

*“take some of the emotion out of the debate... We’re telling you violence in conflict does not only include sexual violence – now we just point to the [South Sudan] report. It’s been extremely helpful to move us forward, using the evidence rather than just taking our word. It’s shining a spotlight on how awful it [VAWG] is but also that the response has to address multiple forms of violence”. C2 research has been able to “get humanitarians thinking about the need for programming for VAWG prevention and response to be a standard; not an add on, not an optional.”*

The robustness and importance of the research, in both the way the research was conducted in very challenging settings, and its results, is applauded by some in its influential target audience:

*“As the first stand-alone VAWG population-based survey in an active conflict context, there is no question about the value of the study to the field”,* said Diana Arango, Senior GBV and Gender Specialist at the World Bank.

And a US government official stated that, “*The No Safe Place research was really seminal in affirming what GBV actors have been saying for a long time. It isn’t just sexual violence, IPV might actually be more pervasive and pernicious and insidious and normalised.*”

Sources: Consultations for the IE 2019 and 2020

WW-VAWG’s ability to influence at national and international levels is impressive. In some cases, however, more needs to be done to ensure that evidence will lead to action. In Afghanistan, for example, it was noted by IE consultees that opportunities to influence had been missed when key implementers did not manage to attend vital meetings. Additionally, the government in Pakistan (at State and National levels) were hesitant to commit to upscaling the ‘Right to Play’ in schools across the country before seeing the results of the cost effectiveness study that was commissioned by DFID, once the positive results of the project became known.

#### 4.2.6 Question 6

**Q6:** To what extent has the programme used innovative approaches effectively?

**The ability to think creatively and innovatively; to address problems as they arose, and to respond to different needs in different contexts, has greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the programme.** The ability to be innovative, to think, and work, “outside the box”, is crucial to all development interventions. In recent years, as programmes have worked more explicitly with an adaptation focus<sup>42</sup>, innovation has been viewed in different ways. The IE Team have worked with an understanding that innovation is not just about doing things differently, and in fact this may not always be the case. Instead, it is about a combination of drive, motivation and conviction that pushes approaches in such a way that transformation happens that was previously thought impossible. It might also mean the application of approaches tried and tested elsewhere, in a new context.

**Thematic Paper 3** examines in more detail how this worked in the programme,

Originally, the ToRs for the programme called for innovation grants to be given to interventions focusing on new approaches to VAWG-prevention. Early on, it could be seen that innovation was a characteristic of the programme as a whole and that it would need to be creative, flexible and innovative if it was to fulfil what was expected of it.

In C1, some organisations had made claims of having tried and tested project approaches (when, in fact, they had not). Many of the projects involved new or adapted approaches. C1 mentors and Secretariat staff worked hard to help organisations develop project approaches and results frameworks which had a good chance of working and which, importantly, would be capable of rigorous evaluation. This presented a considerable challenge as the RCTs are not always considered to be suited to evaluation of social change interventions (see discussion above). They are not usually used on approaches (in medical terms, treatments) that have not already been judged likely to succeed. Yet, through the experience of programme management and mentors, WW-VAWG managed to ensure that RCTs, and quasi-experimental evaluations, could be used without compromising on the implementation of projects or research.

<sup>42</sup> Even if they have not worked with a formal Adaptive Management approach – which requires points for review and adaptation to be pre-programmed from the outset.



Below, we give a brief list of other key ways in which the programme has optimised its effectiveness by adopting innovative approaches. More details are available in **Thematic Paper 3**, on Innovation, Capacity Development and Partnership.

- Partnerships between traditionally uncomfortable “bed-fellows” – NGO implementers and academic research institutions – have been established, many of them highly successfully.
- New ways to promote South-to-South learning have evolved (through “buddy” type relationships between Southern partners, and the Capacity Development workshops prior to the ASMs).
- Intervention approaches that have existed for decades, Stepping Stones, for example, have been adapted to new contexts and concerns. The core principles in Stepping Stones – communication, gender, participation – have been retained, but modules have been developed adapted to VAWG and to the changing context of development intervention.
- The complex, multi-component modality of WW-VAWG, which involved high risks, broke new ground in the VAWG arena, and paid dividends.
- The programme aimed to address a particular form of violence: IPV. Through looking innovatively at IPV in different ways (direct implementation, in fragile contexts, in terms of costs), the relationship between IPV and other forms of VAWG began to be made more explicit.
- Allowing IE to be the fourth component was innovative in itself, and also highly beneficial (to us in the IE Team and, we believe, to the programme). IE is rarely, if ever, a recognised component of a programme. By allowing it ‘in, it has not compromised our ability to be independent and objective. It has, however, made it easier to become the desired “critical friends” and allowed for good relationships that are innovative, independent, and respectful to develop between the IE Team and Components 1, 2, and 3. An example of this has been our ability to be brought into the ASMs, and our inclusive approach to the six-monthly RUPRs. Had we been more siloed, the opportunities for learning from us would not have happened, and we would not have learned as much about the programme.

#### 4.2.7 Question 7

**Q7:** To what extent have the architecture and modalities of the programme contributed to its effectiveness in preventing VAWG?

- *To date, what has been the impact on effectiveness of the staggered start-up dates for components?*

**The architecture of the programme has not been without challenges, but it has allowed the programme to explore different approaches to prevention of VAWG, to gather a wealth of compelling evidence, and to spread information and understanding to a wide audience. The staggered start-up dates, for the different components (C1, C2 and C3), initially made good coordination between components more challenging.**

Over the last decade, there has been growing commitment to the idea that to promote meaningful social change (which prevention of VAWG requires) we need intervention to stimulate change in beliefs, values and attitudes, and in individual and social action. The changes need to happen concurrently in three distinct, but overlapping and interdependent spheres. These spheres are, a) the legal and regulatory environment (through legal, policy and major programmatic reform), b) the general wave of opinion (through catalytic movements), and c) model, targeted interventions that work

and demonstrate tangible change (focused projects at community and social levels)<sup>43</sup>. A major advantage of the WW-VAWG design (and its implementation) is that it has allowed the programme to make an effective contribution in all three of these spheres. Influence in the spheres has been different for each component. There is evidence to show that C1 has been influential in all three spheres, C2 and C3 – since they were not involved in implementation of projects – have been most influential in the policy environment and in opening up spaces for discourse. There is a strong political appetite for the findings from C3. RU is, to a large extent, dependent on countries being able to understand how much they lose by not investing in VAWG-prevention, and how much they may gain by making that investment.

The way in which the programme was divided in the ToR was as follows: C1 - research and implementation, scale-up (though removed following Inception), innovation, and evaluation, C2 - research to deepen and broaden understanding on VAWG in humanitarian and conflict settings, and C3 - research on the economic costs of VAWG, meant that organisations within each component could work to their own strengths and were not dependent on the work of other components. Only C 4, as Independent Evaluators worked across and between all components.

At MTR we noted the separation in design of the three main programme components and assessed the difficulties that derived from their staggered start-up dates (highlighted in **Box 4** below):

#### Box 4: Staggered Start Date Difficulties

*“The programme components were designed to be operationally and contractually separate. This was to allow for adequate concentration on the three distinct areas of research. Cross-working between components was a key consideration in programme design in order that “coherence across components reduces duplication and enables synergies for synthesis and cross-learning”” (DFID 2013: 34).*

*“The risk of lack of coherence across the programme, as a result of the contracting method, was identified in the design phase. The potential for duplication, inability to synthesise across the programme, and loss of opportunity for building on lessons and emerging findings, was recognised. In order to mitigate this risk, cross-learning was built into each component ToR, with C1 holding overall responsibility for learning and synthesis across the three components. The aim was to ensure that component budgets were sufficient to allow for cross-learning. The Independent Advisory Board (IAB) and SMRC were tasked with providing guidance, and DFID was to support and promote cross-learning through monitoring and management processes”*

(Source: MTR of WW-VAWG )

C4 was contracted after the other three components. This was beneficial as we were able to complete our Inception Phase with fair understanding on what the work of the programme entailed and on what we would be monitoring and evaluating.

The MTR assessment found that, although there was cooperation, to a degree, across the three main components, an overall synergy had yet to develop. Staggered start-up times for the three main components did not help, but as the programme progressed, coordination became stronger. This is, in large part, due to the strident efforts of the Secretariat to promote coordination, and commitment of the components to achieving it. Nevertheless, people and organisations tend not to coordinate well together unless they can see and appreciate the benefits of doing so. Our consultations with stakeholders give evidence that the benefits were most appreciated by C1 and C2. C1 and C2 appear to have gained most out of the presentation, sharing and learning opportunities offered by the ASMs,

<sup>43</sup> See, for example: Crawford, S., (2012), Towards Ending FGM/C in Africa and Beyond; A Scoping Paper... Harmful Traditional practices: Your Questions, our Answers,



and appear to have had similar timings and aims driving them towards presentation and publication of findings.

There has been a high level of learning *within* each of Components 1, 2 and 3. The architecture of C1 and the way in which capacity strengthening needs were addressed has led to many of the synergies envisaged by DFID at design stage (see above and the **Thematic Paper 3**). Equally, C 2 and C3 have been able to learn from the approaches adopted in their focus countries, and to share that learning across the component. Learning has also permeated across/between the components (particularly at the ASMs). Nevertheless, dividing the programme into such distinct components, without a completely clear remit to coordinate, nor highly clarified reason to do so, was a gamble. It took time for the individual approaches of each component to be ‘bedded in’, and this was time when little concentration could be devoted to cross-component coordination. In the following section, we note lessons learned from this, and make recommendations on how to encourage deeper coordination in the second phase.

The evidence suggests that the effectiveness of the programme was not severely challenged by the particular programme architecture, but this is because initial difficulties were recognised and overcome. For the current phase, we note that coordination and synergies between the components could have been stronger. That they were achieved is attributable to the dedication and ‘extra time’ invested by the Secretariat (a fact acknowledged by all management level stakeholders consulted).

## 4.3 EFFICIENCY

How well are resources used? The extent to which the intervention delivers, or is likely to deliver, results in an economic and timely way

This section does not give a full assessment of the efficiency of the programme. In-depth, financial analysis was beyond the remit of the evaluation and, if desired at this stage, requires a separate enquiry process. In answering the following efficiency questions, we focus on whether the programme has been able to use its budget effectively and with equity.

### 4.3.1 Question 8

**Q8:** Are the governance and management structures of the components, and of the overall programme, efficient in line with DFID’s ‘4Es’ approach to measuring VFM?

**The governance and management structures have supported VFM, and have enabled adequate attention to be devoted to the equity aspects for VFM.**

The DFID approach to Value for Money (VFM) is given in **Box 6** below.

#### Box 5: DFID’s Approach to Value for Money

DFID uses a 3E framework – economy, efficiency and effectiveness – to track VFM through its results chain (from inputs to outputs, outcomes and impact). Increasingly, it adds equity as a fourth E, equity, in line with its commitment to ensuring that women and marginalised groups are not left behind. Internationally, DFID is a strong advocate for the VFM agenda, as part of the UK’s global commitment to strengthening development assistance. Overall the value for money approach has become more holistic over time, with greater emphasis on the quality as well as the quantity of results, despite measurement challenges. By incorporating equity into its value for money assessments, DFID has also acknowledged that reaching marginalised groups may entail additional effort and cost. However, DFID has yet to develop methods for assessing value for money across different target groups to

inform operational decision-making. It could also do more to take account of the sustainability of its results, giving it a longer-term perspective on value for money.

Source: Adapted from ICAI, 2018.<sup>44</sup>

As focus on VFM has intensified in all DFID's work, the need to add a fourth "E", Equity, into the usual framework of Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness, has become very apparent. DFID's mandate, over recent years, to reach the poorest and most marginalised people, to fulfil rights and address discrimination, means that issues of equity are fundamental to all development work.

Working with an equity lens is sometimes harder in programmes that seem, by definition, already to be addressing the issues of highly vulnerable and marginalised people. These programmes include those on VAWG-prevention, end-FGM/C, and end-Child Marriage. In assessing these programmes, we need to understand, among other things, a) whether the programme design and management is well-suited to the needs of the people it addresses and in a cost-effective manner, and b) whether programme design and operation allow for adequate understanding and disaggregation of programme constituents, so that the most marginalised people, even within an already marginalised 'group', are also gaining benefits.

A third consideration is that of cost-efficiency: is the programme getting the best possible return for its investment? For example, are unit costs 'reasonable'? In WW-VAWG, C3 has begun to give us information through which we can understand the costs of VAWG to families, communities and national economies. Projects in C1 have begun to show that VAWG can be prevented, and we now know much more about what it will take to prevent it, and the costs of prevention. C2 has shown the huge social and developmental costs of violence in humanitarian and conflict settings. But many questions remain. Not least among these is the issue of "what price would we ethically and reasonably set on achieving freedom from violence for a woman or a girl?"

At the end of Phase 1, we would not expect to see solid answers to these questions. What we can say is that the design of the programme – into separate, but inter-connected components – has strengthened its ability to deliver VFM. Intrinsic to this (and see answers on innovation above) has been the programme's ability to manage adaptively, and to problem-solve creatively, especially when C1 projects were in difficulties (for example, in capacity development and mentoring). Although the solutions to problems carried considerable costs, we believe these to be justified in light of ensuing results.

In C1, 40% of the projects supported by the programme were in conflict and fragile settings. Both C2 and C3 worked in conflict and fragile settings (for example, programme work in Afghanistan, DRC, and the Occupied Palestinian Territories). This meant that highly vulnerable people were part of the programme's constituency from the outset. Over the course of the programme, attention to equity issues has been strengthened even further, including greater involvement and active engagement of Southern partners (as evidenced by co-authorship of publications, co-presentation at high-level meetings, etc.) The Southern-Based Secretariat ensured that Southern voices were always strong. Increasingly, more attention is turning to the 'marginal within the marginal'- women and girls living with disabilities, LGBTQ individuals, etc. Reaching the most marginalised people carries higher costs, but has been shown to bring greater long-term VFM than 'business as usual' approaches.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>44</sup> <https://icai.independent.gov.uk/html-report/dfids-approach-to-value-for-money-in-programme-and-portfolio-management/>

<sup>45</sup> UNICEF (2012).

### 4.3.2 Question 9

**Q9: Was there adequate budgetary flexibility to allow programme adaptation in response to change in needs?**

**Negotiations with DFID allowed for flexibility in the budgets, to meet emerging needs as well as those predicted in early budget planning. The programme budget was high. The successes of the programme, however, were partly behind programme organisations investing their own time and resources into ensuring that final products were of the best quality.**

To answer this question, we asked the component management from all components to reply to three key questions:

1. Did you have enough flexibility in the budget to do what you needed/wanted to do?
2. Did your organisation have to subsidise the budget, in any way, to make sure you could do, a) what was expected, b) what you felt was needed, and c) what you wanted to do?
3. Do you feel the budget, and flexibility in it, was adequate to allow you to be as equitable as you would have liked to be in your approach?

The answers we received to these questions suggested that the components generally felt that they had adequate budget to do what they needed to do in terms of their contractual commitments, and that they were allowed considerable levels of fungibility and flexibility.

*“I think we had a lot of flexibility in our budget and were able to try and do what we felt needed to be done and wanted to do rather than just what we had initially proposed or been told to do. A key example was in capacity development, where really we did a lot of things that were not initially planned and budgeted – most of the face to face work was not in the budget and also capacity development for the impact evaluation grantees (Rwanda, Ghana, Pakistan, KHPT, SSCF and WFWI) was not in the initial budget”*

(Source: C1 Management).

Programme management did, however, feel that there was not always space within budgets to respond to emerging opportunities - both C1 and C3 management organisations felt the need to subsidise the budget, so as to ensure they delivered the best results they could:

*“SAMRC definitely did subsidise WW. A major subsidy has been ... to enable the end-line events in London and finishing the programme’s work ... It’s not just the events, ... it was impossible to finish all the products last year ... and we have [paid] for people to work in 2020 on the products”*

(Source: C1 Management)

There are two very positive points about the willingness of programme management organisations to subsidise final costs. Firstly, it ensured that the final products were of the highest possible quality, and satisfy the rigorous, peer review mechanisms in place. Secondly, it points towards the successes and sustainability of achievements as organisations generally do not invest resources unless they can see the benefits in terms of tangible results. In a sense, this “spontaneous” investment, shows the extent to which prevent-VAWG initiatives are now embedded within organisational work.

The components would have liked to have the opportunity for wider intra-programme dissemination at endpoint:

*"We would have liked to have had a large ASM in 2019 or early 2020, to share synthesis products. It's such a pity that those who worked so hard on the actual projects haven't had a chance to really understand what we learned (more than the sum of the parts)".*

(Source: C1 Management).

It is nothing new to find that programmes have neither time nor resources left at the end to ensure that final products can be shared in the best possible ways. It is a shame that partners from the Global South, who have contributed in so many ways to creation of the programme's successes and products, have not been able to take part in the final dissemination process. In future programming, it might be possible to ring-fence final dissemination workshop costs.

### 4.3.3 Question 10

**Q10:** What lessons can be learned across the three components to improve VFM of research and innovation programmes?

- *Choice of research institutes*
- *Synergies with other research programmes and partners*

**Across the programme, we have seen that the ability to develop good, working partnerships, between research institutions and implementers is vital. When a research institution is in the country of operations and/or senior researchers spend considerable time in the context of work, VFM is improved. In future work, synergies will be increased by extending relationships with other organisations/programmes working in the area (see, also, Thematic Paper 3).**

The benefits of an ethical commitment to working in equal partnership can be seen in many of the examples given in the **Thematic Paper 2**. In some instances, these relationships were not fostered and a more extractive approach taken. In one example, the relationships between the external Northern university team and the organisation was difficult, with feelings of being used articulated by the intervention staff involved. The specific approach trialled and the data collected has been cited in KAIs as robust and impressive. However issues arose in relation to the accessibility of the treatment. The RCT seemed to be part of a patent process resting with the Northern research institution which meant that following the conclusion of the research the local partner organisation felt that the treatment approach was not available to them for future use. This example highlights the need for clarity over the purpose and end use of research data, if it evidences success the intervention should be seen as a global public good.

This example raises some tricky questions. Firstly, in this instance equal relationships were clearly not achieved, further evidencing the need to have clear protocols to ensure inclusion and shared expectations throughout. A second question emerges in relation to how scale up can be achieved in a viable and sustainable way. An intervention that is proven to work may be taken to scale through donor funding. But, as we know, this is often subject to funding cycles, with no guarantee of renewal. So, this raises the question, what do we mean by scale and how do we measure it? If an intervention is simply too expensive regardless of the evidence that it works, it will not be economically viable to scale it. Local partner expectations over scale up need to be carefully managed. One KA involved in the data collection reflected; *"Local people were used to collect data only, not part of the process beyond that. The use of a Microsoft package that local researchers had no training in, limited their involvement and they were not offered training"* (Interview conducted October 2019). This again points to the need for firm ethical protocols about how to manage and behave in partnerships.

## 4.4 SUSTAINABILITY

Will the benefits last? The extent to which the net benefits of the intervention continue, or are likely to continue. Involves analyses of resilience, risks and potential trade-offs.

### 4.4.1 Question 11

**Q11:** What evidence is there that the gains made/positive outcomes achieved by WW-VAWG will be sustained over time?

- *Test the claims being made by the research*
- *Evidence that the gains made by WW-VAWG (e.g., 50% reduction violence) will be sustained*

**At this stage, close to the end of the programme, it is hard to judge reliably whether gains made will be sustained over the longer term. More will be known in 2-3 years if the planned follow-up visits are made to test the level to which positive change has been sustained<sup>46</sup>.**

The programme data from the evaluations points to up to 66% (DRC) change rates away from violence. But, can these changes be sustained over time? In Tajikistan, follow-up at 30 months (15 months after the end of implementation) show that changes have been maintained over this period. However, this is not long enough to indicate prolonged social change away from violence.

What we do know, is that some contexts and societies are more likely to sustain positive change than others. In some places, Rwanda example, the society practices and experiences from other programmes suggest that there is a good deal of community support to maintain change, once change has been embraced<sup>47</sup>. Also, in Rwanda, the community is encouraged politically to operate for the good of the whole- the 'Indashyikirwa' being 'champions of change' with responsibilities for promoting and stimulating change throughout their communities. In other contexts, Afghanistan for example, the core unit of cohesion is different. Beneath the concept of tribe, the family is the nexus of control, and anything that happens within the house considered private. This means that different mechanisms of support are needed to promote and maintain positive change away from violence. This also means that we need to have a deep understanding of how relationships and power (i.e. the power to shape social values and behaviours, including gender relations) operate in each of the different contexts of work. We also need to understand more about what keeps people on positive pathways towards VAWG prevention, and what may lead them to return to violence.

There are indications to suggest that some changes, at least, are being sustained. **Box 6**, below, gives an example gained during field enquiry for the FE:

#### Box 6: Sustaining changes in eThekweni

During the visit to Project Empower, in November 2019, I was taken to the townships to have a meeting with one group of young men and one group of young women. We met, first, with a group of seven young men, all of whom had been participants in the Stepping Stones-Creating Futures (SS-CF) project. The group had been gathered by one of the SS-CF participants, and all were self-selecting. After a somewhat cautious start, the group settled down and were very open in talking about their experiences during the programme and since. They all agreed that two of the most important things the project had given them were increased belief in themselves, and a group of friends with whom they could share information and concerns. These things, they said, had continued over the 18 months since the programme ended, even when times were tough. Most of the young men were unemployed, or working as day labourers, whenever possible. I asked no questions about violence – it

<sup>46</sup> We understand that this will planned into a future phase (E. Esplen, *personal communications*)

<sup>47</sup> See, for example, Annual reviews of the 12+ programme, Phase 1

would not have been appropriate, since I had only just met the men. Several of them said, though, that, since the project, they could find better ways to sort out their problems than hitting people. I was impressed when one of the men said he had enrolled in a local college to study business so that he, and his friend from the group, would be able to set up a tailoring business together. Another wanted to set up a chicken business, breeding and selling hens and eggs. These were hopes that the men had been keeping alive since the end of the project. At moments, they seemed to retain belief that they would be able to start a business, or get good work. But, it became increasingly obvious that, really, they had little idea how to make that happen, how to get the funds to make it possible. The good thing is, though, that deep down, they have seen and experienced a different way of being in relationships with people in communities: with parents, new friends, and with partners, and that they still hold onto those changes.

Later, we met with group of seven young women, at the local council offices where one of them was working and the rest of them were volunteering. Five out of the seven women had been SS-CF participants. What was most striking, throughout our time together, was how different the SS-CF participants were to the two women who had not taken part in the project. Even though I made it very clear that I would like to hear from everyone, not just ex-participants, the two women who were not part of SS-CF found it very hard to join in. I noted, even before I knew they were not participants that they seemed to be less comfortable interacting with me and less confident. At first, all the women were very cautious – to the point of almost being rude (at least, in my interpretation). But, after we broke the ice (I asked what good things they had “taken away” from the project, and fell about laughing when one woman replied that the best thing had been the lunch) we had a serious discussion about what they had gained from the project and what their concerns for the future are. The 5 ex-participants all said that they were “different” after the project and would no longer put up with bad treatment at home. They would rather deal with being alone with kids than put up with abuse. But for all of them, what they worry about is how to support their children as the children grow and are influenced by so many bad things: drugs, gangs, sex for money etc.. These are issues that they feel powerless to handle. SS-CF has helped them to have, and maintain, better views on themselves. It has also shown them where they fear they may soon fail as parents and be unable to protect their children from the hurdles which they, themselves had to face.

Source: eThekweni, Durban, fieldwork for the FE, November 2019

Although the changes, illustrated in **Box 6**, above, are not directly about violence, they are related to whether violence is chosen by men as an option in dealing with life, or tolerated by women. More nuanced qualitative research, which addresses these things amongst others, can help us set new indicators (see learnings and recommendations) of the pathways to VAWG prevention.

#### 4.4.2 Question 12

**Q12:** Has innovation contributed to the sustainability of interventions to prevent VAWG, including amongst the poorest and most marginalised women and girls?

**Innovation has been essential across the work of the programme. The ability to be innovative, and to use creative approaches to problem-solving, has been critical to optimising possibilities for sustainability of achievements.**

Programme components have developed ways in which to work with women and girls in exceptionally difficult circumstances, and projects have been able to encourage and maintain participation by people who might not normally sustain their interest in project activities. This is most evident in the work of C1 and C2. C3 also worked with the most marginalised people, for example in South Sudan. Timing, resources and the outbreak of conflict meant, however, in South Sudan C3 were unable to carry out



their planned qualitative survey, which would have given greater insight into the situation of the most marginalised people.

### Reaching Highly Marginalised People Requires Innovative Approaches

The following boxes (**Box 7 and 8**) illustrate positive examples of work by C1 and C2 to ensure that highly marginalised people were reached in ways that, a) respected their rights, b) were appropriate, and c) were accessible and attractive to the poorest and most vulnerable people.

#### Box 7: Component 2: Development of Tools for Work with Women in Conflict Situations

As part of the WW-VAWG consortium, the IRC, the Global Women's Institute at the George Washington University (GWI), and CARE International UK obtained rigorous data on the prevalence, forms, and drivers of VAWG in South Sudan. The study used quantitative and qualitative methods to explore the situation of women and girls in five settings in South Sudan. By using local partners, trained to gather data accurately and sensitively, the researchers were able to provide quantitative evidence demonstrating the widespread and severe nature of both non-partner and intimate partner violence. In addition, qualitative evidence gathered tells a clear story of the lifetime of violence women endure and the devastating consequences of this for their health and wellbeing. To obtain the data, it was necessary to ensure conditions of utmost safety for research participants and researchers, including, for example, the ability to agree on "safe" discussion subjects, such as women's health, should any men approach the interview. Using these methods, the study found that VAWG is pervasive in conflict zones, with up to 65% of women and girls experiencing physical and/or sexual violence in their lifetime. In order to bridge the gap between research and action, the GWI has developed a new toolkit to support non-academic stakeholders to understand and interpret the data gathered through population-based research on VAWG, in conflict and humanitarian settings, and to create a process for moving from evidence to implementing action.<sup>48</sup>

The ability to reach highly marginalised people is essential beyond conflict and humanitarian settings:

#### Box 8: Project Empower: Stepping Stones, Creating Futures, Durban, South Africa

In the eThekweni Municipality of South Africa, approximately 40% of the population live in informal settlements. With a combination of poverty and unemployment, widespread violence, racism, and xenophobia, urban informal settlements have very high levels of violence against women, mental trauma, alcohol and drug abuse, and HIV infection. The conditions of life are amongst the most marginal in urban South Africa. As part of the WW-VAWG programme, Project Empower continued its work in the settlements, implementing a combined Stepping Stones and Creating Futures project. One key difficulty faced by the project, and by all those who work in the settlements, is the fluidity of the population, with high levels movement in and out of the population. This fluidity meant that facilitators needed to be highly skilled in order to retain the interest and attention of the participants and to encourage their ongoing support for the project. The fact that this was successful was evidenced during an IE Team visit to the area in November 2019, when two groups of former participants (one male, one female) explained what they had gained from the programme, and that they continued to benefit from it 18 months after the end of implementation.<sup>49</sup>

### Disaggregation and Inclusivity

The examples given above are successes generated by the specific contexts of work, contexts which necessitated development of new ways of engaging in order to ensure inclusivity and safety.

Nevertheless, because the projects address the issue of violence – which is often considered to be

<sup>48</sup> Source: No Safe Place: A Lifetime Of Violence For Conflict-Affected Women And Girls In South Sudan, 2017, Ellsberg, M. et al.; <https://www.whatworks.co.za/resources/project-resources/item/683-research-to-action-toolkit-vawg-in-conflict-and-humanitarian-settings>; Ellsberg, M. SRVI 2019

<sup>49</sup> Source: Stepping Stones And Creating Futures: An evidence-based intervention to prevent violence against women and improve livelihoods, Andrew Gibbs | Laura Washington; October 2018; IE fieldwork 2019

exceptional or marginal (despite least a third of all women and girls are likely to experience it), they will sometimes not look further into whether the most disadvantaged and marginalised women and girls are able to participate in, or benefit from, project services. Over the life of the programme, attention to issues of violence and (dis)ability has grown. In future work, this needs to be strongly embedded in project ToRs. The programme Evidence Briefs<sup>50</sup> show that women living with disabilities are more likely than fully-abled women to suffer IPV and other forms of sexual violence<sup>51</sup>.

### **Innovation increases the chances that highly marginalised people will be included**

Innovative approaches to prevention are likely to increase the sustainability of achievements, especially for the poorest and most marginalised people, as is suggested in the example on working in the Durban settlements given in **Box 8**, above. This is explored further in **Thematic Paper 3**. Work in other programmes, also dealing with highly sensitive issues of VAWG, suggests that a degree of innovation is *always* needed when the aim is to promote social norm change and, ultimately, social change. This is, at least in part, because individuals, groups, communities, and societies, bend and adapt their own social norms in the face of pressure (internal or external) to change. The programmatic response to this needs to be equally adaptive, flexible, and creative<sup>52</sup>.

Not all WW-VAWG projects addressed disability. This needs to become a Standard Operating Procedure for DFID programming. Even though questions on (dis)ability were always asked, projects did not all fully differentiate between different levels of marginality amongst their client groups (for example, Bangladesh garment workers; Nepal, VSO One Community, One Family). This, and other issues of inclusivity, need further development in Phase 2.

## **4.4.3 Question 13**

**Q13: Is there evidence that the research has influenced wider academic discourses on VAWG beyond the programme?**

**Generating impact outside of the WW-VAWG community within the timeframe of the programme was an impossible ask.**

Despite this, C1 feels it has had impact on Spotlight, RESPECT and UNTF, which lie outside of the programme. In a small sample of interviews with researchers working on VAWG but not part of the WW-VAWG programme it is clear that it has had impact not least as a body of work that now must be referred to, “the research makes an important contribution which is now informing my own research” (Interview conducted in August 2019). All three components targeted dissemination events that would maximise their uptake and impact rather than strictly academic conferences. In the next year or two following the end of this phase it is likely that greater impact on academic discourses will become apparent.

<sup>50</sup> <https://www.whatworks.co.za/search?searchword=disability&ordering=newest&searchphrase=all&limit=50>

<sup>51</sup> For example, Barrett KA, O'Day B, Roche A, Carlson BL. Intimate Partner Violence, Health Status, and Health Care Access Among Women with Disabilities. *Women's Health Issues* 2009; 19(2): 94-100.16.Mitra M, Mouradian VE, Fox MH, Pratt C. Prevalence and characteristics of sexual violence against men with disabilities. *American journal of preventive medicine* 2016; 50(3): 311-7.17.Schrötte M, Glammeyer S. Intimate partner violence against disabled women as a part of widespread victimization and discrimination over the lifetime: Evidence from a German representative study (with acknowledgement to <https://www.whatworks.co.za/documents/publications/114-disability-evidence-brief-new-crop-3/file>)

<sup>52</sup> See, for example, The End Child Marriage in Ethiopia MTR programme report and the final Evaluation of Phase 1 of the Sudan Free from FGM/C programme.



## 4.5 IMPACT

What difference does the intervention make? The extent to which the intervention has generated or is expected to generate significant positive or negative, intended or unintended, higher-level effects.

### 4.5.1 Question 14

**Q14:** To what extent has the programme's RU strategy been effective in achieving uptake?

- *Including positive change in policy and programmes*

**The programme's Research Uptake strategy was a useful tool in guiding and informing the actions of the programme, but it was not the primary driver of success in achieving Research Uptake.** Each of the separately contracted components generated a RU strategy which reflected the contexts in which they were working, their institutional capacities and experience of uptake, and to a limited extent, the nature of the research they were undertaking. These were aligned with the global Research Uptake Strategy that was endorsed by the IAB in September 2017.

The strategy did allow the programme to have regular conversations across the three consortium to reflect on progress made, identify opportunities for influence, and, to a certain extent, agree priorities for future engagement. In practice, the more meaningful and strategic conversations happened within each consortium and drew on individuals' vast tacit knowledge of the sector, gaps in knowledge that they could fill, opportunities they could respond to, and agendas that they could drive forward using WW-VAWG programme evidence. This resulted in some impressive opportunistic 'wins', particularly in South Africa, and some impressively designed campaigns, including in the complex context of South Sudan.

The programme made full and strategic use of an IAB that represented key players and influence targets. They were used extensively and effectively as brokers, champions and influencers. The secretariat leveraged the global reputation of the IAB and their networks to support RU efforts throughout the uptake journey. Examples include the joint WW-VAWG, WHO and UN Women pre-conference workshop at the SVRI Forum, and engagement of IAB members in reviewing WW-VAWG products and chairing What Works events at global fora. The World Bank invited WW-VAWG to present evidence to desk staff, and UN Women organised a face-to-face engagement/webinar with UN partners in the Asia-Pacific Regional Office in November 2018, and a global webinar with UN family country Gender Focal Points in June 2019. The WHO and UN Women actively drew on emerging evidence to inform the new RESPECT publication.

The programme learned to be more systematic and intentional about its RU approach as it evolved. This was made easier as findings emerged, but it was evident that learning took place both as a result of capacities being strengthened, and as a result of the programme reflecting on experiences of what had and had not worked well. It often made good use of its member organisations to maximise reach and leverage existing reputation. For example, APHRC and LSHTM hosting workshops in Kenya and London respectively for the launch of the Dadaab study, using DFID to host events, and asking for introductions via IAB board members.

The ASMs were exemplary showcases for the programme and its emerging findings, which also provided capacity gains and networking and career opportunities for participants, as well as media exposure and the chance for the 'What Works family' to refine and restate their allegiance to the programme and its higher cause. This was crucial, and partially explains the high levels of commitment found across the programme that went far beyond contractual obligations.

**Influence as a ‘way of doing business’ (rather than implementation of a strategy)**

Individual consultants working as part of the programme have themselves been the ‘vectors of influence’, including by continuing on to become consultants/advisors on other programmes such as DFID’s VAWG country programmes in Malawi and Zimbabwe. C3 team members are also involved in new research being undertaken in Mongolia, Morocco and Ethiopia that is funded by UN Women, and in the Arab Region funded by ESCWA. The active collaboration between the RU lead and the VAWG Help Desk, also funded by DFID but independent of the What Works programme, ensured that the latest WW-VAWG evidence was reflected in Helpdesk outputs e.g. regular newsletters and answers to DFID staff in-country.

**The programme brought together influential individuals**

The programme encompasses some of the world’s leading thinkers, researchers, and practitioners on violence prevention. This has meant that each individual and institution has brought to the programme an established reputation for high quality work and a network of collaborators and stakeholders ready to be engaged, and receptive to receiving evidence and recommendations from the programme. The importance of this cannot be underestimated in explaining the programme’s impact. Individuals have held influential positions in both formal and informal policymaking structures within governments, inter-agency, and civil society forums. For example, Professor Rachel Jewkes chaired the technical task team developing a policy framework to address GBV in the Higher Education Sector in South Africa. These positions of authority enabled individuals to position the evidence strategically to optimise uptake. In this example, the policy framework included a draft policy for adoption at an institutional level that drew on the WW-VAWG Evidence Reviews.

**4.5.2 Question 15**

**Q15:** What lessons are being learned on how to design and manage innovation and research programmes that promote change in policy and practice?

For detailed answers to this question, please refer to **Section 5: Lessons, Conclusions and Recommendations**.

## 5. LEARNING AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

In this section, we give the high-level learnings drawn from our IE consultation process, review of programme literature, our IE findings (see **Section 3**), and our experience of being “critical friends” to the programme over the last four years. We then present some conclusions and key recommendations emerging from these findings.

### 5.2 LEARNING

Learning was a core requirement of the original evaluation ToRs and has remained a common thread throughout each evaluative phase. Lessons given here are relevant to many different stakeholders working to prevent VAWG. These stakeholders include policymakers, people with decision-making power, practitioners – researchers and implementers – and those who audit them (at community through to government levels). Where we feel that the learning is particularly directed or operationally useful to specific stakeholders, we have noted this.

#### 5.2.1. Prevention of VAWG is Possible

##### Learning for all stakeholders

Evidence that VAWG can be prevented is not simply a question of demonstrating decrease in the prevalence or incidence of VAWG (in absolute terms, or in terms of intensity – see Learnings below). It is also an issue of whether a critical number of decision-makers and practitioners can be shown to have the commitment *and* resources (capacities, funds, opportunities) to make change happen. The learning from the RCTs and qualitative enquiries coming out of WW-VAWG points to successes, yet rates of decrease in violence vary widely from place to place, with highs of 55%+ reported from DRC and Ghana, and more modest figures from Nepal, Zambia and South Africa (in the range 20-30%).

In some places, the results appear contradictory, for example, in Durban South Africa, there has been a significant decrease in men’s reporting of their own *perpetration* of violence, but rates of women (who were not the partners of the men) reporting on their own *experience* of violence have remained the same. This suggests the intervention has had meaningful success. In Rwanda, peer-based couples work led to a significant decrease, while community-based work showed less success. There are explanations (in part, to do with the short time available for the couples’ work) to account for these differences. Where interventions have seemed to be “less successful”, it cannot necessarily be said that the approaches do not work, only that we do not yet know what is needed for them to work better.

#### 5.2.2. Knowing and understanding the context of what works is crucial to developing the right approaches

##### Learning particularly for programmers and implementers

What works to attract people into prevent-VAWG projects in one place will not, necessarily, work in another. Differences, for example, in women’s ability to move around outside the house and attend group work – with permission and safety – influence the type of project that will be accessible to them. Additionally, people who live a highly marginal existence may be very unused to sitting and talking with others, or concentrating in a group-setting. Continued participant engagement in VAWG-prevention projects also varies widely. In South Africa, amongst highly disadvantaged people in urban settlements with fluid populations, it is hard to retain project participants for the purposes of research. Conversely, in the very different context of Rwanda, where participation is both a political and a social obligation,

and transportation allowances were paid (in line with official guidelines) participation rates were retained at well over 95%.

The results noted above suggest that, to **prevent violence, a grounded understanding of context is all-important**. For example, the work carried out with and through religious leaders in DRC would not be appropriate in some other countries where religion shapes much more conservative gender values, which in turn impact on political systems<sup>53</sup>. Most importantly, whilst we now know that VAWG can be prevented, we still do not know enough about how equal the positive impact of interventions may be and why they might work. A second Phase of WW-VAWG needs to be very carefully crafted to bring us closer to the answers to those questions.

### **5.2.3. Good quality research is an essential foundation for research uptake, but is not sufficient to ensure that decisions, policies and programmes will be shaped by evidence. Positive Pathways towards change are never linear or simple**

#### **Learning particularly for RU, donors, programmers**

The learning from WW-VAWG is that our evaluation hypothesis (see **Section 2**) was and is correct- there is good evidence of prevention coming from work across the WW-VAWG programme, but it takes more than this to turn evidence into action.

The programme has achieved positive results in both research and RU, but there is a limit to how the programme itself can push for change. WW-VAWG is not an advocacy programme that is informed by evidence, rather, it is a research programme with ambitions to influence policy. For sustained social change, the evidence from the research must be connected with and be used by others – activists, social movements, women’s organisations – as ammunition for advocacy. Evidence is not enough, you also need the implementers to say ‘we can do it, and we can do it cheaply’ using evidence that is robust and supports the claims.

The success of RU in South Africa (see **Thematic Paper 2**), including bringing about a government commitment to bring Stepping Stones-Creating Futures to scale, is a perfect example of how complex it can be to establish a national commitment to act on evidence. The example shows that a number of elements have to be in place, and the opportunities that arise have to be recognised and seized (this is expanded in **Thematic Paper 3**).

### **5.2.4. Investment in people is needed from the outset of the programme: assumptions about the capacities of organisations and their personnel are often misguided**

#### **Learning particularly for donors, programmers, implementers**

In our earlier findings (**Section 4**), we outlined how design assumptions, made when the Business Case was drawn up, about the capacity of implementing organisations, necessitated the development and implementation of a more extensive capacity development strategy by C1. A key learning from this is that an extended Inception period, based on co-creation, and building in adaptive management systems throughout the programme, would have been highly valuable. We believe this is an approach that will be beneficial in any future WW-VAWG programming. .

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<sup>53</sup> Yet, whilst different approaches are suited to different contexts, there are characteristics of approach which are common to all prevention work, and these are discussed in the learning below.

The approach taken to developing capacity was smart, and was tailored to the particular needs of the organisations involved. The mentoring approach (whereby TAs supported one or more organisations) generally worked well. According to projects, however, success depended on whether a good relationship could be built with the mentor, the extent to which the mentor was able to invest themselves in the projects, and the kinds of technical expertise they were able to share. Projects said that it was less important that the mentor had in-depth knowledge of the particular context, and that they had the right approach to mentoring and to building knowledge, skills and capacities<sup>54</sup>.

In their Project Completion Reports, all components highlighted the importance of capacity development in achieving programme successes. This approach will require budget investment and a nuanced understanding of operational VFM that goes beyond unit costs. The results from WW-VAWG where these investments were made were significant. All components felt that there is more to be done in future in ensuring that learning is not just a North-South process, but that there are adequate resources for intensified South-South learning and for research agendas driven by the South (C2 PCR). We fully agree with this assessment.

### **5.2.5. The gains from Annual Scientific Meetings and Learning Events far outweigh the costs of staging them**

#### **Learning particularly for donors, managers, implementers, researchers, Community of Practice**

A further key learning related to capacity development is the success of the ASMs and the immediately preceding capacity development workshops for project practitioners. The outcomes of these workshops and meetings far exceeded what had been hoped for. Participants found them highly enjoyable and important forums for learning, sharing and caring. Crucially, they offered excellent opportunities for practitioners to present alongside researchers, and to share information and experiences, and for a wide range of stakeholders to meet on an equal footing.

The ASMs were included in the early design of WW-VAWG. The learning is that they can be a highly effective and inclusive mechanism for synergy and expansion of learning in any multi-component programme that seeks to generate a Community of Practice (CoP), create a critical cadre of personnel, skilled at defining and sharing their data and messages and to promote learning within and across components. Bringing together people from different countries, different backgrounds (academic, political, practical etc.), and different generations paid off many-fold in WW-VAWG. This would not have happened, however, in a conventional approach to sharing academic findings. It took the dynamism and lateral-thinking of programme management and technical assistance to ensure that benefits were optimised. The ASMs and Learning Events were also exceptionally well-organised.

### **5.2.6. Contract all major components at the same time, when the aim is to build synergies between components in a programme, and to make the “whole greater than the sum of the parts”**

#### **Learning particularly for donors, contracting agencies, bid-writers**

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<sup>54</sup> This fits well with modern approaches to coaching and mentoring. Coaches and mentors are not expected to have in-depth knowledge on all technical issues, but to be able to support individuals and organisations in finding out a) what they need to know and what skills they need to employ b) guiding them towards finding that knowledge and building those skills. (<https://www.i-l-m.com/learning-and-development/coaching-and-mentoring-qualifications>). Projects opinions' learned from consultations during the final evaluation process.

As discussed in **Section 4**, early co-ordination between the programme components were not optimal, because of the staggered approach to contracting. All components were fully employed in undertaking their own work, and the C1 Secretariat mandate to promote coordination was not, at first, strong enough to encourage full coordination and synergies. Around the time of MTR, this situation changed, and co-ordination became much stronger.

**It is worth the resources (and potential difficulties) of contracting all major components at the same time.** At MTR, the IE Team were told that a possible reason that DFID chose to stagger start times might have been to reduce programmatic risk by ensuring each component was up-and-running before the next began<sup>55</sup>. In fact, we now judge this to have been a riskier strategy than starting all components together. Our IE consultations showed (**Section 3**) that management of all components could still point to areas where coordination might be improved, and suggested that C3 never had the opportunity to become fully embedded within the overall coordination. We think this is, in part, because of the different nature of C3 activities. But, it is also because C3 development took place separately from, and later than, the wider programme development, and came from a different disciplinary background

**Design multi-component programmes with potential coordination synergies, and harmonisation of components in mind.** This means that potential overlaps of, or inter-dependence between, different components need to be explicit from early concept through to contracting. To do this, or rather to enforce this programmatically, means embedding harmonised working into the ToRs of programmes and their related deliverables and KPIs.

**Embed requirements, resources and possibilities for coordination, from the tendering stage.**

The chances of achieving good coordination between components are much greater if all components start out at the same time. The best coordination cannot be achieved without a strong statement that it is a programmatic requirement, and an awareness across all organisations that, in one way or another, the effort of coordinating will bring them benefit.

The only component that does not need to be contracted from the outset is IE. That is not to say there should be a lag between the beginning of the main components and the evaluation- contracting IE needs to be complete at least as soon as the inception period of other components is ending (unless IE is to participate in co-creation of the other components, in which case, it will need to be contracted sooner). Experience in other programmes (notably, the recent Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Unit Inception for the Global Fund to End Modern Slavery), has shown that it is extremely difficult for an IE team to develop fully relevant strategies until the operating systems, and activities of the programme to be evaluated, are known.

### **5.2.7. Contract high quality research, using mixed-methods and building partnerships between researchers and implementers offers the greatest chances for uptake**

#### **Learning particularly for programmers, researchers and implementers**

WW-VAWG has shown that RCTs can generate high-quality, scientific evidence that carries policy clout, but only when accompanied by a range of qualitative methods, woven through the process and from the start. Qualitative research is essential and needs to be properly budgeted for, undertaken, and used to support the orientation and design of the research methods. Positive equitable partnerships are essential for the generation of rigorous research data and for the analysis of it. An action-led approach to managing research relationships and assessing capacity needs can ensure a

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<sup>55</sup> WW-VAWG, 2015 IE MTR Report..



consistently inclusive approach. This involves using local knowledge for the contextualisation of the research including design, analysis, and uptake. Wherever possible, senior Southern researchers should be used in order to drive contextual understanding, and ensure research quality, even when the context is challenging. In addition, when interventions that have been proven to work through donor funded research, this needs information to be made available as soon as possible as an open access global good (see learning also in **Thematic Paper 1 on Research**).<sup>56</sup>

Qualitative approaches and mixed methods are critically important to learning. C2, for example, used a survey, followed by qualitative methods, which allowed not only for VAWG prevalence data to emerge, but also to draw out a clearer and more nuanced understanding of *why* VAWG is so prevalent in specific contexts. The data (made up of 2725 quantitative surveys, 18 qualitative interviews, 29 FGDs, and 30 KIIs) have been cleaned, anonymised, and made available in open access data repositories, creating potential for further learning, which can (and likely will) be engaged by researchers from inside and outside the WW-VAWG community.

### **5.2.8. Existing indicators on prevention and reduction of VAWG are relevant and meaningful. But, do they adequately capture the process of VAWG prevention from women's perspectives?**

#### **Learning particularly for programmers and evaluators**

Existing indicators<sup>57</sup> on violence reduction and inter-partner well-being have been very helpful in offering a framework by which to measure reduction in VAWG. Nevertheless, they are not always easy to use in social enquiry, and they may elicit different answers (to the same/similar questions), depending on whether it is a woman or a man who is being consulted<sup>58</sup>. The evidence from WW-VAWG suggests that there may be significant differences between men's interpretation of VAWG reduction and women's perceptions of the realities they face. In several places (South Africa for example) evaluations showed flat, or almost flat, levels of change for women, whilst men said that they had reduced their perpetration of violence against women (it should be noted that the men and women interviewed were not couples). There are several reasons why this might be so, including, amongst other things: a) women experience actions as violence when men do not consider these actions as violence, b) men are mistaken in their interpretation of their own behaviour, c) women are mistaken in their reporting of their own experience, and d) as researchers/enquirers, we are not asking the right questions.

Any one of the reasons listed above, or a combination of them, could account for the different opinions voiced by men and women. It may also be that we have not yet invested deeply enough in the right kinds of qualitative research to be able to get beyond the reported numbers of incidences of violence. Where in-depth qualitative research findings do exist (for example, in other work in rural South Africa and Ethiopia)<sup>59</sup>, we are learning that we may be missing steps along women's paths to being violence-free. We learnt that we need to take into account the fact that staying in a violent relationship often seems like a lesser risk to women than leaving it does<sup>60</sup>. Yet, whilst still experiencing violence, women may also be building their own resilience, and developing the agency, self-esteem and skills that will allow them to get free of violence, if they choose to in the longer term. This process takes time, and

<sup>56</sup> Information on interventions is available <https://www.whatworks.co.za/about/global-programme/global-programme-projects>

<sup>57</sup> For example, those given in The Lancet, Violence Against Women Series, 2014

<sup>58</sup> <https://methods.sagepub.com/book/handbook-of-interview-research/d15.xml>.

<sup>59</sup> Shai, N, *pers. Comm* and Crawford, S. *et al* fieldwork in Ethiopia for the End Child Marriage Programme, 2014

<sup>60</sup> In the UK, women will, on average, enter a refuge seven times before finally leaving an abusive partner <https://www.refuge.org.uk/our-work/forms-of-violence-and-abuse/domestic-violence/barriers-to-leaving/>

will not show up in end-of-project, quantitative questionnaires. We need rigorous, qualitative, and participatory studies, over time and reaching meaningful numbers of women and men, to allow us to understand women's experiences in gradually moving away from violence<sup>61</sup>. This research is best carried out by people who fully understand the context in which the enquiries take place, and can understand the priorities of the women they consult. For example, women may judge keeping a roof over their head to be important enough to put up with occasional IPV.

From both a programmatic and an ethical perspective, violence is never acceptable. But there is currently debate about what, exactly, needs to be measured in terms of violence prevention- are we interested in reduction of instances *per se*, in reduction of intensity (type of violence, frequency of attacks), or in Zero Tolerance (getting to no violence)?<sup>62</sup>. There is a huge danger in working for anything other than an ultimate goal of Zero Tolerance. Anything else normalises aspects of violence and perpetuates social norms that allow (and sometimes celebrate) the abuse of women (and children). The balance needs to be in realising that women may move gradually away from violence, and that each step needs to be recognised and celebrated.

### **5.2.9. Innovation is a way of thinking and operating. It will always be needed in all work to stimulate change in social norms and social change. Donors need to be encouraged to understand the ongoing benefits of innovation**

#### **Learning for all**

Until recently, some donors were still often uncomfortable with the idea of innovation, and are wary of the potential risks it might bring. Originally, in the WW-VAWG Business Case concept, it referred primarily to 'innovation grants', awarded to new or adapted implementation projects in C1. But, innovation has, in fact, been a key driver throughout WW-VAWG. In our evaluation processes, we define innovation as:

*"Creative thinking and action used in identification, invention or development, of new or adapted approaches to problem definition and problem-solving."*<sup>63</sup>

WW-VAWG has provided a great deal of learning in relation to VAWG on all aspects of the innovation statement above. In meeting challenges, working to adapt VAWG-prevention approaches needs to be ongoing and responsive to context. Donors tend to be risk averse and may feel uncomfortable with too much innovation where the risks seem too great. We believe this is, a) because of a misunderstanding of what innovation is and what it can be, and b) because of a desire to believe that different contexts, in different places and at different times, replicate each other. Neither of these ways of thinking is correct.

As inter-programme learning has grown, and with it the 'critical friendship' of the IE Team, we have all learnt more about the importance of innovation. As outlined in Section 3, and developed in Thematic Paper 3, innovation permeates all aspects of the programme – from its original design through to results. We have learning that – especially when addressing highly sensitive, yet entrenched, social

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<sup>61</sup> Stern, E., Gibbs, A., Willan, S., Dunkle, K., and Jewkes, R. (2019) 'When you talk to someone in a bad way or always put her under pressure, it is actually worse than beating her': Conceptions and experiences of emotional intimate partner violence in Rwanda and South Africa. PLoS ONE 14(11), and see also our **Thematic Paper 3**

<sup>62</sup> See Lori Heise's work.

<sup>63</sup> See Thematic Paper 3 – Innovation.



norms, values and practices – the ability to be flexible, to adapt to changing circumstances and to find creative solutions to problems as they arise, is vital.

There does not come a point when innovation is no longer needed. Experience, in WW-VAWG and in other programmes<sup>64</sup>, has shown that the ability to work for and *maintain* achievements, depends, at least in part, on thinking and acting innovatively in response to dynamic contexts and circumstances. This does *not* mean that approaches and projects cannot be replicated and brought to scale. It does mean that there must be flexibility *within* the approach, as well as adaptations and innovations to make it appropriate to peoples, groups, and communities in differing circumstances, and from different backgrounds. This is how successful implementation approaches, such as Indashyikirwa, can evolve and remain relevant outside the original areas of implementation. A major example is the Stepping Stones approach. Stepping Stones was first developed in the early 1990s for use in Uganda. It was published in 1995 as a community-based, social change training intervention on gender and communication to prevent HIV transmission. It has evolved over time, changing to meet the particular issues and needs of different contexts and constituencies and, in WW-VAWG has been used and adapted as a base to project development in South Africa, Bangladesh, Tajikistan and Nepal.

In working for social change one size does not fit all. Goalposts change the all the time. Getting at the root causes and solving them is so complex and needs openness to innovation, so that causes can be addressed from as many different directions as possible (for more detail, see Thematic Paper 3).

### **5.2.10 Prevention of VAWG is about Social Change. Change in social norms and behaviours are steps along the way, but are they enough for achievements to be sustained?**

#### **Learning for all**

WW-VAWG has shown that positive change away from violence can happen. It happens in projects that aim to promote fundamental social change (change in the power relations between men and women, and between older people and younger ones, and moves towards gender equity.), such as Stepping Stones-Creating Futures (South Africa) and Indashyikirwa (Rwanda). It happens in projects that focus more on behaviour change, such as the SHARPZ approach to alcohol and abuse in Zambia. The question remains: which approach is more sustainable? One which focuses on particular social norms (such as attitudes to excessive drinking) or one which focuses on changing fundamental values and social relationships (e.g., gender equity)? Is it necessary to work for a wider and deeper range of changes, or will a single-issue approach do?

Experience in other programmes, dealing with aspects of VAWG, suggest that the deeper, social change is essential if women and girls are to be protected, in the longer-term, against violence. For example, it is relatively 'easy' to promote short-term change away from FGM/C, with communities declaring against it and avoiding cutting during the usual 'cutting season'. It is quite another problem to ensure that people do not find other times, places and ways to cut their girls, or revert to cutting in the following year's ceremonies<sup>65</sup>. A learning is that, if we are to identify the most cost-effective and sustained routes to VAWG-prevention, we cannot make our judgements only on short-term, or even short-to-medium term successes, or the lowest cost options. We need to look at the triggers which "trip up" success and lead to renewed violence. Most models of change<sup>66</sup> now recognise that change is not linear. The CR2 model of Social Change used by the IE team shows that sustained change needs

<sup>64</sup> See for example, the Sudan Free from Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting Programme, Phase 1, ECMP, Ethiopia

<sup>65</sup> This argument is developed further in **Thematic Paper 3**

inputs so that it can be maintained. A single period of positively changed behaviour does not necessarily signal long-term change. In addition, as the learning at **Section 5.2.2** showed, whilst evidence is crucial, on an individual and a societal level, it is not enough.

### **5.2.11 Success in short-scale (five year) programmes may rely heavily on reputational assets**

#### **Learning particularly for donors and programmers**

Five years is, in principle, too short a time for any programme as complex and ambitious as WW-VAWG to generate robust evidence and bring about change that is visible. Yet, the programme has managed this to a certain extent. The programme has achieved impressive outcomes, at least partly because of the pre-existing reputation of the people involved, and the networks, credibility, and reputation that they brought with them. These ‘reputational assets’ are often underestimated in the design and configuration of a programme but are important factors in whether and how it achieves visibility, engagement, and traction around the evidence generated.

Our consultations for the IE, with internal and external stakeholders, drew attention to the fact that the reputation of SAMRC, and the dedication and extremely hard work of the Programme Director and the Secretariat, were crucial in building the programme brand recognition and respect. The programme components brought together a wide range of “the best in the field” – individuals whose knowledge on VAWG-prevention are trusted. These reputational assets are crucial foundations for RU, and for the programme to achieve global attention, and ultimately, the final goal of reduced VAWG.

### **5.2.12 Success reading across components to find thematic evidence and learning is a specialised and vital task**

The job of ‘reading across’ the raft of different projects, to identify thematic evidence and lessons learnt. For example, how to do, and communicate, research in fragile and conflict settings; approaches to working with specific groups such as men or adolescents; identifying who is best to engage with which global debates and with emerging evidence, needs to be done from the outset to optimise lessons for others. The field of whom to engage with will change over time, as will the range of products which will attract their interest. But, the approach needs to be part of programme DNA. The reading across needs to complement, but also go beyond, the identification of synthesis products. It is a complex process that needs to be assigned to someone ‘at the heart’ of the programme. This person needs to be close to programme delivery and to have expertise in understanding the relevance and resonance of findings as they emerge.

More rigorous and nuanced reflection and reporting of progress against the RU strategy, as identified by best practice (for example as part of regular monitoring against the Logframe output for RU), would have helped to catalyse conversations around influence opportunities, gaps, and who across the consortium was best placed to engage with which stakeholder groups around which topics. The outcome of such conversations might have generated a clearer articulation of how the programme prioritised influencing opportunities and empowered a broader set of actors across the programme to respond to opportunities. This would have helped those across the programme who felt constrained and without a clear mandate to speak publicly, and would have also allayed the donors’ concerns about doing too much (‘scattergun influencing’).

In the next sub-sections, we give seven key conclusions, drawn from our findings and learnings. We also list priority recommendations for future VAWG prevention activities.

## 5.3 CONCLUSIONS

1. **The Time is Now<sup>67</sup>.** WW-VAWG happened at the right moment- a time when global attention was finally turning towards prevention and ending of VAWG. But, through its work, it also helped to further create and sustain that moment, and is ensuring that end-VAWG efforts remain on the agenda, and gain greater support from governments and people across the globe.
2. **WW-VAWG set the bar for donor engagement in VAWG prevention and marked DFID-UK, and the UK Government, as brand leaders in the field.** The investment of £25,420,000 in the Prevention of Violence Against Women and Girls: Research and Innovation Fund (WW-VAWG), in 2013, solidified UK government's commitment to prevention of, and bringing an end to, violence against women and girls.
3. **WW-VAWG has attracted, and benefited from engagement of some of the best-known and well-respected members of the VAWG community, globally.** The WW-VAWG researchers, implementers and structural pillars (i.e. DFID and organisations representing and advocating for the programme through the IAB) are well-known for their activism and commitment to promoting positive social change for the benefit of women and girls, based on robust evidence.
4. **At MTR, our assessment was that WW-VAWG was on-track to be a “game-changer”, and to change the face of VAWG-prevention.** It has done this. Although WW-VAWG is still best known within the VAWG-prevention sphere, its influence continues to grow and spread more widely. WW-VAWG has strong reputational assets. This is largely down to the work and dedication, not only of the programme management within the component partners, but also the strong champions among DFID management, who have supported the programme throughout. The achievements of WW-VAWG have, as predicted, far outweighed the risks of heavy investment in a “difficult” subject. The UK can now count itself a brand-leader in both its investment in, and approach to, prevention of VAWG. It is now in a position to use its influence, and evidence, to stimulate further investment from other countries and donors, and to support the UK anti-violence agenda.
5. **For a start-up complex, multi-component programme, WW-VAWG has done well to ‘get the message out there’.** The programme has significantly expanded the range of influence, bringing VAWG to the attention of governments and people which, and who, previously chose to ignore it. It could have done more, but it did reach into a population of people who did not even know that the moment to address VAWG was coming.
6. **DFID and the IAB played an important role as broker, champion, advocate, and facilitator** for the work across key influence targets such as UN agencies, the WB, DFID and HMG more broadly. Individuals were asked to play strategic roles as brokers and advocates for the programme in their respective organisations, and they played these roles actively and effectively, in a way that raised both the profile and credibility of the evidence, and contributed to the influence the outcomes.
7. **In spite of the many gains of WW-VAWG, there will, undoubtedly, be losses in a next phase and in future work.** In whatever form a new phase of WW-VAWG takes place, there will be losses. The bidding process, and the development of new consortia and partnerships, mean that some people who have been key to the success of Phase 1, will be left out of the WW-VAWG Community of Practice. Any new phase will need to build in structures, systems, and mechanisms

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<sup>6767</sup> SVRI, 2019, strapline

to mitigate against this loss. We need to ensure that there is no lapse in the progress generated by Phase 1, no knowledge is lost, and that the momentum continues to grow.

## 5.4 PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS

Below we present priority recommendations. These are directed at DFID, other donors, programmers, researchers at all levels, and at the designers *and* implementers of interventions. We believe that they offer a portfolio of key recommendations, at high level to inform programming of future VAWG-prevention work. They focus particularly on strengthening the programmatic, enabling environment for VAWG-prevention research and implementation, on catalysing engagement, and focusing efforts. Further recommendations, specific to research, research uptake, innovation, capacity development and partnership, are given in the three Thematic Papers.

1. **Ensure that all programming takes a rights and gender based approach and that, where possible, partners are already embedded in this way of operating.** This may seem obvious, but a view outside the WW-VAWG world shows that it is not always the case. To increase the rights and gender perspective, we recommend increasing the involvement of women's organisations and those working with children and men, especially in the countries and contexts where work is to take place. As yet, however, not all women's organisations, including some of those now working for women's rights and VAWG prevention, have all the capacities to work in a fully gendered and rights-based way. This issue needs to be recognised and factored into capacity development strategies when it is considered to be cost-effective and likely to stimulate better results.
2. **Embed VAWG prevention in all relevant sectors.** VAWG prevention needs to be an intrinsic part of all policy and programming in a full range of sectors (health, education, WASH, social protection, justice, environment). We need to remember, however, that we have been working to mainstream gender throughout development for over three decades, and have still not (fully) succeeded. The only way we can hope for more success in terms of VAWG prevention is to make sure we seize the moment and refuse to let VAWG slip from the political and development agenda. We now have the evidence, from the education sector and economic sector approaches to convince governments and sector departments to embed VAWG-prevention across the board. We need to address all sectors – education, health, WASH, livelihoods, justice and more. This is one area where the active involvement of women's organisations is critical- building the voice to kick-start political commitment to change.
3. **In a multi-component programme, build in requirements for, and possibilities of, strong coordination between all components, from the design-concept stage.** We need to recognise fully that good coordination leads to synergies, which will lead to stronger results. Coordination is driven by incentives- immediate or anticipated benefits for those who actively coordinate. Good coordination takes dedicated time, resources, and budgets. It needs to be mandated in programme concepts and earliest planning, and required from the outset. It also tends to work best when someone is given the specific role of promoting coordination. People at the highest management levels are not, necessarily, the best people for the job, as they tend to be busy with other commitments and priorities. The coordinator role does need someone who will be trusted and respected by all<sup>68</sup>.

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<sup>68</sup> See, for example, the coordinator role between UNICEF, UNFPA and WHO in the Sudan free from FGM/C programme, Phase 1

4. **Future programmes, wishing to capitalise on all reputational assets, should be sure to draw also on the “social capital” of their stakeholders at all levels.** Programmes need to provide opportunity for everyone to play their full part, for VFM reasons, if nothing else. The programme drew on an impressive community of Southern researchers, implementers and activists, who became committed over time (and with significant efforts, of the ASMs, for example) to the WW-VAWG ‘family’ and its mission. The contextual knowledge of these actors, as well as their capabilities as researchers, policy entrepreneurs and, advocates, was not always used to its full extent. This was sometimes contractual, with prominent academics feeling they were being used ‘only’ as data gatherers (from FE consultations). And sometimes it was intentional, with local staff not having the time or interest in being involved in RU activities that they felt were ‘beyond their mandate’. It was also sometimes practical, the programme did not have enough money to utilise everyone to their full potential.
5. **In programme design, build on Phase 1, do not abandon Phase 1 partners.** It is unfortunately the case that many small implementing organisations are heavily reliant on single funding sources to survive. In future work, it is not possible, or desirable, to continue funding to all Phase 1 implementing organisations. But, there can be other ways to involve them in continued learning, sharing, and mentoring of new implementing partners that come onboard. A balance needs to be found between operating in the manner of many UN agencies (which often tend only to fund tried and trusted civil society organisations who are already partners), and working only with new organisations, which may have little or no experience in the field. It is not indicative of an ethical approach if organisations “go under” once programme funding ends. This was nearly the case, for example, in South Africa: Project Empower had already laid off staff and was considering closing its offices, and was only saved at the final hour by the South African Government’s decision to roll-out Stepping Stones-Creating Futures.
6. **Find out more about what drives successful and ethical scale-up and scale-out.** There will be demands for future programming to scale-up approaches that have worked in Phase 1, and to encourage government financial commitments to this. As discussed in Section 3, at least 20 instances of scale-up (in some form) have been claimed by C1<sup>69</sup>. However, we still do not know enough about what, when, why, where, how, and with whom, to work for scale-up. If they commit at all, governments (and donors) will always try to go to scale as cheaply as possible. But, we need to set strong ethical boundaries and to ensure that we fully understand how to scale-up initiatives that have worked well with smaller constituencies. We cannot make compromises that may endanger people’s rights and safety. Some things are easier to scale than others (though none are easy). For example, Right to Play (Pakistan) is expanding by increasing the number of schools in which it operates. There are good chances for government to take it over as part of the education curriculum if costs can be kept economical. But, it will still be necessary to monitor the work closely to ensure that Right to Play values are maintained and standards do not slip. Future work will place strong emphasis on learning how to promote and implement ethical scale up.
7. **Do more to promote reciprocal learning between the Global South and the North, and to intensify Southern ownership and authorship of research.** In Learning 3, we stated the importance of strengthening the capacities of partners in the Global South to share their learning, to promote greater understanding among Northern partners, and to have greater engagement and ownership in all aspects of research. To achieve this, DFID and other donors need to commit to a capacity development approach, particularly in complex operational environments. This includes encouraging the elaboration of realistic capacity development approaches and budgets from the tendering stage onwards. Linking capacity development, from the outset, *directly* to desired

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<sup>69</sup> C1 Completion Report, Jan 2020

outputs and outcomes, which explicitly include Southern ownership of research agendas, could make this acceptable to funders.

8. **Ensure that Research Uptake is part of the DNA of any programme.** As our findings and learnings showed RU is not simply something that happens after research has been done. An RU lens needs to inform all programme planning and implementation. In programmes we need, from the start, to think more broadly about what RU is and what it can do. WW-VAWG programme documentation has included concerns that RU, if carried out too early, will raise false expectations and hopes when there is nothing yet to offer<sup>70</sup>. But, this overlooks the fact that RU happens at all levels and in many different ways. It needs to be an on-going part of programme logic of ToCs and Logframes. It is a means to achieving many different results. In short, RU needs to be part of the research process, not a reaction to it.
9. **Make more use of in-country Research Institutions, or those willing to invest fully in person-time in-country and building relationships of trust with implementers.** Our analysis showed that the best researcher-implementer relationships (for example, in South Africa, Rwanda and Pakistan) came when the research institution was either located in-country, or when researchers spent extended lengths of time in-country and got to know the context well. Conversely, distance or lack of in-country time, led to more difficult relationships. We recommend that, wherever possible in future work, national research institutes be used or, at least, a requirement be made for in-country researcher time. We also recommend that 'local knowledge' is used actively in the design of research. We would expect that participatory design of implementation projects is carried out as a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP).
10. **Always follow standard good practice in relation to qualitative and participatory research.** Making the best use of qualitative research does not detract from the importance of high-quality quantitative research. But, as we have discussed, we will never be able to programme correctly or understand our results if we do not have a nuanced and qualitative understanding of people, processes, and products. Resources need to be invested in getting qualitative research embedded as a SOP. Formative, qualitative research needs to be done in the area of programme operation. Qualitative research needs to be done with rigour *before* other work, and used to inform the development of quantitative research. It needs to be undertaken *during the lifetime* of the intervention, and also *after* it is completed. Mixed research methods should always be used, not just in terms of quantitative and qualitative research, but also in the types of qualitative research. For example, longitudinal ethnographic work can be combined with participatory action research (snap-shot enquiry, in-depth interviews, Participatory Interest Groups), with meaningful numbers of people. It should not be treated as a 'tack-on'. A rigorous approach to qualitative research is cost-effective and does not need to be especially resource-heavy<sup>71</sup>.
11. **Make better use of Digital Platforms:** Evidence provides the facts with which to argue and to challenge the norms around VAWG, but conversation is the mechanism by which to persuade, advocate, and build a common cause around it. Digital communication is an increasingly powerful tool to reach audiences that are not directly known and that cannot be easily mapped, and to engage these audiences in conversation. Purposeful use of digital platforms is a VFM approach that can play an important role in influencing discourse and framing global debates. It showcases evidence; raises the profile of researchers and implementers; and has the potential to 'ride the

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<sup>70</sup> See C1 Completion Report.

<sup>71</sup> See, for example, Brocklesby, M.A., and Crawford, S. Rights Based Development Swansea Centre for Development Studies 2005

coattails' of important media events around global issues in a way that can build reputation and bring nuance to debates using evidence.

- 12. Expand the type of indicators used to assess progress towards VAWG prevention.** More, good quality, participatory qualitative research will give us a more nuanced understanding of the process by which VAWG is reduced and ended. We need to give space to greater understanding of how, why, and when women develop the kind of agency that enables them to choose not to put up with violence. This can enable us to develop new sets of indicators, which can follow women's positive pathways to empowerment and being violence-free.
- 13. Continue to identify and assess Positive Pathways to prevention of, and ending, VAWG.** In WW-VAWG we built on previous experience and understanding and learnt a great deal about what it will take to prevent and end VAWG, particularly IPV. But, this is only the beginning. We have not yet been able to identify as much as we would have liked to about the Positive Pathways that lead to prevention. We know much more about the factors that are needed for good implementation projects (a rights and gender approach, good facilitation, dialogue, working with women and men.), but it will take another phase to get close to full confidence in how to programme, how to bring programming to scale, and how to encourage governments to work for VAWG prevention as a matter of everyday business.



## **ANNEXES**

### **CONTENTS:**

**ANNEX 1: UPDATED TORS**

**ANNEX 2: EVALUATION FRAMEWORK**

**ANNEX 3: ETHICS POLICY**

**ANNEX 4: LIST OF KEY ACTORS INTERVIEWED**

**ANNEX 5: LIST OF KEY DOCUMENTS AUDITED**

**ANNEX 6: FINAL EVALUATION TEAM**

**ANNEX 7: MTR RELEVANCE SECTION**

**ANNEX 8: POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS**

### **ALSO INCLUDED AS STANDALONE DOCUMENTS:**

**THEMATIC STUDY 1 – RESEARCH**

**THEMATIC STUDY 2 – RESEARCH UPTAKE**

**THEMATIC STUDY 3 – INNOVATION IN WW-VAWG**

## **ANNEX 1 – UPDATED DFID TORS**

ITT Volume 3

# **What Works to Prevent Violence Research & Innovation Programme**

**(formerly Violence against Women and Girls Research and  
Innovation Fund)**

## **Mid-term and End-term Performance Evaluation Terms of Reference**

**Final**

**Violence against Women and Girls Team,**

**Inclusive Societies Dept, Policy Division**

**and**

**Governance, Conflict and Social Development Team,**

**Research and Evidence Division**

**DFID**

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**Requirements:** DFID seeks a team of highly qualified evaluators with strong experience in evaluating (i) research impact, research uptake and policy influencing, and (ii) violence against women and girls, to undertake a performance evaluation<sup>72</sup> of DFID's What Works to Prevent Violence research and innovation programme. The What Works programme, original budget £25mn/5 years, has three components which run between Dec 2013-April 2019. The intention is to **evaluate performance against the overall programme outputs and outcomes at the mid-term and end of the programme**. This Terms of Reference sets out the requirements. DFID's Inclusive Societies Department (Policy Division) and Research and Evidence Division (RED) will fund this **up to £400,000 from April 2016 to July 2019**<sup>73</sup>.

## 1. Background

DFID is commissioning a performance evaluation of the design, implementation, outputs and outcomes of the What Works to Prevent Violence research and innovation programme (What Works). The programme is a joint initiative between DFID's Research and Evidence and Policy Divisions, which aims to reduce violence against women and girls (VAWG) by:

- Increasing the quality, quantity and use of evidence in decision-making.
- Catalysing and bringing to scale major innovations in preventing VAWG.

DFID sees higher quality evidence and practical innovation as a critical contribution to international development. Investment in research and innovation is seen as a global public good, addressing market failures that exist in relation to research to better address the problems of poor people living in developing countries.

### 1a. DFID and Violence against Women and Girls

The Department for International Development (DFID) leads the UK government's effort to fight global poverty. DFID's approach to international development is focused on delivering results, transparency and value for money in British aid particularly in fragile and conflict-affected states.

The role of DFID's Inclusive Societies Department is to promote policies and programmes that aim to leave no-one behind, and to ensure voice, choice and control for all men and women, girls and boys. Critical to ISD's work is our leadership on violence against women and girls (VAWG) policy for DFID. DFID's Research and Evidence Division commissions, manages and synthesises research to produce policy-relevant evidence.

DFID's Business Plan (2011-2015) highlights VAWG as a priority and commits DFID to pilot new and innovative approaches to prevent it. Preventing VAWG is one of four pillars for action in DFID's Strategic Vision for Girls and Women launched in 2011 and we support targeted interventions to address VAWG in over 26 programmes. DFID developed a [VAWG theory of change](#) to guide its comprehensive approach to prevention and response.

Globally, several factors limit efforts to reduce the prevalence of VAWG, and hinder response services for survivors, including:

- limited focus on interventions to **prevent** violence, and lack of rigorous evidence on the effectiveness of existing prevention programmes in developing countries;
- limited focus on interventions to address violence in **conflict and humanitarian emergencies**, and lack of rigorous evidence on the effectiveness of existing programmes; and
- **limited investment** by key international and national actors in VAWG policies and programmes.

<sup>72</sup> Performance Evaluation evaluates an intervention on the basis of its contribution to development outcomes and impacts within its context. Source: *Typology for DFID Evaluations*, Sept 2015.

<sup>73</sup> Exact dates to be confirmed during contract negotiations.

## 1b. What Works to Prevent Violence programme

In response, DFID designed a joint ISD-RED **five year £25 million VAWG Research and Innovation Fund (2013-2018)** to address critical evidence gaps and improve the effectiveness of interventions to address VAWG. This fund has been re-named as **What Works to Prevent Violence programme** ("What Works").

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What Works is largely directed at addressing both *intimate partner violence*<sup>74</sup> and *sexual violence*<sup>75</sup> given the large scale and extensive consequences of these forms of violence against women and girls. And given that DFID makes complementary investments in trafficking, FGM and child, early and forced marriage.

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The **expected impact** of the What Works programme is that improved policies and expanded programmes reduce the prevalence of VAWG and increase the number of women and girls receiving quality prevention and response services in at least ten DFID priority countries.

The **expected outcome** is improved development of and investment in evidence-based VAWG policies and programmes across the global south (including by UK Government, international agencies, development partners, and national governments). *Outcome indicators track how evidence is used to inform policies, programmes and scale-up decisions.*

The What Works programme consists of 3 distinct but inter-related components, and the Evaluation will assess the **combined programme** against the Theory of Change (see Annex A) and revised overall programme Logical Framework (see supporting documents). Annex B provides further background on the specific research questions to be answered by the overall What Works programme.

Each of the three components has been procured through separate tenders. The three components are implemented by different research consortia, and are at different stages of implementation due to staggered procurement processes. Component 3 was envisaged just to be 3 years in duration, whereas Components 1 and 2 were envisaged to have 5 years. However, DFID is currently seeking approval to align Component 3 with Component 1 end date (December 2018). Component 2 will continue until April 2019.

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- **Component 1 (up to £17.8mn/5 yrs): Global Programme to Prevent VAWG** (in stable and fragile contexts). This component funds 10 innovation grants for NGOs to test out new approaches to preventing VAWG. It also funds operations research or impact evaluations for up to 7 existing programmes. The consortium is led by the South Africa Medical Research Council (SA MRC), with London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and Social Development Direct. This started in Dec 2013, completed its inception phase in June 2014, and is now in its implementation phase. The consortium produced [5 evidence briefs and evidence reviews](#) during the inception phase.

The SA MRC has been responsible for administering the competition processes for the innovation grants and operations research/impact evaluations that have been selected in 15 countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East (see Annex C).

The SA MRC acts as the Secretariat for the Management Committee and Independent Advisory Board on behalf of all What Works' components. It is also responsible for learning and synthesis across the whole programme (components 1, 2 and 3) in order to facilitate exchange on best practice in research methods, innovations and research results. This will minimise duplication

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<sup>74</sup> Defined as behaviour within an intimate relationship that causes physical, sexual or psychological harm, including acts of physical aggression, sexual coercion, psychological abuse and controlling behaviours. This definition covers violence by both current and former spouses and partners.

<sup>75</sup> Defined as any sexual act, attempt to obtain a sexual act, unwanted sexual comments or advances, or acts to traffic, or otherwise directed against a person's sexuality using coercion, by any person regardless of their relationship to the victim, in any setting including but not limited to home and work. This includes rape, defined as the physically forced or otherwise coerced penetration of the vulva or anus with a penis, other body part or object.

of efforts and help the three components to learn from good practice and successes (and failures). It will also enable key research findings across common themes and geographical foci (e.g. sub-Saharan African or national level evidence) to be synthesised to inform policy debates at national or regional levels.

- **Component 2 (up to £5mn/5 yrs): VAWG in conflict and humanitarian emergencies.** The consortium is led by International Rescue Committee, with George Washington University (Global Women's Institute) and CARE International. This started in May 2014 and completed its inception phase in October 2014, and is now in its implementation phase. It is conducting 6 studies in South Sudan, Kenya, DRC, Nepal, Yemen, the Philippines and one other upcoming natural disaster context.

It will deliver evidence on the drivers, prevalence, trends over time and effective prevention and response mechanisms for VAWG in conflict and humanitarian emergencies. This research will complement component one by providing an in-depth study of the nature of VAWG in conflict and emergency contexts.

The programme has developed a research framework to guide the research and cross study/country analysis. The two over-arching research questions for the programme are:

- (1) What is the prevalence of and forms, trends, and drivers of VAWG and VAMB in conflict and emergency contexts?
- (2) What interventions are most effective for prevention of and response to VAWG in conflict and emergency settings?

This component is conducting research studies using a range of designs and methodologies and drawing on multidisciplinary expertise. Research includes initial reviews and / or syntheses of existing research and evidence. The programme is creating a curated literature database with guidelines, tools, policies, academic and grey literature which are applicable to VAWG in humanitarian settings, plus synthesis documents.

- **Component 3 (up to £1.5m/3yrs<sup>76</sup>): Economic and social costs of VAWG.** This consortium is led by the National University of Ireland (Galway) with Ipsos MORI, and ICRW, it is testing out new methodologies to assess economic and social costs of VAWG. It will conduct 3 empirical studies in South Sudan, Ghana and Pakistan and create synergies with Components 1 and 2. It completed its six-month inception phase in February 2015 and is now in its implementation phase. Component 3 has developed a conceptual framework for measuring the economic and social costs of VAWG in developing countries; and is developing effective methodologies for measuring costs across diverse contexts.

This component will also advance approaches on measuring value for money and cost-effectiveness in VAWG programmes, through analysing social and economic costs at local and national levels. Research will be multidisciplinary and will produce high quality research papers, policy briefs and a costing toolkit for policy makers.

- **Component 4 (up to £400,000): Overall evaluation - the subject of this Tender.** The **effective use and uptake of evidence and results coming from the 3 components above is a priority for the success of this programme.** It is essential that knowledge and evidence of "what works" and "what does not work" is synthesised and effectively communicated so that it directly informs decision-makers influencing strategic investment, policy and programming to prevent and respond to VAWG, at the national and international level. Research evidence is most likely to have direct impact on policy and practice if those who could use research results are engaged throughout the research.

These ToRs should be read in conjunction with the full Business Case and revised LogFrame.

## 2. Evaluation Purpose, Scope and Audience

### 2a. The **purpose** of the independent evaluation is:

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<sup>76</sup> DFID is currently seeking approval to align the timeframe for Component 3 with that of Component 2, to end December 2019.

To evaluate the extent to which the overall What Works programme has delivered, “improved development of and investment in evidence-based VAWG policies and programmes across the global south (including by UK Government, international agencies, development partners, and national governments”. (Outcome objective of the Log Frame)

The supplier should note that it is the implementers of the three components who will be responsible for generating evidence of what works for the prevention of VAWG, in what contexts and why - from both large-scale complex programmes and smaller innovation pilots. **The task of the independent evaluation team is to assess to what extent that evidence is being used to inform decisions to invest in VAWG policies and programmes in the global south.**

2b. **Scope:** Due to the large scale of the investment, the Programme’s ambitious objectives and innovative nature, it is important that DFID is able to understand the progress against outputs and outcomes of the programme *as a whole* across the life-span of What Works. The evaluators will be expected to undertake an ‘overview’ assessment of all three components and the innovation grants and operations research/impact evaluation projects contracted within Components 1, but not to evaluate each component in detail.

The model of generating evidence for policy change through fund portfolios is well used by DFID and other international donors, for example, SAAF (Safe Action Abortion Fund) and RAF Pakistan (Research and Advocacy Fund for Maternal Health). The Evaluation team should draw on relevant experience of measuring outcomes from similar fund portfolios. The Evaluation team should also draw on relevant experience of evaluating *research impact*, for example the recent mid-term evaluation of DFID’s Health Research Programme Consortia.

The evaluation will include:

- A **3-month inception phase** to finalise the **evaluation plan and evaluation design**.
- A **mid-term evaluation of What Works**, setting out a clear **Evaluation Framework** with recommendations on how the 3 components’ implementing partners should improve their methods for capturing research uptake at Outcome and Output levels.
  - Annual check-in with implementing partners of the 3 components on how their M&E systems to capture research uptake are going.
  - An in-depth **end of programme outcome evaluation**.

2c. There are several **target audiences** for the evaluation, combining accountability, lesson learning and programme strengthening aims:

- **Implementing partners** of the three components, to sharpen their monitoring and evaluation systems for tracking Outcome level indicators during programme implementation. This will enhance their ability to demonstrate the difference their research is making to policy and programming.
- **DFID and the Independent Advisory Board** of What Works, country level project **advisory groups**, and component-specific technical advisory groups, to verify delivery of the programme to determine that expenditure on the programme has achieved the intended Outputs and Outcome, i.e. accountability purpose.
- It will also provide evidence on accountability for external scrutiny, for example the **Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI)**.
- **DFID and any future co-funders** of What Works, to verify programme performance in order to inform decisions about course corrections, scale up, or closure of the What Works programme.
- **DFID and Component 1 consortium partners**, to help inform decisions about allocation of resources across the portfolio of innovation grants and operation research/impact evaluation projects; and whether to expand the innovation grant funding mechanism.
- **Grantees under Component 1**, to seek new funding for scale up.
- The final report will be a **public good**, providing high quality findings for the wider VAWG community, including donors, research institutions, think tanks, and civil society, who may be considering the value for money of a large investment in research and innovative programming or learning how to translate evidence into action.

**Communications:** DFID Annual Reviews of What Works reflecting findings from the Evaluation will be published on the DFID website (subject to due consideration of any requests for sensitive information to be withheld). Other sections of the Evaluation team's reports may be placed in the public domain on the DFID research portal (R4D – [r4d.dfid.gov.uk](http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk)).

### 3. Evaluation Questions, Principles, Methodology, Data

The evaluation design should include development of the existing **theory of change**<sup>77</sup> (results chain) in the What Works business case into a fuller theory of change, to provide a holistic view of the overall programme. This should build on the revised programme LogFrame. Different studies/projects/grants under any of the three components may be selected for more intensive evaluation.

#### 3a. Evaluation questions

The provisional evaluation questions are not prescriptive or absolute, rather, are illustrative. The supplier is encouraged to refine these questions and then to finalise them in agreement with the What Works Management Committee, Independent Advisory Board, and DFID during the Evaluation inception phase:

Illustrative evaluation questions against DAC Evaluation Criteria
<p><b>Effectiveness and Potential Impact</b><sup>78</sup></p> <p><i>To what extent is What Works delivering on its Outcome and Output objectives, as defined in the overall LogFrame? An assessment might include consideration of:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How effectively have research uptake strategies been implemented? If evidence has been produced by What Works, to what extent has this evidence contributed to global and national policy change and/or national government or donor investment in evidence-informed VAWG prevention and response policies and programmes both (a) in countries where What Works operates, and (b) beyond? To what extent have results in specific thematic areas (e.g. costs of scale up; approaches to social norms change; preventing violence against children) informed changes in policies and programmes? [policy outcomes]</li> <li>What demonstrable contribution has What Works made to VAWG-related knowledge and research capacity/skills of programme implementers and evaluators? And to the capacity of decision-makers, including grantees and partners under Component 1, to use evidence effectively? [capacity outcomes]</li> <li>What demonstrable contribution has What Works made to academic advances in understanding, research methods, theory and application in the field of VAWG prevention? [academic outcomes]</li> <li>What are the programme's positive or negative unintended consequences?</li> </ul>
<p><b>Relevance</b></p> <p><i>To what extent is What Works preventing violence against women and girls, and of practical applicability? An assessment might include consideration of:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What evidence is there that the research will have relevance to policy and practice in developing countries?</li> </ul>

<sup>77</sup> See Annex A.

<sup>78</sup> The DAC Evaluation criteria of 'Impact' is included alongside 'Effectiveness' as this evaluation will focus on achievements of What Works at the Outcome level



- What evidence is there for the ongoing demand for the research being undertaken?
- To what extent do the assumptions in the overall What Works' Theory of Change related to research demand, capacity to use research evidence for decision-making, research impact and pathways for policy impact hold?
- Under Component 1, is the innovation grant funding mechanism an appropriate way in which to fund and rigorously test out new approaches to preventing VAWG?

### **Efficiency**

*To what extent are the What Works' components functioning in the best possible manner, maximising the resources available to them? An assessment might include consideration of:*

- Whether the implementing partners across all three components have made the best use of their strengths and comparative advantages to optimise the achievement of results in terms of research generation, research uptake and capacity-building? Can/how might this be strengthened?
- Has the governance and management structure of the components and overall programme enabled What Works to be efficient, achieving high impact work at the lowest possible cost, in line with DFID's '3Es' approach to measuring value for money?
- What lessons can be learned across the three components to improve value for money of research and innovation programmes? In particular, what lessons can be learned about effective approaches to turning research into action and building capacity of individuals and organisations to use evidence to inform decision-making?

### **Sustainability**

*What is the likely legacy of What Works? An assessment might include consideration of:*

- What is the likely medium and long-term sustainability of the observed policy and programme outcome changes and academic outcome changes – both at programme-wide level and at grantee level in Component 1?
- Is What Works on track to build long term research capacity amongst individual developing country researchers?
- Is What Works as a consortium of implementers and researchers likely to remain in existence after the programme end date as a result of this initial investment?

## **3b. Evaluation principles**

The Evaluation design and supplier should:

- Work collaboratively with the implementing partners of the 3 components to inform the evaluation framework and to identify ways to learn and improve together;
- Demonstrate how they will avoid establishing parallel or redundant data collection mechanisms; but rather build on existing M&E systems established by the 3 components' implementing partners;
- Use, support and strengthen reliable secondary data sources wherever possible;
- Adhere to ethical guidance on VAWG research;
- Maximise the utility of the evaluation results for the broadest range of stakeholders;
- Establish systems that are highly flexible and adaptable to the evolving context; and,
- Promote continuity and consistency of evaluation management.

## **3c. Methodology**

The evaluation should take a strategic approach that aims to review the performance of the *overall* What Works programme rather than evaluating each component of the programme separately.

The supplier should set out an approach and methodology for gathering and analysing data. This is likely to include a series of ‘outcome-oriented case studies’, .e.g. tracking when and how research findings have influenced donors, policy makers or programme decision-makers, or adoption of an innovation. We envisage that 6 such studies will be appropriate selected against the three components, with sampling commensurate with the value of each component. For example:

Component 1: 1-2 funded innovation grants and 1-2 operations research/impact evaluation projects.

Component 2: at least 2 country studies.

Component 3: at least one country study.

However, alternative approaches and designs may be offered.

The supplier should present a methodology for conducting and analysing these outcome-oriented case studies. The supplier should submit an Evaluation Plan and methodology that best delivers the objectives and required outputs, and justify the selection options. This should also cover the potential risks and challenges for the evaluation and how these will be managed.

The evaluation supplier will have a 3 month inception phase to finalise the *evaluation plan and design*, and *evaluation communications strategy* to be agreed by DFID, Management Committee and the Independent Advisory Board of What Works. This should be based on a literature review of research uptake, impact of research, and evidence-informed policy and programming. This should also draw on DFID’s guidance on Research Uptake [here](#)<sup>79</sup> and guidance on how to [evaluate the social and economic impacts of research](#).

### **3d. Data sources**

The supplier should set out the different data sources they expect to use. We would expect a design that takes a mixed methods approach, combining primary data collection from all 3 Components of the programme, and their funded innovation grants (Component 1) and evaluation projects/studies (Components 1, 2 and 3). This would be combined with secondary evidence synthesis drawn from the 3 Components (eg Component 1 has produced [5 evidence briefs and evidence reviews](#) during the inception phase) and analysis from existing research and evaluation sources.

The evaluation is expected to focus on the use of research evidence produced by What Works in a broad sense, i.e. evidence reviews; published academic research papers; statistical databases; “established” i.e. widely debated and accepted policy papers and positions; and formative research, operations research and evaluation findings. The supplier is welcome to include a definition of research evidence in their proposals, where they feel this may be helpful to clarify their proposed evaluation design and approach.

Data sources will include at a minimum:

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<sup>79</sup> The Research Uptake guidance includes four strands: stakeholder engagement including stakeholder mapping to identify the main organisations and processes which influence policy making in this area; capacity building; targeted communication plans to ensure research and evidence outputs reach key decision-makers at national and international levels; and monitoring and evaluation of uptake.

- **Background documentation:** VAWG Research and Innovation Fund business case, theory of change, revised LogFrame, component-specific M&E guidance, inception phase reports for the 3 Components, annual reviews of What Works (April 2014, April 2015), component 1 evidence reviews, research uptake and stakeholder engagement strategies (for each component and overall cross-component).
- **Secondary data and literature:** a document review and analysis of existing Theories of Change and evidence on research uptake/research into use, policy influencing, and capacity building on use of evidence.
- **Secondary data on policies and programmes:** national data on VAWG policies, VAWG programme beneficiaries and levels of investment by governments and donors in VAWG programmes in case study countries.
- **Primary data gathered by the Evaluation team:** e.g. interviews with Suppliers of the 3 Components, their key implementation and research/evaluation partners, and evidence users/potential users and stakeholders. The latter are likely to be national governments, multilateral agencies (e.g. World Bank, UN Women, UNICEF, WHO), DFID country offices, other bilateral donors, foundations and NGOs. They should include Independent Advisory Board members. This will include qualitative key informant interviews and other data collection methods. It is not anticipated that data collection from community members themselves will be required.
- **Primary data gathered by the What Works' Suppliers for the 3 Components,** e.g. data from the monitoring and evaluation of the innovation grants and of programmes partnering on operations research & impact evaluations (Component 1), project progress reporting (Components 2 and 3) etc.
- In addition, the evaluation may also draw on the 3 Components' lessons from research in specific thematic areas (e.g. intervention approaches to shift social norms underlying VAWG), to assess to what extent these thematic lessons are being taken up by decision-makers.

The proposed evaluation plan should clearly show how evaluators will address well-known **challenges** with evaluating the outcomes of research and innovation programmes aimed at long-term changes. These challenges will include:

- *Complexity and time lag:* The pathways from the What Works programme generating new evidence, to communicating it to and engaging with DFID and global and national stakeholders, to decision-makers using this evidence to inform investments, policies and programmes, through to the ultimate benefits for women and girls experience less violence, can be long and variable, and the full effects may be outside the span of this evaluation.
- These challenges are particularly relevant to this evaluation because the three components of What Works are being implemented in parallel to the evaluation. The proposed evaluation plan should acknowledge the degree to which they expect to be able to answer the evaluation questions within the timeframe.
- *Contribution/attribution:* the components of the What Works programme may not be the only factor impacting on the changes observed in investments in VAWG policy and programmes.
- *Context:* the evaluation will need to draw lessons from across a wide range of countries and contexts.
- *VAWG programmes themselves can be difficult to evaluate* for a range of reasons, including the longer timeframes, interventions that work at multiple levels, measuring social change, and difficulty in capturing baseline data and isolating impact. Components 1 and 2 will face these challenges. Lessons learned from a [review](#) of VAWG programme evaluation approaches and methods highlight ways in which to maximise the effectiveness of evaluations of interventions.

#### 4. Outputs and Timeframe

The evaluation will commence in September 2016 and run for a period of 34 months. The staggered timing of the implementation of the 3 components, due to separate tendering processes, presents an evaluation challenge. The design of the evaluation will be taking place alongside the third year of the implementation phase of Component 1, the second year of the implementation phase of Component 2, and the second year of Component 3. The evaluation team will deliver the following outputs:

**4a. Inception report:** development of the **evaluation plan and design**, including a final draft of the **Evaluation Framework** based on the What Works' Theory of Change and LogFrame, and make

suggestions for the selection of individual outcome-oriented case studies from the 3 components. Discussions on refinement of the Theory of Change should include DFID and the 3 components. Ensure consistency in the reporting of common indicators and methodology to measure outputs and outcomes across the 3 components. This will include reviewing each component's research uptake strategies and their monitoring and evaluation tools if available, and the overall cross-component research uptake and stakeholder engagement strategy.

The evaluation team will refine the **evaluation methodology** in consultation with key stakeholders, including refinement of **evaluation questions**. The evaluators will produce a short design report (max. 10 pages) outlining the agreed approach, evaluation framework, methods, data, sampling, timing, roles and responsibilities and setting out clearly how the evaluation team will report to and engage with DFID, and the What Works Management Committee and Independent Advisory Board. The plan should also include a workplan and ways of working with stakeholders and a timeline and budget.

The evaluation team will also produce a **communications plan** that will detail how evaluation outputs will be effectively disseminated to the intended audiences.

There will be a break point at the end of the inception phase. Continuation of the contract into the implementation phase will be dependent on DFID's acceptance of the Suppliers' inception report.

The stakeholders with whom the evaluators should engage while designing the evaluation plan include:

- DFID ISD and RED teams responsible for managing What Works.
- Staff within implementing partner organisations of the three components.
- Potential users of the research in the VAWG community including DFID country offices and senior management, other donors and practitioner agencies, partner country governments, researchers in this area, UN agencies. The Independent Advisory Board of What Works represents some of these stakeholders.

The Inception report should be delivered to DFID by Friday 16 December, 2016. DFID's response to the Suppliers' inception report will be given during the week of 9 January, 2017.

**4b. Mid-term Evaluation report:** Performance evaluation of What Works. The Mid-term Evaluation report is chiefly concerned with the assessment of progress against outputs and towards outcome objectives, and reflection on the effectiveness of implementation of research uptake and engagement strategies. It should contain an assessment of progress of two selected outcome-oriented case studies, and conduct independent verification of each component's performance against outcomes and output objectives.

The Mid-term Evaluation report should identify what information the three components already collect as part of their monitoring and evaluation systems. It will revise and finalise the **Evaluation Framework**, considering a basis for refinements that may enhance data collection and methodologies for capturing progress in delivering research uptake and engagement strategies, for each of the components. The revised timeframe for the Mid-term evaluation means that specific recommendations for components and implementing partners to improve their research uptake and engagement strategies may be delivered at a later stage (see six-monthly reports, below).

The Mid-term Evaluation report is to be delivered to DFID by 10 March, 2017, to inform DFID's annual review due on 17 April, 2017.

**4c. Short six-monthly report:** every six months between the mid-term evaluation and end of programme evaluation, the Evaluation team will check-in with the 3 components<sup>80</sup> to build capacity of their systems for collecting data on implementation of their research uptake and engagement strategies and achievements at Outcome level.

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<sup>80</sup> The Evaluation team will hold Component-specific and cross-component discussions, by phone or in person if resources allow (NB. The Components do not have budgets for this purpose, so any costs need to be built into the Evaluation team's proposal).

Each report will assess progress against the objectives contained in the log frame, to check if the programme is on track, and if any adjustments need to be made. These six-monthly reports will build on considerations given in the Mid-term Evaluation report to make recommendations for implementing partners to improve the monitoring and evaluation of each component's own research and engagement strategies. The Evaluation team will help the 3 components capture evidence on their component-specific research uptake and stakeholder engagement strategy, and support the Secretariat to capture evidence against the overall research uptake and stakeholder engagement strategy.

Three six-monthly reports will be delivered in September 2017, March 2018 (to support DFID's Annual Review at the same time), and September 2018. The March 2018 report should consider DFID requirements to inform the annual review taking place at the same time. Similarly, a light touch summary document may be required to inform the annual review process in March 2019, although the substantive piece at this point is the end of programme outcome evaluation, due July 2019. The six-monthly reports will not be reviewed by EQUALS.

**4d. End of programme outcome evaluation:** assessment of progress towards achievement of outcome-level indicators and the degree to which these are attributable to DFID's work, based on the selected outcome-oriented case studies. Research impact is often not seen for many years.

**4e. Communication of evaluation results:** A strategy to communicate the evaluation findings. We expect the Supplier to develop a communication strategy. The programme will build on and strengthen existing networks and communication channels with key individuals, organisations and processes.

In summary, the independent evaluation team are expected to deliver the following outputs, which will feed into DFID's annual review and project completion review processes as set out below:

Output	Deadline
Inception report including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evaluation Framework based on What Works' theory of change, overall revised LogFrame</li> <li>• Literature review on research uptake, impact of research, and evidence-informed policy and programming<sup>81</sup></li> <li>• Evaluation plan &amp; design: detailed evaluation questions and methodology for the main evaluation process, including selection criteria for outcome-oriented case studies; methodological approach</li> <li>• Evaluation communications plan</li> </ul>	16 December, 2016
Mid-term Evaluation Report including an executive summary and considerations for partners – <i>to feed into DFID's Annual Review due 17 April 2017.</i>	10 March, 2017
Three short six-monthly reports summarising engagement with 3 components' implementing partners and Secretariat, with revised recommendations for partners to ensure systems in place to capture research uptake and	Three reports are due; September 2017, March 2018, and September 2018.

<sup>81</sup> The literature review will draw on guidance on how to [evaluate the social and economic impacts of research](#), and DFID's guidance on Research Uptake [here](#)<sup>81</sup>.

engagement indicators at Output and Outcome level, approximately 10-20 pages, not including any annexes.	
Final Evaluation Report, including an executive summary and recommendations – <i>to feed into DFID's Project Completion Report, due July 2019.</i>	34 months after contract start

## 5. Reporting and contracting arrangements

The Evaluation Supplier will be required to submit an **inception phase report** to DFID at the end of the 3-month inception phase which will be submitted to EQUALS upon receipt. DFID will include a summary note on submission to EQUALS to clarify shortened timetables and expectations.

A week-long break period will take place at the end of the inception phase to allow the DFID programme team to consider progress of the evaluation, once feedback from EQUALS has been received and considered (expected during week commencing 9 January, 2017). Progression to the implementation phase will be subject to satisfactory performance by the Supplier. Notification will be given to the supplier no later than one week after the EQUALS report is received by DFID.

As explained in the outputs above (section 4), the evaluation team will be expected to produce **six-monthly reports**. Outputs from the evaluation team, including the six-monthly reports, will be used by DFID to form the basis of the overall Annual Review of What Works, including annual financial reporting. DFID carries out Annual Reviews of all of its programmes to assess progress against the objectives contained in the log frame, to check if the programme is on track, and if any adjustments need to be made. The annual review template should be consulted for further information.

All reporting requirements will be agreed between DFID and the Supplier on agreement of the contract. The supplier should suggest a milestone-based payment plan in their tender.

All draft **outputs** outlined in Section 4 will be reviewed by the What Works Management Committee for factual corrections and right to respond by the component managers. DFID's external quality assurance body, EQUALS, will also conduct a quality assurance report on the inception report, the mid-term review, and the final evaluation report, within two weeks of submission. DFID will summarise a joint-response from EQUALS and DFID to the submission from the supplier within one week of receiving comments back from EQUALS.

The supplier will then be required to respond appropriately to comments within 2 weeks of receiving the reviewers' observations. Fixed dates are given for the inception report review phases, below:

- 16 December, 2016 – Inception Report received by DFID and submitted to EQUALS, with summary note, contextualising mitigating circumstances (restricted timeframe)
- Week commencing 9 January, 2016 – EQUALS quality assurance report received by DFID
- No later than week commencing 16 January, 2016 – DFID gives Inception Report response to supplier.

The Evaluation team will then submit outputs to DFID and the Independent Advisory Board for approval. See Section 8 for further information on the governance and management arrangements.

In the event that there is a dispute between the evaluation team and DFID, this will be addressed by:

- i. A meeting between first the Independent Advisory Board and the evaluation team. If this does not resolve the dispute, then it will be referred to the DFID Head of Evaluation.
- ii. If this does not address the concerns, then DFID will publish the report but with an annex articulating those areas of dispute for reference.

Outputs must comply with DFID's ethical guidance, be of publishable standard and be written in plain English. All recommendations must be substantiated with evidence and be actionable. The evaluation reports will be available through DFID's website, and DFID will have unlimited access to the material produced by the supplier (including confidential data sets and analysis).

## 6. Skills requirements

The independent evaluation team should demonstrate:

- A strong proven track record in the design and implementation of evaluations of research impact, research uptake, policy influencing, and building capacity of decision-makers to use evidence.
- Multi-disciplinary expertise across sociology, economics, health, law, governance, psychology, anthropology.
- Extensive experience of VAWG programming in developing countries, including experience of working in humanitarian emergencies and conflict-affected contexts.
- Strong understanding of VAWG research methods.
- Strong skills in both qualitative and quantitative research methods and mixed methods evaluation design.
- Excellent written and verbal communication skills with proven record of delivering clear, succinct, evidence-based evaluation reports.

There should be a designated evaluation team leader. The team leader will be responsible for overseeing the evaluation, and must be able to demonstrate the following expertise:

- Proven ability to design and deliver high quality evaluations on complex issues on time and on budget.
- Evaluation of research uptake and/or policy influencing.
- Excellent knowledge of qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods, including of user-driven evaluations.
- Exemplary writing and presentational skills.
- Strong inter-personal and negotiation skills.

Desirable areas of expertise include:

- VAWG and gender programming
- Research capacity building

**Conflicts of Interest:** To remove the potential for bias, all evaluation team members should be independent from all the consortium member implementers of Components 1, 2 and 3.<sup>82</sup>

## 7. DFID coordination

The Supplier will report to a Social Development Adviser yet to be appointed and John McGinn (Deputy Programme Manager) in the VAWG Team, and Tim Conway (Senior Social Development Adviser) in RED. A DFID Evaluation Adviser (Simon McNorton) will provide technical advice to the VAWG Team, and in turn draw on EQUALS for independent quality assurance of evaluation team outputs.

The DFID point of contact will be Simon McNorton through to the delivery of the Mid-term evaluation report (March 2017). Thereafter, the point of contact will be assigned to a programme manager or senior adviser in the Inclusive Societies Department, Violence Against Women and Girls team.

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<sup>82</sup> Component 1: South Africa Medical Research Council, London School of Tropical Hygiene and Medicine, Social Development Direct. Component 2: International Rescue Committee, CARE International, George Washington University. Component 3: National University of Ireland (Galway), IPSOS-Mori, International Center for Research on Women.



## 8. Governance arrangements for the independent evaluation

### 8a. Governance structure for the overall What Works programme

A **Management Committee** has been established for the *What Works* programme as a whole (i.e. all three components plus evaluation team), and includes:

- Two representatives from the lead Supplier (or partner institution) of each component, including the Evaluation team.
- Representatives from DFID ISD and RED, and any other additional donor(s) who may also fund the programme in the future; and will
- Have the provision to allow observers.

The purpose of the Management Committee is to:

- Promote synergies and learning across the components to ensure consistency and reduce potential duplication;
- Agree and approve call specifications and peer review processes;
- Ensure the development of a robust monitoring and evaluation process across the programme as a whole.

It meets quarterly: three times a year by phone and once in person.

An **Independent Advisory Board** has been established for the *What Works* programme as a whole. This board includes:

- An independent chair from WHO and six members involving international experts, including representation from Africa or Asia;
- *Ex officio members* including one member from the lead Supplier for each component, and from DFID and any other potential funders.

It meets annually, first in December 2014 and then in September 2015.

This board will not make any executive decisions, but advises the Management Committee on:

- Direction the programme components need to consider;
- Technical advice on design and delivery of components;
- Technical advice on key outputs;
- Opportunities and strategies for synthesis and research uptake across components; and will
- Provide advice to the Management Committee as required;
- Provide a challenge as well as a Quality Assurance function. **This includes overseeing the independent evaluation of What Works.**

In addition, Components 2 and 3 also have their own research advisory groups to guide and peer review their research studies. Component 1 has external peer review mechanisms for its research outputs.

The South Africa MRC provides the Secretariat function to co-ordinate the work of the Management Committee and the Independent Advisory Board. The South Africa MRC is responsible for learning and synthesis across the whole programme (components 1, 2 and 3) in order to facilitate exchange on best practice in methods, innovations and research results.

### 8b. Governance arrangements and management of the evaluation

The evaluation team will report to the Independent Advisory Board and DFID. The evaluation team will submit all draft outputs (set out in Section 4):

- first to the Management Committee for factual corrections and the components' Suppliers' right to respond. This will also ensure the Management Committee's buy-in to the evaluation questions and plan;
- and then to the Independent Advisory Board (IAB) as part of their Quality Assurance function for What Works;
- in addition, DFID's evaluation quality assurance function EQUALS will provide independent comments on the inception report, the mid-term report, and the final evaluation report.
- the six-monthly reports will not be subject to EQUALS assessment.

The evaluation team will have 2 weeks in which to make revisions to the full set of comments. DFID will sign off on the final outputs, making payments for delivery against milestones. DFID will be responsible for providing a management response to the final evaluation report.

The Evaluation Supplier will bring together a team of organisations and/or individuals with relevant expertise, including strong technical expertise in VAWG, proven expertise in conducting evaluations and evaluating the impact of research and research uptake. This will not involve the separate establishment of a physical centre or the formation of a new institution.

The specific management structure of the Independent Evaluation team will be set out in the supplier's proposal.

The independent evaluation will complement and link to the three components in the What Works programme. The components have been designed to be operationally and contractually separate. This is to ensure an adequate concentration of expertise for addressing related but distinct dimensions of the VAWG agenda. Notwithstanding their independent existence, the partners working on the different components will be required to work closely together, routinely sharing research and programming plans and findings; and meeting up in at least one annual scientific meeting.

The Evaluation Supplier is expected to work closely with the implementing partners for Components 1, 2 and 3, through the Management Committee and directly, in order to:

- Support the Suppliers of Components 1, 2 and 3 to suggest ways in which to strengthen their monitoring frameworks (the overall revised LogFrame) in order to maximise alignment with the evaluation objectives;
- Comment on monitoring tools developed by implementing partners, such as M&E Guidance for innovation grantees (component 1), and the information gathered from those tools;

The Supplier will also participate in the annual Scientific Meetings for all 3 components, organised by the SA MRC. The location of this may vary between London, South Africa and other locations in Africa or Asia and the evaluation team will be expected to budget for at least two members of the team to participate each year i.e. 3 meetings during the evaluation timeframe. The IAB meetings and in-person Management Committee meetings will usually be timed to coincide with the Scientific Meeting.

All 3 components of the *What Works* programme were made aware in advance of DFID's plans for independent external evaluation. Good levels of co-operation can be anticipated with regard to reasonable requests to support the evaluation. Input from the three components does not need to be costed.

## 9. Proposal Requirement

Documentation to be provided by the supplier will include a detailed plan of proposed evaluation activities including:

- A very well defined, feasible and robust methodology and data collection plan, a proposed approach for the mid-term evaluation and end of programme evaluation, which considers the evaluation questions and envisaged tasks outlined in section 3 of these ToRs. The approach should integrate Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria for best practice in an evaluation;
- Details of the general evaluation structure, including all key activities;
- Details of the management and governance structure for the evaluation;

- Details on how the Evaluation team will work collaboratively with the implementing partners of the 3 components and build on their existing M&E systems, and how the team will build capacity of components on monitoring research uptake & stakeholder engagement;
- Identification of key challenges to designing and delivering a robust evaluation for What Works, and how these will be addressed;
- Staffing roles, over the course of the project, their general and project specific qualifications (including CVs<sup>[2]</sup>);
- Details and specifications on other required resources;
- A timetable for undertaking and completing each of the identified key evaluation activities;
- A detailed budget (excluding VAT) <sup>[3]</sup>. The Supplier is expected to budget for no more than two high risk locations alongside lower risk locations (see Duty of Care section 13).
- A milestone-based payment plan.

The supplier should demonstrate how it would manage the evaluation effectively, in order to deliver both value for money and robust results.

## **10. Research and Evaluation Ethics**

Given the highly sensitive nature of VAWG, it is essential that researchers, evaluators and implementing agencies adhere to ethical guidelines for research and programme implementation, building on existing WHO resources and academic ethics protocols. Further details are given in Annex D. Given the potentially threatening and traumatic nature of the issues involved, and the fact that the safety and even the lives of women respondents and interviewers may be at risk, this requires approaches that go beyond ethical research of other areas of social research (e.g. confidentiality, problems of disclosure and the need to ensure adequate and informed consent).

Contracts will only be awarded to researchers and evaluators where research/ evaluation ethics and appropriate ethical clearance protocols are embedded in their institutions and where they can demonstrate adherence to current WHO protocols as outlined above and detailed in current guidelines.

## **11. Environmental Considerations**

The Supplier should ensure due consideration is given to the environmental impact of all work undertaken to deliver this evaluation. Specific attention to minimising operational impacts on the environment and global climate of those undertaking the evaluation should include ensuring individuals travel by economy class, and reducing carbon footprint through for example, using recycled paper and minimising printing waste.

## **12. Duty of Care**

The Supplier is responsible for the safety and well-being of their Personnel (as defined in Section 2 of the Contract) and Third Parties affected by their activities under this contract, including appropriate security arrangements. They will also be responsible for the provision of suitable security arrangements for their domestic and business property.

DFID will share available information with the Supplier on security status and developments in-country where appropriate.

The Supplier is responsible for ensuring appropriate safety and security briefings for all of their Personnel working under this contract and ensuring that their Personnel register and receive briefing as relating to health, safety and security. Travel advice is also available on the FCO website and the Supplier must ensure they (and their Personnel) are up to date with the latest position.

This requirement may require the Supplier to operate in a seismically active zone that is considered at high risk of earthquakes. Minor tremors are not uncommon. Earthquakes are impossible to predict and

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<sup>[2]</sup> CVs should be kept to a maximum of two pages each.

<sup>[3]</sup> All travel and flights must be economy class.

can result in major devastation and loss of life. There are several websites focusing on earthquakes, including <http://geology.about.com/library/bl/maps/blworldindex.htm>. The Supplier should be comfortable working in such an environment and should be capable of deploying to any areas required within the region in order to deliver the Contract (subject to travel clearance being granted).

This requirement may require the Supplier to operate in conflict-affected areas where parts of it are highly insecure. Travel to many zones within the region will be subject to travel clearance from the UK government in advance. The security situation may be volatile and subject to change at short notice. The Supplier should be comfortable working in such an environment and should be capable of deploying to any areas required within the region in order to deliver the Contract (subject to travel clearance being granted).

The Supplier is responsible for ensuring that appropriate arrangements, processes and procedures are in place for their Personnel, taking into account the environment they will be working in and the level of risk involved in delivery of the Contract (such as working in dangerous, fragile and hostile environments etc.). The Supplier must ensure their Personnel receive the required level of training and complete a UK government approved hostile environment training course (SAFE) or safety in the field training prior to deployment if necessary.

Suppliers must develop their Tender on the basis of being fully responsible for Duty of Care in line with the details provided above and the example risk assessment matrixes prepared by DFID (see Annexes E and F of this ToR). Suppliers must also confirm in their ITT response that they have the capability to work in a variety of countries as outlined, but not limited to, those stated in paragraph 29 and that:

- They fully accept responsibility for Security and Duty of Care.
- They understand the potential risks and have the knowledge and experience to develop an effective risk plan.
- They have the capability to manage their Duty of Care responsibilities throughout the life of the contract.

If you are unwilling or unable to accept responsibility for Security and Duty of Care as detailed above, your ITT will be viewed as non-compliant and excluded from further evaluation.

Acceptance of responsibility must be supported with evidence of Duty of Care capability and DFID reserves the right to clarify any aspect of this evidence. In providing evidence, interested Suppliers should respond in line with the Duty of Care section in ITT Volume 5 – Duty of Care Information.

If the Supplier is unwilling or unable to accept responsibility for Security and Duty of Care as detailed above, the Tender will be viewed as non-compliant and excluded from further evaluation.

### **13. Supporting documents provided with this ToR**

- a. Violence against Women and Girls Research and Innovation Fund Business Case (Feb 2013)
- b. Violence against Women and Girls Research and Innovation Fund original Logframe (Feb 2013)
- c. Violence against Women and Girls DFID Theory of Change
- d. 2<sup>nd</sup> Annual Review of What Works (April 2015)
- e. Revised Logical Framework (August 2015).

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## ANNEX 2 – EVALUATION FRAMEWORK

### 1. EVALUATION APPROACH OVERVIEW

The evaluation approach was originally designed as part of our inception approach revised in 2017.<sup>83</sup> Prior to beginning the Final Evaluation (FE), our team reviewed and updated (where needed) the final evaluation framework, approach and methodology and agreed this with DFID in 2019. The FE period ran from August 2019 to February 2020, and included in-country fieldwork in South Africa, Zambia, South Sudan, Nepal and Pakistan with interviews with key actors at all levels (including remotely), and an evidence and literature review.

As discussed in **Section 1** of the FE report, there have been a number of core stages in the wider evaluation process prior to this FE: from the initial Inception Phase, closely followed by the Mid-Term Review, and then three Research Uptake Progress Reports (RUPRs). Each stage has had a separate focus (**Figure 14**), and we build on this and the evidence each stage generated for use in this FE.

**Figure 14: Evaluation Stages and Focus**

Evaluation Stage	Core Focus
<b>Inception (2016-2017)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evaluation design, including questions, methods and data collection and analysis approaches;</li> <li>• Embedded research uptake as a core evaluation theme.</li> </ul>
<b>Mid-Term Review (2017)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focused on relevance, approach and processes.</li> </ul>
<b>RUPRs (Oct 2017, Jul 2018 and Apr 2019)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reporting on progress against research uptake logframe indicators and validating reported progress;</li> <li>• Identification of 'potential influence' cases and reflections on tactical approaches to response;</li> <li>• Interim critique of academic outputs to date.</li> </ul>
<b>Final Evaluation (2019-2020)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focused on effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact of the programme to inform future programming;</li> <li>• Thematic focus on the three programme strands: innovation, research quality and research uptake.</li> </ul>

#### Purpose, Objectives and Overview

The core focus and purpose of our wider evaluation process has been to generate lessons learnt and support accountability of the WW programme. Key objectives hold from the original ToRs, our original technical response and the MTR stage hold, these include:

- Evaluate the programme's performance against the overall programme outputs and outcomes at the mid-term and end of the programme;
- Assess the quality of the research outputs and the potential impact on uptake;
- Assess to what extent that evidence is being used to inform decisions to invest in end-VAWG policies and programmes in the global south; and to maximise uptake.

As described in **Section 1** of the main FE report, WW-VAWG is a multi-component, complex programme, based on research and research uptake, in three main areas of VAWG prevention:

<sup>83</sup> Please see the What Works to Prevent Violence Research & Innovation Programme, Mid-term and End-term Performance Evaluation Inception Report (2017) for further details regarding the initial evaluation design.

- **Component 1:** The largest WW-VAWG component and led by SA MRC, which provided grants to test new approaches to tackle VAWG, operations research and evaluation of these;
- **Component 2:** Led by the International Rescue Committee, funded research into VAWG in humanitarian conflict settings; and
- **Component 3:** Supported and tested new methodologies for assessing the economic and social costs of VAWG;
- **Component 4:** Comprised the whole evaluation of the WW-VAWG programme.

It should be noted that this evaluation was not intended to assess WW-VAWG programme activities at a detailed level but rather provide an overview evaluation of the ways in which its design, modality, approach and operation have either assisted, or hindered, progress towards its required results (see programme ToC and logframe for these). To do this, as guided by DFID, we focused on reviewing programme research and paths towards research uptake, and the eventual outcomes of this work. We also assessed factors which we consider key to the programme's success, but which were given insufficient weight in the original programme logic: innovation, capacity development and partnership.

### Final Evaluation Scope

The scope of the IE shifted from the MTR focus, with this evaluation focusing on generating key lessons for the first phase of WW-VAWG. We considered that questions regarding the overall relevance of the programme, as defined in the OECD-DAC criteria, had been fully answered at MTR. Therefore, we did not include relevance as part of this FE, and instead the assessment we made of relevance at MTR is given as **Annex 7** to this report. In this FE, we have focused on effectiveness, the equity aspects of VFM, sustainability, and impact<sup>84</sup>, and also aimed to generate relevant programmatic and operational recommendations for future programming, including shaping the next phase of WW-VAWG. To do this, as guided by DFID, we focused on reviewing programme research and paths towards research uptake, and the eventual outcomes of this work. We also assessed factors which we consider key to the programme's success, but which were given insufficient weight in the original programme logic: innovation, capacity development, and partnership.

Our evaluation hypothesis is given in the box below.

### Box 9: Evaluation Hypothesis

Based on our original ToRs, and discussions with DFID and WW components, a core focus of the evaluation team's work through the whole evaluation, from the MTR to the six monthly RUPRs, has been the impact of the research itself, and research uptake (RU). A core evaluation assumption for the team has been that good quality research is essential and necessary but not enough to achieve change. The evaluation hypothesis used at MTR still holds:

*"good quality research is an essential foundation for research uptake, but is not sufficient to ensure that decisions, policies and programmes will be shaped by evidence"*

We built this focus into core assessment tools we adapted for the evaluation, including the research excellence framework<sup>85</sup> (Section 2.3.4) which we enhanced to capture specific RU dimensions of change).

The IE also takes into account the revised ToC for each component and revised programme logframe. The logframe has been a living document, but this and the revised, unified programme ToC, were initially reviewed in October 2016 during an all-component and DFID workshop, facilitated by the

<sup>84</sup> In agreement with DFID, the IE contract was awarded on the understanding that it would have only a very light touch approach to the OECD-DAC criterion of Efficiency. This is why we have focused on equity in relation to value for money.

<sup>85</sup> Please see [www.ref.ac.uk/about/what-is-the-ref/](http://www.ref.ac.uk/about/what-is-the-ref/) for further details on the REF.

Evaluation Team, as part of our inception phase activities. This IE has focused on drawing out key lessons and capturing the legacy of the programme, with analysis not focused on providing a critique of the ToCs and logframe, but rather assesses the extent to which each component achieved the goals they set themselves (as depicted through the ToCs and logframe). The approach considered whether new ToCs are emerging, now that WW-VAWG Phase 1 has been completed.

### **Innovation, Capacity Development and Partnership**

During the MTR, the evaluation team noted that the programme was operating with a very narrow concept of innovation. In November 2016, the WW-VAWG logframe and ToC was reworked and now includes core focus areas of Research, RU, innovation, partnerships and capacity development.

The team worked to identify and assess innovation as it happened throughout WW-VAWG, and to analyse it in relation to the work of all three components. We also used an innovation analysis lens when assessing the programme, and across research and research uptake. Assessing innovative problem-solving, as evidenced in relation to capacity development and partnership, for example, was a critical approach to assessing the effectiveness and sustainability (and impact) of WW-VAWG.

At MTR, we realised that there were important aspects of the programme's work which were not being captured or assessed: Innovation, Capacity Development and Partnership. We, therefore, adopted new approaches to gathering data and understanding on these aspects. We broadened the view on Innovation in the programme (previously limited to innovation grants to implementing projects in C1), to capture:

- Creative problem-solving on key issues (capacity development and partnership)
- New Positive Pathways to RU and VAWG prevention

As with the other evaluation components, RU remained a core feature of the FE. Records of uptake successes were reviewed as an on-going process as assessed in the three RUPRs. All academic peer reviewed outputs were read and fed into the adapted REF framework, as they were posted onto the programme website or communicated directed to the academic lead. Through regular conversations and KAIs, successes, challenges and innovations were logged. This on-going set of activities fed into and informed our RUPRs, which have been produced on a six-monthly basis and have been a rich evidence source for this evaluation. Yet, for the FE we have sought to go beyond evidencing examples of uptake and sought to demonstrate if, how, and when, WW-VAWGs had impact on processes of social norm change and social change. This focus was critical for understanding the likely sustainability of the impact generated, and to inform the second phase of WW-VAWG.

### **Participation, Inclusion and Mainstreaming Intersectionality**

Our evaluation approach was intersectional, gender-focused and rights-based. Across all evaluation phases, we ensured that we captured experiences and voices across WW-VAWG, and at all levels, including; senior component leads and researchers, in-country research teams, data collectors, implementers, advisory members at national and programme levels, other stakeholders and academics outside of the programme and wherever possible the participants of the interventions.

Who we sought to interview, and the analysis of transcripts, was guided by an intersectional approach that aimed to include a range of interviewees across gender, (dis)ability, ethnicity and status levels. Marginality was also a key dimension as we wanted to measure the reach of the programme in terms of the experiences and perceptions captured, were the poorest and most excluded included? We did not consult as many project constituents as we would have liked due to resource constraints. These we did meet, shared highly valuable insights on the programme and on VAWG more widely.


### **Evaluation Conceptual Framework**



Again designed during MTR, **Figure 15**, below, sets out our conceptual framework that that we used to test the research uptake hypothesis given above. Uptake, as the central goal of the programme, is placed in the centre, surrounded by the differing dimensions of the enabling environment for uptake. Key factors influenced this pathway. WW-VAWG research needed to be of high enough quality to withstand scrutiny, and to give lobbying confidence (those using it to push for change need to feel empowered by rigorous evidence). Capacity needs to exist at all levels in order to generate data, operationalise interventions, and drive uptake. Linked to capacity are strategies, that are designed for particular contexts, and are flexible enough to be opportunistic. Most significantly for uptake, the political economy factors at country level (see disaggregated factors underneath country heading) will impact massively on the likelihood that robust evidence, sufficient capacity and well-designed strategies will drive, or stimulate, the political will to change (see our learnings, in **Section 5** of the main report).

The framework also sets out how we measured change, at all levels. We sought to capture how the research itself was used (or not) by different actors: did the knowledge captured support activities that caused shifts in mind-sets? Finally, we sought the answer to the key question: can we see evidence of VAWG prevention?

**Figure 15: Evaluation Conceptual Lens**



### Paris Declaration, Rights and Working with Vulnerable People

All DFID development work follows the OECD Paris Declaration themes of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results, and mutual accountability<sup>86</sup>. The approach taken, throughout the IE, has been fully in-line with this declaration. Rights approaches, and respect for Human Rights, underly all aspects of our approach to meeting our objectives, to our processes, and products. We have taken a strong ethical approach to working with all stakeholders. We ensured that all team members are fully aware of, and able to comply with, IMC's safeguarding policy. Mechanisms were in place to ensure that any ethical/safeguarding concerns could be addressed (none arose). Risk assessments were made, and confidentiality protocols observed.

Taking a rights perspective, we used a gendered approach throughout our work. We ensured that all data we collect were disaggregated, wherever possible— by gender, age, social background, and (dis)ability. We used our extensive experience to ensure that the rights of vulnerable people were fully respected, and that the poorest and most marginalised people were able to participate. We used this rights lens when making our assessments of WW-AVWG interventions.


<sup>86</sup> <https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm>

The methods and tools we used in the field have been pre-tested, in various contexts, to ensure their appropriateness and effectiveness in reaching the different groups of people.

## 2. FINAL EVALUATION FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

Our FE design comprises four main components (**Figure 16**): ToC, evaluations questions, evaluation methods and data analysis and synthesis. It should be noted that while the theory of change component took place prior to this core FE stage, it was one of the foundation blocks of the evaluation, and as such is included here.

**Figure 16: Final Evaluation Design Components**



For the Final Evaluation, we worked with the ToC we had helped to refine at MTR stage. The logframe continued to be refined – largely in terms of targets – until June 2018. Components either met, or exceeded their set targets (as captured in Annual Review and Components Completion Reports). We accept these achievement statements and have used them in our analyses of programme progress and success.

### 2.1.1 Evaluation Questions

Our evaluation questions (EQs) were initially discussed and agreed with DFID during our inception phase for the following MTR. Prior to starting core final evaluation activities, these questions were refined by the evaluation team in April 2019 and agreed by DFID. The EQs focus on OECD-DAC criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability, as questions surrounding relevance were addressed in the MTR. As with the MTR, our questions are broadly realist, and have a research uptake focus, aiming to cover the full research to impact pathway.

Figure 17: Final Evaluation Questions according to OECD-DAC Criteria

OECD DAC	Evaluation Questions
EFFECTIVENESS	16. Have the research methods selected and designed led to the rigorous collection of data that in turn has generated world leading new evidence?
	17. How is WW contributing to understanding, research methods and theory, and to the use of these for VAWG prevention. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Are the research methods considered innovative by those working to end VAWG outside of the programme?</li> </ul>
	18. Has WW developed and implemented systems and processes to ensure the availability, accessibility and usability of evidence, and to enable it to adapt and learn? If so, how? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Has the programme been able to adapt in response to monitoring information?</li> <li>How has the programme's internal monitoring systems allowed them to be responsive to needs and gaps in use?</li> </ul>
	19. Has the programme been effective in developing capacities, of partners and relevant stakeholders, that are sufficient to achieve outcomes? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Is there evidence that in country research capacity has been built through the programme e.g. are outputs systematically co-published with southern partners? Is there evidence of ongoing training?</li> <li>What was the contribution of the programme's 'CB for RU' approach to achieving uptake?</li> </ul>
	20. Has the evidence influenced policy and is it changing investment levels in WW countries and beyond? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Where there are signs of positive shifts, what is the evidence of the programme's unique contribution?</li> <li>Where positive shifts are not yet visible, where is the potential for uptake and how has the programme optimised the chances for this to happen?</li> </ul>
	21. To what extent has the programme used innovative approaches effectively?
	22. To what extent have the architecture and modalities of the programme contributed to its effectiveness in preventing VAWG? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To date, what has been the impact on effectiveness of the staggered start-up dates for components?</li> </ul>
EFFICIENCY	23. Are the governance and management structures of the components, and of the overall programme, efficient in line with DFID's '4Es' approach to measuring VFM?
	24. Was there adequate budgetary flexibility to allow programme adaptation in response to change in needs?
	25. What lessons can be learned across the three components to improve value for money of research and innovation programmes? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Choice of research institutes</li> <li>Synergies with other research programmes and partners</li> </ul>
SUSTAINABILITY	26. What evidence is there that the gains made/positive outcomes achieved by WW will be sustained over time? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Test the claims being made by the research</li> <li>Evidence that the gains made by WW (e.g. 50% reduction violence) will be sustained</li> </ul>
	27. Has innovation contributed to the sustainability of interventions to prevent VAWG, including amongst the poorest and most marginalised women and girls?
	28. Is there evidence that the research has influenced wider academic discourses on VAWG beyond the programme?
IMPACT	29. To what extent has the programme's Research Uptake strategy been effective in achieving uptake? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Including positive change in policy and programmes</li> </ul>
	30. What lessons are being learned on how to design and manage innovation and research programmes that promote change in policy and practice?

### Equity and Intersectionality: Cross-Cutting Issues

The review team considers equity and intersectionality as key cross-cutting issues across all EQs. In considering equity in relation to each of the questions, we assessed the extent to which the interventions, research and evaluations carried out under the programme were designed, implemented and assessed with full and explicit attention to issues of inclusivity. For example, in the design, targeting and analysis of the programmatic outputs, are the different perspectives of people of different ages and genders taken into consideration? Are younger people included in design, implementation and analysis of research, where research concerns their lives? In what ways are they included – as respondents or as active participants? Are research populations adequately disaggregated by gender, social background, ethnicity, age, disability etc.

**Figure 18**, below, gives a wider overview of our FE methodological approach. It builds on our EQs, with data collection methods, and analysis and synthesis used.

Figure 18: Evaluation Matrix

OECD DAC Criteria	Evaluation Questions	Data Collection Methods and Sources	Analytical Method
EFFECTIVENESS	1. Have the research methods selected, and designed, led to the rigorous collection of data that in turn has generated world leading new evidence?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review of academic outputs</li> <li>KAIs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Application of the adapted REF</li> <li>Thematic coding.</li> </ul>
	2. How is WW contributing to understanding, research methods and theory, and to the use of these for VAWG prevention. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Are the research methods considered innovative by those working to end VAWG outside of the programme?</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review of academic outputs</li> <li>KAIs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Application of the adapted REF</li> <li>Thematic coding.</li> </ul>
	3. Has WW developed and implemented systems and processes to ensure the availability, accessibility and usability of evidence, and to enable it to adapt and learn? If so, how? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Has the programme been able to adapt in response to monitoring information?</i></li> <li><i>How has the programme's internal monitoring systems allowed them to be responsive to needs and gaps in use?</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>KAIs</li> <li>Document review</li> <li>PEAs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Thematic coding</li> <li>Document coding table</li> </ul>
	4. Has the programme been effective in developing capacities, of partners and relevant stakeholders, that are sufficient to achieve outcomes? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Is there evidence that in country research capacity has been built through the programme e.g. are outputs systematically co-published with southern partners? Is there evidence of ongoing training?</i></li> <li><i>What was the contribution of the programme's 'CB for RU' approach to achieving uptake?</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Document Review</li> <li>KAIs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Thematic Coding</li> </ul>
	5. Has the evidence influenced policy and is it changing investment levels in WW countries and beyond? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Where there are signs of positive shifts, what is the evidence of the programme's unique contribution?</i></li> <li><i>Where positive shifts are not yet visible, where is the potential for uptake and how has the programme optimised the chances for this to happen?</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Document Review</li> <li>KAIs</li> <li>PEAs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Document evidence table</li> <li>Thematic coding</li> </ul>
	6. To what extent has the programme used innovative approaches effectively?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Document Review</li> <li>KAIs</li> <li>Participant observation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Document evidence table</li> <li>Thematic coding</li> </ul>

EFFICIENCY	7. To what extent have the architecture and modalities of the programme contributed to its effectiveness in preventing VAWG? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>To date, what has been the impact on effectiveness of the staggered start-up dates for components?</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Document Review</li> <li>KAI</li> <li>PEAs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Document evidence table</li> <li>Thematic coding</li> </ul>
	8. Are the governance and management structures of the components, and of the overall programme, efficient and in line with DFID's '4Es' approach to measuring VFM?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Document Review</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Document evidence table</li> </ul>
	9. Was there adequate budgetary flexibility to allow programme adaptation in response to change in needs?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>KAls</li> <li>Document Review</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Thematic coding</li> </ul>
	10. What lessons can be learned across the three components to improve value for money of research and innovation programmes? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Choice of research institutes</i></li> <li><i>Synergies with other research programmes and partners</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>KAls</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Thematic coding</li> </ul>
SUSTAINABILITY	11. What evidence is there that the gains made/positive outcomes achieved by WW will be sustained over time? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Test the claims being made by the research</i></li> <li><i>Evidence that the gains made by WW (e.g. 50% reduction violence) will be sustained</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>KAls</li> <li>Academic output review</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Thematic coding</li> <li>Adapted REF</li> </ul>
	12. Has innovation contributed to the sustainability of interventions to prevent VAWG, including amongst the poorest and most marginalised women and girls?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>KAls</li> <li>Document Review</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Thematic Coding</li> <li>Document evidence table</li> </ul>
	13. Is there evidence that the research has influenced wider academic discourses on VAWG beyond the programme?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>KAls</li> <li>Citation capturing by components</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Thematic review</li> <li>Document evidence review</li> </ul>
IMPACT	14. To what extent has the programme's Research Uptake strategy been effective in achieving uptake? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Including positive change in policy and programmes</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>KAls</li> <li>Document Review</li> <li>PEAs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Thematic coding</li> <li>Document evidence table</li> </ul>
	15. What lessons are being learned on how to design and manage innovation and research programmes that promote change in policy and practice?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>KAls</li> <li>Document Review</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Thematic coding</li> <li>Document evidence table</li> </ul>

## 2.1.2 Methodological Overview

### Realist Evaluation Lens

To assist in organising and making sense of the data collected through all the review methods, data was assessed with a realist perspective: concentrating on what (currently) is working, where, and how. A realist lens simply means that we tracked the programme as an ongoing process rather than dipping in and out intermittently. This meant we were able to capture the adaptations needed (ToC and logframe, reporting on RU, etc.), challenges that emerged, and successes as they happened. When possible, we conducted critical KAls to capture the motivations, views, and experiences of people in real time. Owing to everyone's time and budget constraints, in practical terms this meant checking in biannually in preparation of the RUPRs. We also consulted stakeholders during the quarterly Management Committee Meetings. Our approach increased its veracity by recording views at the time rather than relying on memory, which can easily become distorted or influenced by a range of factors.

### Methods and Justifications

As outlined in our original proposal, we took a mixed-method approach to data-collection, combining qualitative primary data (KAls, 'check ins', Participatory Interest Group Discussions (PIGDs), observational approaches) and secondary data (document review), secondary data (programme monitoring) and political economy analysis across a number of the focus countries. Following a similar approach to that used at MTR, our IE method consisted of **six** key components as outlined in the table below:

**Figure 19: Methods and Justifications**

Method	Tool	Description / Justification
<b>Evidence and Literature Review</b>	Evidence Tables	Including an audit of select WW-VAWG documents, and review and analysis of key programme, and VAWG, literature. This intensive review of key products helped us fair understanding across all programme components.
<b>Key Actor Interviews (KAls) and Project Level Fieldwork</b>	Interview Instrument	<p>KAls were undertaken with a range of actors (see <b>Annex 4</b>). A Participatory Interest Group Discussion (PIDG) was also undertaken with 7 men and 7 women in eThakwini, Durban.<sup>87</sup></p> <p>During the ASMs and the 2019 SVRI, we also conducted numerous formal and informal interviews with programme stakeholders. In addition, we attended Management meetings and IAB meetings, over the course of the programme. In preparation of the 6-monthly RUPRs, we consulted a range of actors. All these enquiries also fed into our FE assessments and analyses.</p> <p>This enabled us to provide snap-shot qualitative, participatory data testing the sustainability of achievements, and to compare with understanding gathered at mid-term.</p>

<sup>87</sup> We were unable to do planned field level work in Ghana, owing to the last-minute ill-health of the team member in charge of enquiry there.



<b>Case Study Approach to produce Thematic Papers</b>	Document Review, KAIs, Snap-shot enquiry, PP analysis	As agreed with DFID, after MTR, we have produced three thematic papers on the distinct, but inter-connected key aspects of the programme: Research, Research Uptake, and Innovation (including capacity development and partnership). This helped provide an in-depth analysis of key elements of the programme underpinning the ToC and log-frame.
<b>Political Economy Analysis (PEA)</b>	Document and web review, KAIs, snap-shot enquiry	Included six detailed PEAs (Ghana, Nepal, South Sudan, Pakistan, South Africa, Zambia). The choice of PEAs was based on similar criteria as the MTR country case studies (which were Pakistan, Kenya, Nepal, South Africa), which included component potential for cross-over, fragility of context, stability of context, and regional representation. This enabled us to gain an in-depth understanding of contexts in which WW-VAWG has worked, and to underpin our analysis of interventions.
<b>Research and Research Uptake Assessment</b>	Adapted Research Excellent Framework (REF)	Developed by the team for the MTR, we adapted the REF as a basis for assessing WW-VAWG outputs across the research design to impact pathway. This provided a mechanism for rigorous assessment of WW-VAWG research products.
<b>Positive Pathways</b>	Positive Pathways Analysis (PPA) <sup>88</sup>	PPA has been designed and developed by the Team Leader (copyright CR2 Associates Ltd) in response to a growing need for better understanding of effectiveness and VFM in end-VAWG policy and programming. PPA is a way to synthesise understanding, gained through innovation and research/evaluation programmes/ projects, and to identify approaches, and combinations of components, which are most likely to lead to sustained positive change. This helped us develop methods by which to understand steps which lead to VAWG prevention success.

### 2.1.3 Evidence and Literature Review

#### Document Sampling and Sources

During the FE, our team reviewed numerous WW-VAWG programme documents. A list of the key documents reviewed is supplied in **Annex 5**. Documentation sources included: project documentation, wider VAWG literature, grey literature.

- **Research:** The document review conducted was comprehensive and covered all reported outputs from each component. The documents were thematically coded according to the EQs and also in response to issues that repeatedly emerged from the documents. The analysis was triangulated through the KAIs and the academic literature reviewed. The review for this final report built on the ongoing process put in place post-inception. The ongoing review of academic literature was overseen by the Academic Lead, whose own research is on VAWG, and so no separate review was required, but instead key academic sources were identified

through the programme as and when they were published. The ongoing review of academic literature was also supported by the review team's advisor Professor Ruth Pearson.

- **Research Uptake:** We drew on the initial **RU Literature Review** that was produced as part of our Inception Report 2016, to reference current theories and practices on how evidence informs policy and practice, and to review the programme's internal monitoring documents. We updated the Evidence Table that had been produced as part of our MTR to show the nuanced research uptake themes that had emerged by the end of the programme. This was systematically applied to all WW-VAWG programme documentation produced since the MTR. In addition, we **critiqued the WW-VAWG programme's digital platforms, engagement strategies and resulting analytics** (where data was made available) for the What Works website and digital platforms (Facebook and Twitter specifically), using benchmarked 'best practice' for engagement on these sites. We also drew on the evaluation team's **three interim RUPRs**, themselves based on KAls and reviews of all monitoring reports, which shortlisted as potential cases based on early signs of uptake.

### 2.1.4 KAls and Project Level Fieldwork

Between August 2019 and January 2020, the evaluation team undertook several field-visits to conduct interviews with key actors as part of the FE. The remainder of the interviews were carried out remotely. Country visits were made to South Africa and Zambia. Whilst in South Africa, the Team Leader (TL) attended all of the Sexual Violence Research Initiative (SVRI) conference in Cape Town. WW-VAWG researchers and implementers participated – as presenters and panellists – in many of the sessions, and the TL was able to gain valuable insight into the programme's progress and success. This was supported by in-depth interviews with WW-VAWG personnel at SVRI, interviews with project researchers and constituents in Durban, group and individual meetings with Secretariat staff, and a full day's consultation with the Programme Director. A visit to Ghana was planned but later was cancelled owing to health reasons. In-depth KAls were held via skype with stakeholders from Ghana. An earlier evaluation visit was made to Nepal after the 2018 Annual Scientific Meeting (ASM) there, which also fed into the FE.

Due to budget constraints and appreciation of VFM best practice, the number of trips was small, but we had already formed very positive relationships with WW-VAWG researchers and implementers across the portfolio, which made it easy for remote calls to be arranged. Additionally, the team as a whole, and through the life of the evaluation have made visits to many of the WW-VAWG contexts, either as part of the evaluation or on other project work, and know many of the country contexts well. The countries covered by field trips over the programme's duration include: South Africa, Zambia, South Sudan, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, India, and Kenya. The team attended each scientific meeting (Dubai – 2016; Pretoria 2017; Kathmandu 2018). We were also able to extend our IE KAls in Pakistan, Nepal and South Sudan, by contracting national staff, already known to us, to conduct interviews in person.

All interviews followed a semi-structured approach, with pre-designed and pre-tested questions for each stakeholder grouping. This ensured their appropriateness and effectiveness in reaching the different groups of people, differing operational contexts, and compliance with our strict ethical standards.

#### Snapshot Participatory Enquiry

While in South Africa, we used a snapshot participatory enquiry in Durban using an informal snowball technique and positive coaching methods in order to understand how/if participants are still using skills they learned during Stepping Stones Creating Futures. We also worked with them to identify future wishes and desires for themselves and their children.

## 2.1.5 Thematic Papers

The biggest change from MTR to IE design was the agreed change from a case study approach as a core evaluative method, to thematic papers. We proposed to DFID (and they agreed), that evaluation resources should focus on three thematic papers instead of the previous country-focused case study design of the MTR. The reason for this shift was to ensure that we captured a comprehensive picture of the programme as a whole. Limiting ourselves to a number of country level case studies would have meant that we might miss key programme-wide successes and learning. The three papers themselves, as previously mentioned, reflect the key areas of the review and the concerns of the programme as a whole: research, uptake, and innovation.

### Focus of Thematic Papers

Using combinations of KAIs, document review, PEA, and the adapted REF to gather evidence for inclusion, each paper had a specific focus (**Figure 20**).

**Figure 20: Overview of Thematic papers**

Paper	Focus	Methods	Related EQs
<b>Research</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To draw out the important lessons across each component in relation to research design, data collection, ethical protocols, data analysis and the identification of key findings.</li> <li>To understand and map the legacy of the WW programme.</li> <li>To offer a realistic account of the challenges and the lessons learnt from them.</li> <li>To understand how the WW evidence base may contribute to the research of academics outside of the programme, but within the VAWG space, and working in developing contexts.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Academic output review</li> <li>KAIs</li> <li>PEAs</li> </ul>	EQ 1 EQ 2 EQ 5 EQ 10 EQ 13 EQ 15
<b>Uptake</b>	To what extent has the programme's Research Uptake strategy been effective in achieving uptake including positive change in policy and programmes? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Is there evidence that in country research capacity has been built through the programme e.g. are outputs systematically co-published with southern partners? Is there evidence of ongoing training?</li> <li>What was the contribution of the programme's 'CB for RU' approach to achieving uptake? Has the evidence influenced policy and is it changing investment levels in WW countries and beyond?</li> <li>Where there are signs of positive shifts, what is the evidence of the programme's unique contribution?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Document review</li> <li>KAIs</li> <li>PEAs</li> </ul>	EQ 3 EQ 5 EQ 14 EQ 15

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Where positive shifts are not yet visible, where is the potential for uptake and how has the programme optimised the chances for this to happen?</li> </ul>		
<b>Innovation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To define innovation in relation to WW, and to identify its relevance to the programme and to VAWG prevention</li> <li>To draw out the important lessons, across components, on why innovation is essential in all efforts to prevent VAWG</li> <li>To understand and map the legacy of the WW programme, in relation to innovation in capacity development; partnership and intervention approaches</li> <li>To offer a realistic account of the challenges arising from innovation, and the lessons learnt from them.</li> <li>To make recommendations on which successful innovations can be institutionalised and how this can be achieved.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Document Review</li> <li>KAls</li> <li>Participant observation</li> <li>Snapshot participatory enquiry in South Africa</li> </ul>	EQ 4 EQ 5 EQ 6 EQ 7 EQ 8 EQ 9 EQ 10 EQ 11 EQ 12 EQ 15

### 2.1.6 Adapted REF Approach – From Research Quality to Use Assessment

At the MTR stage, we adapted the existing REF commonly used to assess research outputs of UK universities, and expanded it to include four specific RU dimensions. This enabled us to assess and capture change across agreed factors that need to be in place for RU to take place within a research programme. These included: presence of a robust, and comprehensive, RU Strategy; capacity around RU; engagement and a strategic communications approach.

At MTR stage, we developed definitions and a metric for each of these four areas beyond the existing REF dimensions (**Figure 21**) and indicators across the research quality into use spectrum. The framework has been influenced by DFID's Practice paper 'Assessing the Strength of Evidence' (February 2013). At mid-term stage, we analysed research processes and RU activities and reviewed progress towards these ratings. For the FE, we again used the ratings to rank WW's research and research uptake. The framework below is geared mainly on the assessment of material containing new primary data rather than literature reviews or outputs based on secondary data analysis. The reason for this relates to the evaluation ToR which focuses on assessing the uptake of new evidence generated by the programme.

**Figure 21: Research Quality and Uptake Dimension Definitions**

Dimension	Definition
<b>Research / Evidence Significance</b>	Evidence triggers a paradigm shift in how VAWG issues are researched, thought about and used.
<b>Evidence Reach</b>	Amount of data collected is sizable enough to trigger a shift in perspective and/or to leverage commitment to approach VAWG programming/policy in a particular way.
<b>Research / Evidence Rigour</b>	High quality data collected, analysed and used, with robust processes of quality control and built-in checks and balances.

<b>Evidence Impact/ Outcome</b>	High quality evidence, synthesis, packaging and communication setting the best possible foundation for influencing policy and programme change, with an awareness that impact can be unexpected or sudden.
<b>RU Capacity</b>	Research uptake is acknowledged as an important part of the research cycle at both individual and institutional levels. Resources and staff capacity to undertake demand-driven, feasible and flexible research uptake planning and related activities are present within the research and implementation teams.
<b>RU Strategy</b>	High quality and context-appropriate RU plans including regular reflective processes and flexible engagement timelines, which are feasible to implement, and responsive to actual and emerging demand.
<b>Engagement</b>	Demand-driven engagement with the key stakeholders of research at all levels, which is systematically designed, feasibly implemented and monitored with the purpose of iterating the engagement plans. Evidenced relationships are built, and there is increased visibility and reputation of both VAWG findings produced and organisations involved in its generation and communication.
<b>Strategic Communications</b>	Demand driven and innovative communications containing clearly defined policy or practice implications appropriate to the target audience. Materials are effectively synthesised, packaged and disseminated, giving due consideration to the strength of the evidence generated.

The tables below consist of a number of indicators mapped to each rating category of the REF but adapted to capture the multiple ways in which the WW programme may generate research impact. **Figure 22** and **Figure 23** below provide an overview of how these dimensions will be tested during the final evaluation. **Figure 24** provides an overview of what we expected to find in each dimension:

Figure 22: Suggested RU Domains, Metrics and Units of Measurement for FE

Rating	Impact	Research Uptake Capacity	RU Strategy	Engagement	Strategic Communication
<b>4*</b>  <b>Quality that is world-leading in terms of adaptation to demand, feasibility and flexibility.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence of a coherent and demand-driven pathway to impact. Setting out a clear set of causal links between communications activities and the project policy or practice influence.</li> <li>Evidence that planning for impact was taken into account and embedded within the design of a feasible research methodology.</li> <li>The plans for impact are robust and flexible enough to seize windows of opportunity due to their basis upon quality evidence and awareness of arising opportunities.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Internal and external RU capacity have been assessed and the resulting RU strategy and associated capacity building activities are demand driven.</li> <li>The RU capacity is based on a feasible and adequate budgetary and staffing commitment at both the individual and the organisational level. There is an awareness that RU is an essential part of the research use cycle and should be embedded from the start of the process.</li> <li>The RU capacity of both individuals and the organisation is monitored, evaluated and iterated flexibly based on a peer learning approach.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A well designed, context appropriate and demand-led RU strategy has been designed and implemented in a participative manner.</li> <li>The associated mechanisms are in place for adaptive delivery of the RU strategy in a realistic and feasible manner, supported by staff and budget. There is an awareness of both the strategy and the associated responsibilities within individuals and the organisation.</li> <li>The RU strategy is monitored, evaluated and iterated flexibly based on information being collected and also best practice sourced from similar programmes. Windows of opportunity and</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Well researched and strategic stakeholder mapping and engagement plans have been formulated and implemented based on an awareness of internal and external RU capacity and the contextual demand for research findings.</li> <li>The engagement with stakeholders is strategically layered, feasible and realistic given the political economy. There is an awareness of the plans and the designated responsibilities attached to both the individual and the institutional organisation.</li> <li>The engagement is being monitored, evaluated and flexibly iterated based on the information</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The suite of traditional and non-traditional communications materials are planned with their target audience in mind as identified by the stakeholder mapping, and with an implicit understanding of the external RU capacity, the political economy and the general policy and practice appetite for the research findings.</li> <li>Highly innovative and demand-driven range of outputs are synthesised from quality evidence, effectively packaged and communicated in a two-way manner within a feasible timeframe and budget in mind. The associated policy and practice recommendations</li> </ul>

			innovation are developed.	gathered. There is evidence of sustained relationships and an increased reputation of the research findings. Windows opportunity are seized.	are clear and appropriate to the context. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Indicators for the primary and secondary uptake of the communications materials are monitored, evaluated and iterated flexibly. There is an opportunistic approach to both identifying opportunities for engagement and generation of new materials to suit audience needs.</li> </ul>
<b>3*</b>  <b>Quality that is internationally excellent in terms of adaptation to demand, feasibility and flexibility.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Anticipated pathways to impact are based on the context and demand for the findings. Ambitions for impact might not align between the organisation and the individual for full maximised planning during the research cycle.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Internal and external RU are assessed, and demand-driven plans are made. There might be a disjoint between the organisational and individual capacity that is not fully addressed.</li> <li>Significant attention and resources dedicated to</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A robust and demand-driven RU strategy is designed and implemented. The strategy makes use of innovations, but individuals are not fully utilised or empowered as a tactic to respond quickly to new opportunities.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A robust and demand-driven mapping process and stakeholder engagement plan are in place. Each individuals' network has been acknowledged but not fully explored.</li> <li>There are mechanisms in place to reach and</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Communications plans and materials are audience-appropriate and respond to new audiences and innovations. Plans for empowering individuals to communicate when there is a window of opportunity have not been fully exploited.</li> </ul>



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The anticipated pathways to impact are feasible and do not contain any unrealistic assumptions, but the individuals might not be empowered to plan for impact.</li> <li>Monitoring and evaluation of impact pathways is informed by best practice but lacks a collaborative approach and thus some windows of opportunity are missed.</li> </ul>	<p>upskilling and maintaining RU capacity. The only aspect that might not be feasible to address within the budget or system of incentives is empowering individuals to facilitate peer learning.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Monitoring and evaluation of RU capacity is undertaken, and plans are adaptive. Windows of opportunity associated with peer learning are not fully utilised.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The strategy has a strong understanding of policy and practice context for uptake of evidence and is feasible within the context. Individuals' strengths are not fully exploited to respond to new opportunities.</li> <li>Appropriate indicators have been identified for M&amp;E of RU strategy and procedures designed and implemented for collecting and analysing agreed indicators. There is learning but ultimate flexibility offered by empowerment of individual is lacking.</li> </ul>	<p>effectively involve key stakeholders and to build relationships with them at relevant stages of the research cycle. A disjoint between organisational and individual understanding and associated importance of engagement might hinder awareness of arising opportunities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There are appropriate M&amp;E indicators and learning associated with them. Ultimate flexibility attained by collaborative engagement with similar programmes and individuals' networks is lacking.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Diverse and innovative range of communication products, appropriately purposed and packaged to meet differential needs of target audience, including collaboration in producing syntheses products and adding research to broader body of knowledge. Outputs are accessible and visible to secondary stakeholders but snowballing of communications by individuals has not been fully achieved.</li> <li>There is appropriate M&amp;E and associated learning. Plans are not yet adapted to allow individuals to communicate during arising opportunities.</li> </ul>
<p><b>2*</b></p> <p><b>Quality that is recognised internationally in terms of</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Anticipated pathways to impact are based on the context and demand but might be based on assumptions that are unlikely to be</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A capacity assessment of the external RU landscape has been conducted but the internal capacity has not been similarly</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>RU strategy is well researched and demand-driven but is not innovative to reach beyond the usual suspects or tailored to the exact</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sound and well researched stakeholder mapping and engagement plans which are demand driven. Implementation does</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Planning of materials is audience-appropriate but does not reach beyond the usual suspects due to a limitation of scope for the</li> </ul>

<b>adaptation to demand, feasibility and flexibility.</b>	<p>overcome. Little effort has been made to project impact in other fields, policy areas of contexts.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Plans for impact are feasible and appropriate in the given context but lack benchmarking to allow for easier seizing of windows of opportunities in unexpected areas or contexts.</li> <li>Monitoring and evaluation inform a flexible approach to the plans for impact, but flexibility is constrained by a lack of ambition outside of the given context.</li> </ul>	<p>addressed in detail. Research uptake is seen as an important element of the research cycle by some champions but not others.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There is adequate capacity to plan and manage RU strengthening, but activities will not feasibly convert sceptics or address the thorny uptake problems externally.</li> <li>Monitoring and evaluation inform a flexible approach to RU but peer learning is not utilised to its full extent.</li> </ul>	<p>context and specificities of policy or practice in the given area.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reasonable and realistic tactics deployed in the strategy. Incentives do not allow for innovation or exploration of detailed context of policy or practice.</li> <li>Monitoring and evaluation inform a flexible approach to the strategy which is revised, but never to address other context or window of opportunity presented.</li> </ul>	<p>not reach beyond the usual suspects of the given context of the research.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Regular and appropriate levels of engagement maintained around research findings, but visibility does not reach to a secondary level of stakeholders and there are lacking incentives to innovate or seize windows of opportunity.</li> <li>Monitoring and evaluation inform the approach to engagement with signs of learning from and responding to demand, but opportunities presented are not seized.</li> </ul>	<p>demand for findings in the given context or geographic area.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Outputs are strategic and communicated engagingly, but there are lacking incentives to communicate beyond the usual suspects. Materials are accessible to the primary stakeholders but not feasibly accessible or visible to the secondary stakeholders.</li> <li>Monitoring and evaluation of materials is conducted and indicators feed into flexibility and adaptation of existing materials to new audiences. There are lacking incentives to develop new materials and try to reach entirely new audiences.</li> </ul>
<b>1*</b>  <b>Quality that is recognised</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There is an awareness of the importance of demand for the</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There has been recognition of the internal and external RU capacity, but the</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The RU strategy acknowledges the context and demand for findings but does</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Stakeholder mapping has been carried out and an engagement plan put</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Planning of communications materials indicates awareness of the</li> </ul>

<p><b>nationally in terms of adaptation to demand, feasibility and flexibility.</b></p>	<p>research findings, but this does not translate to a nuanced anticipated pathway to impact.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Plans for impact are feasible but lack ambition and are not robust enough to seize windows of opportunity.</li> <li>There is monitoring and evaluation of impact plans but no sense-making and thus no flexibility or ability to seize windows of opportunity.</li> </ul>	<p>necessary modifications based on the context, demand for findings and the individual and organisational levels of awareness of the importance of RU have not been addressed.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There has been a general introduction to research uptake, but no significant capacity building activities have been undertaken due to lack of staff, budget or lack of incentives.</li> <li>Some monitoring and evaluation but there is weak capacity to understand or implement RU either individually or organisationally.</li> </ul>	<p>not make the necessary modifications. The plans are not robust enough for windows of opportunity to be seized.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The RU strategy is delivered mostly word-for-word, with little attention to evolving to suit changing policy and practitioner contexts, and no obvious mechanisms in place to do so. The lack of ambition may be due to lack of budget, staff or awareness of responsibilities.</li> <li>Monitoring and evaluation is perfunctory reporting of indicators around RU in logframe, with no flexibility or adaptation.</li> </ul>	<p>together, but the activities do not make enough modification for demand, internal and external constraints and are not tailored enough to the context. The activities are extracted from the research process.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The engagement plans are feasible but lack ambition and are not opportunistic. There is an emphasis on dissemination not engagement, due to lack of staff, budget or awareness of responsibilities.</li> <li>Monitoring and evaluation is undertaken but there is no flexibility or adaptation and windows of opportunity are missed.</li> </ul>	<p>target audience but does not make the necessary modifications to the demand for research findings. The plans are supply driven.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Communications outputs are strategic and can be based on quality evidence but are synthesised badly, packaged ineffectively, and simply disseminated opposed to actively engaging with the audience. Might not be feasible due to lack of staff, budget or awareness of responsibilities. Communications materials may not be easy to access or very visible to the intended audiences.</li> <li>M&amp;E is undertaken but there is no flexibility or adaptation to strategy, communications materials or the timeline.</li> </ul>
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<p><b>Unclassified</b></p> <p><b>Does not reach the quality threshold for one star</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No evidence of anticipated pathways to impact in the research plans. Or the pathways to impact are generic and fatally constrained by the external context.</li> <li>Expectations of impact are unrealistic and there is no awareness of why it is important to build in plans for impact from the start of the research process.</li> <li>There is no M&amp;E of impact and no flexibility.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No evidence that a needs assessment has been undertaken to understand the RU capacity internally or externally.</li> <li>No interest in RU or awareness of why it is important, the capacity building plans are to strengthen RU when the research findings are complete. The timelines, staffing and budgeting are also not feasible.</li> <li>No M&amp;E of RU capacity and no peer learning.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No evidence that the RU strategy has been strategically planned, it is a pro-forma template with little context specificity or demand related modifications.</li> <li>RU strategy plans, materials and timelines are not feasible due to inadequate budget or staffing levels and the delineated responsibilities fall at the individual level.</li> <li>No M&amp;E or flexibility around the RU strategy.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No evidence that the engagement plans and stakeholder mapping are strategic or account for the demand for findings. Or worse, engagement plans that are not underpinned by stakeholder mapping first.</li> <li>Engagement planning, materials and timelines are either not feasible (inadequate budgets or impossible expectations) and do not account for external constraints.</li> <li>No M&amp;E or flexibility around engagement.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No evidence that communications materials have been planned strategically with the target audience in mind.</li> <li>Communications planning, materials and timelines are either not feasible (inadequate budgets or impossible expectations) or the messages are not resonant with the target audience due to external constraints not factored in. Bare minimum materials are produced as a tick box exercise. Materials may reflect the organisations as a whole instead of the project, be inaccessible or not fit for purpose.</li> <li>No M&amp;E or flexibility around communications.</li> </ul>
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**Figure 23: Suggested Research Quality Domains, Metrics and Units of Measurement for FE**

Rating	Evidence Significance	Evidence Reach	Evidence Rigour	Impact
<b>4*</b> <b>Quality that is world-leading in terms of originality, significance and rigour.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A systematic literature review has been conducted.</li> <li>The literature review has been used to evidence clear knowledge gaps.</li> <li>There is a clear research question and sub-questions.</li> <li>Assumptions have been identified and mitigated by the methodology.</li> <li>The questions generate the right kind of evidence that has a good chance of triggering a paradigm shift.</li> <li>The questions are mapped to a conceptual frame that will support in-depth analysis that has a good chance of triggering a paradigm shift.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Has enough data been collected in order to convincingly answer the research questions?</li> <li>The data collection and analysis process has been clearly set out.</li> <li>The ethical challenges and migration strategies have been clearly presented.</li> <li>The approach has been designed and implemented rigorously and ethically.</li> <li>Attempts have been made to eliminate bias from the data collection process.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Detail has been given on how openness and transparency.</li> <li>The design methods are clearly defined and justified.</li> <li>The researcher attempted to be self-critical flagging up possible limitations in the research.</li> <li>Possible alternative interpretations or inconsistencies have been acknowledged.</li> <li>There a logical argument throughout that links the theories and concepts to the data.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence of a coherent pathway for impact. In other words, a clear set of causal links have been identified channelling findings through a series of communication activities focused on transformation.</li> <li>Evidence that the maximisation of impact was taken into account in the design of the research methodology.</li> <li>The type and nature of the data collected is persuasive enough to generate 'potential' impact at policy and programme level (even if high quality data will not be enough).</li> </ul>
<b>3*</b> <b>Quality that is internationally excellent in terms of</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Every measurement for a 4* output met in part or fully. The main distinctions:</li> <li>Size of the evidence gap the research intends to</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Every measurement for a 4* output met in part or fully. The main distinctions:</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Every measurement for a 4* output met in part or fully. The main distinctions:</li> <li>There may be some areas on inconsistency, lack of</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Every measurement for a 4* output met in part or fully. The main distinctions:</li> </ul>

<b>originality, significance and rigour.</b>	<p>close (it will be bigger for 4*).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Level of originality of the adapted theoretical frame and concepts.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>in the ambition of the data collection (amount and approach).</li> <li>The level of innovation in the research methods deployed.</li> <li>Consistency of analysis.</li> <li>The research goal may be slightly less ambitious.</li> </ul>	<p>transparency. Assumptions may not have been fully explored.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The links between argument, theory and evidence may not be as consistent.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>We might see less of a thought through communication pathway.</li> </ul>
<b>2*</b> <b>Quality that is recognised internationally in terms of originality, significance and rigour.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The ambition of the research will be less.</li> <li>The size of the evidence gap will be smaller.</li> <li>The level of innovation adapting conceptual frames and analysis will also be less but still evidence.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The data collected has been appropriately and rigorously analysed.</li> <li>The ambition in the design of the tools may be less evident.</li> <li>The goal of the research in terms of bringing about change may also be more focused national rather than looking at the possible scale up potential.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The evidence will support the argument presented but the level of new insight will be less.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The data may be too micro or thin to really leverage high level impact (e.g. change policies or programming) but may well help to inform the local context and therefore be of high value at this level.</li> </ul>
<b>1*</b> <b>Quality that is recognised nationally in terms of originality, significance and rigour.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The research here will be very much focused on and limited to the generation of new knowledge to support the work of local-national stakeholders.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The concern to scale up beyond the country level will not be evident.</li> <li>The goal will focus on bringing about national level change rather than challenging or building</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The level of innovation at all levels, design, conceptualisation and data tool design and analysis will be less.</li> <li>There may be inconsistencies in the development or the</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As with 2* research impact is localised but still of significant value to immediate populations.</li> </ul>

		global or international discourses.	argument and disconnects between the argument, theories and data.	
<b>Unclassified<sup>89</sup></b> <b>Does not reach threshold for one star</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The data collected does support the argument presented and is not original.</li> <li>The research contributes to the weight of evidence but is not a departure from accepted wisdom.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The purpose of the research is unclear.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The research is filled with too mainly inconsistencies to make it viable as evidence.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence too weak to inform or generate any impact.</li> </ul>

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<sup>89</sup> This category is intended to capture the impact of WW at the level of building in country VAWG research capacity. It is designed to capture and evidence the achievements of southern researchers.



**Figure 24: Research Quality and Uptake Anticipated Progress by Final Evaluation**

Dimension	Definition	Anticipated Final Evaluation Progress
<b>Research / Evidence Significance</b>	Evidence triggers a paradigm shift in how VAWG issues are researched, thought about and used.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A significant number of peer review articles.</li> <li>• Deliberate inclusion and support of southern researchers with some outputs now led by southern authors.</li> <li>• Evidence of readership outside of the immediate WW community (citations).</li> </ul>
<b>Evidence Reach</b>	Amount of data collected is sizable enough to trigger a shift in perspective and/or to leverage commitment to approach VAWG programming/policy in a particular way.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Publications in a range of journals both discipline and practitioners based and regional.</li> <li>• Most publications are open access.</li> </ul>
<b>Research / Evidence Rigour</b>	High quality data collected, analysed and used, with robust processes of quality control and built-in checks and balances.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Flag-ship publications containing the most impressive data either forthcoming (in press) or published.</li> </ul>
<b>Evidence of Impact</b>	High quality evidence, synthesis, packaging and communication setting the best possible foundation for influencing policy and programme change, with an awareness that impact can be unexpected or sudden.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Outputs are numerous and now represent a critical mass of knowledge which cannot be ignored by others in the VAWG field.</li> <li>• Outputs targeting practitioners are known about by key non-academic stakeholders with some evidence of usage.</li> <li>• Evidence that all opportunities to channel the findings into processes of change and influence have been taken.</li> <li>• Successes have been monitored and documented.</li> <li>• WW-VAWG evidence (includes both process and findings) has influenced policy and practice as evidenced by: increased appetite and demand for evidence, discursive changes, procedural changes, content changes, attitudinal changes, behavioural changes, and impact and scale up.</li> <li>• Programme can evidence its contribution to the changes witnessed (pathways to uptake).</li> </ul>
<b>RU Capacity</b>	Research uptake is acknowledged as an important part of the research cycle at both individual and institutional levels. Resources and staff capacity to undertake demand-driven, feasible and flexible research uptake planning and related activities are present within the research and implementation teams.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sufficient capacity across the team (across all RU skillsets) to effectively engage and influence priority stakeholders</li> <li>• Evidence of built capacity being used to effectively engage and influence outside of the WW programme</li> <li>• Existing capacity for uptake is recognised and deployed effectively to achieve influencing objectives</li> </ul>

<b>RU Strategy</b>	High quality and context-appropriate RU plans including regular reflective processes and flexible engagement timelines, which are feasible to implement, and responsive to actual and emerging demand.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strategy updated and used as a 'living document' to guide programme uptake activities</li> <li>• Learning from strategy implementation has been captured and used to guide programme activities (including prioritisation and resource allocation)</li> <li>• Stories of positive impact and lessons learned captured and communicated</li> </ul>
<b>Engagement</b>	Demand-driven engagement with the key stakeholders of research at all levels, which is systematically designed, feasibly implemented and monitored with the purpose of iterating the engagement plans. Evidenced relationships are built, and there is increased visibility and reputation of both VAWG findings produced and organisations involved in its generation and communication.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Appetite and demand for evidence identified and effectively satisfied with high quality products and activities</li> <li>• Programme shows understanding of the information needs and evidence gaps of its target stakeholders and involves them in framing final evidence products and events</li> <li>• Patterns and results of engagement have been captured</li> </ul>
<b>Strategic Communications</b>	Demand driven and innovative communications containing clearly defined policy or practice implications appropriate to the target audience. Materials are effectively synthesised, packaged and disseminated, giving due consideration to the strength of the evidence generated.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence framed and crafted to suit target audiences</li> <li>• Evidence effectively communicated used to engage stakeholders in most appropriate formats</li> <li>• Range of techniques used (e.g. digital + face-to-face) to raise profile and engage audiences in meaningful conversations that contribute to outcomes</li> </ul>

### 2.1.7 Positive Pathways

Positive Pathways Analysis (PPA) has been designed in response to a growing need for better understanding of effectiveness and VFM in end-VAWG policy and programming. The concept was introduced at mid-term and since then, WW-VAWG has also begun to make its own assessment on the pathways which lead towards achievements in VAWG prevention. Based on PPA, we assessed the WW-VAWG programme's contribution to the on-going debate on how best to intervene for prevention and ending of VAWG. Instead of looking for the negative outcomes of VAWG (which are being clearly defined through the work of the three WW-VAWG components), we aim to identify positive pathways. Positive pathways are those which lead away from VAWG towards improved social, economic, and well-being outcomes for women and girls, and for wider society. Through PPA, we hoped to identify the junctions along a pathway where different methods and approaches to protecting women and girls and ending VAWG are linked to different contexts and cultures. We also sought to identify which aspects of any approach are most likely to be essential, which are desirable, and which might be considered "extra" (see **Thematic Paper 3**).

Based on PPA, we assessed the WW-VAWG programme contribution to the on-going debate on how best to intervene for prevention and ending of VAWG. We sort to contribute to on-going debate about:

1. What interventions are essential, and in what combination?
2. What interventions are desirable? And
3. What interventions are helpful, but may be seen as added "extras"?

We assessed these factors against different contexts and circumstances. The questions above seem obvious but they are ones which have plagued policymakers and programmers, over the years, in relation to all aspects of VAWG. Because of the way that WW-VAWG programmes have been designed, and evaluations set up, it has not yet been possible to measure the effectiveness of one programme component against another, or to judge what supporting factors need to be in place for RU to move to positive action.

A Positive Pathway is the opposite of a Causal Net. The use of Causal Nets is common in analysis of the drivers and consequences of social problems, including ones related to VAWG. A Causal Net centres on an issue (such as FGM/C) and traces its effects and consequences to, inevitable, negative outcomes (such as, in the case of FGM/C, continuing inter-generational poverty and perpetuation of gender inequality and inequity).

Instead of looking for the negative outcomes of VAWG (which are being clearly defined through the work of the three WW components), we aim to identify positive pathways. Positive pathways are those which lead away from VAWG towards improved social, economic and well-being outcomes for women and girls, and for wider society. Through the analysis of positive pathways, we hoped to identify the junctions along a pathway where different approaches and methods, to protecting women and girls and ending VAWG, are linked to different contexts and cultures. We will also sought to identify which aspects of any approach are most likely to be essential, which are desirable and which might be “extra” (see **Thematic Paper 3**)

## 2.2 ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS

In addition to the REF and PPA analysis we described above, for this FE we used the following analysis and syntheses approaches.

### Evidence Coding and Analysis

All qualitative data, KAIs, and participant observations were thematically coded into a data table, which we then drew finding from. The codes related to the key focus areas of the review, but also emerged through a grounded reading of the transcripts (i.e., patterned themes that emerged). They were analysed and coded against specific evaluation questions and themes, with issues that emerged with high frequency being added to the coding as we progressed. The data was disaggregated according to the type of participant (e.g. internal or external to WW-VAWG, stakeholder working in VAWG, academic, etc), this enabled bias in responses to be captured and accounted for in the identification of findings.

The findings from the document and the interview coding tables point to a number of ‘positive pathways’ (see below) that demonstrated how successes have been able to emerge, and also the barriers and challenges to positive outcomes.

### Political Economy Analysis

In considering our uptake hypothesis we acknowledge that the main factor when it comes to successful uptake is the political and economic appetite for change (see **Section 5** of the main FE report, and **Thematic Paper 2**).

The inclusion of PEA, as an analysis tool, allowed us to measure why uptake may have been more possible in some contexts than others even when the evidence is at the same robust level. For the inception and MTR, we focused on a number of case countries in order to take deep dives and draw out the complexities of the environments in which WW-VAWG was operating. This approach helped us to contextualise the challenges. It also helped us to understand the ways in which WW-VAWG has adapted and been responsive to shifts and changes in the operating environment. Moving into the FE, we needed to be able to capture the programme as a whole. We shifted from the deep dive case study

approach to a combined PEA of a number of contexts, with an overarching assessment across the whole portfolio.

We conducted, in total, six detailed PEAs (Ghana, Nepal, South Sudan, Pakistan, South Africa, Zambia). The choice of PEAs was based on similar criteria as the original case studies (which were Pakistan, Kenya, Nepal, South Africa). These criteria were component cross over, fragility of context, stability of context and regional representation. The PEAs have been critical in our assessment of the uptake hypothesis, given at the start of this annex. This hypothesis is that, even with high quality research, change will be hard to achieve, if actors within the political and economic environment have no appetite for it.

### Adapting the Ecology Model

In line with the overall evaluation objectives and supported by the findings of the VAWG literature review developed in the inception phase of the review, we focused on deepening understanding of the political-economy of the stakeholder environment at various levels; global, national, state and local, in order to support the RU analysis.

At **country level** we worked with the logic that in order for uptake possibilities to be optimised, and for a clear architecture to emerge to support the dissemination of new VAWG knowledge, a complex understanding of each case is needed.

The national political economy is shaped by a number of intersectional dimensions including religion and culture, economic growth rates, strength of infrastructure, education and health provision. All these dimensions feed together to influence the strength and commitment of government to take coordinated decisions around VAWG, shape policies to bring about transformation, and then finally to implement them. Taken collectively these dimensions could be seen as shaping the ecology of policy and programming. Understanding this ecology is critical if uptake strategies will have any meaningful chance of making inroads into influencing government.

Similar questions around the size and flexibility of civil society organisation were asked and activities in this sphere mapped. For example:

- How much appetite existed for VAWG interventions and what relationships does this sector have with government?
- Are there relationships that were drawn on for WW uptake purposes?
- Moving onto state, district and local levels similar questions were asked and the environment mapped. For example, who are the key decision makers and what is their knowledge, commitment and capacity around VAWG interventions?
- What possibilities were there to mobilise particular organisations and actors to galvanise change based on the WW evidence?

### From Country Level to the Global Level

In order for us to be able to analyse data in relation to the EQs we needed a detailed understanding of the global level political economy in relation to VAWG. Through the evaluation was asked: do country contexts engage with the global level. in reciprocal fashion? Mapping the global scene represented a first stage. Data has been analysed in order to answer the following questions: who are the major global stakeholders currently engaged in VAWG prevention activities? What are they doing and where? To what extent are their activities informed by evidence? How have they reached the decisions they have in terms of the forms of VAWG they are working to end, and the approaches they are taking? These were then used to direct assessment into the extent to which the WW programme has adequately utilised country knowledge and relationships to leverage uptake.

The review needed to analyse data and to use them to measure the potential and actual change brought about at a global level, as well as at national and local. A second category of data analysis focused on identified stakeholders with programming influence who may not be as active in VAWG programming (or indeed active at all), but with whom the WW programme may have leverage (refer to the category of non WW stakeholders in the interview table).

### Triangulation of Data

Findings from each of the data sets were compared in order to triangulate the findings to ensure robustness, and that the full richness of data was explored and drawn on.

## 2.3 EVALUATION COMMUNICATION AND DISSEMINATION

The evaluation team developed a Communication Strategy that drew on the core team's reflections of good practice for communicating evaluations, and on DFID's guidance on Research Uptake<sup>90</sup>. This is outlined in full in **Section 4** of the main report, including our aims, target audiences, communication methods and dissemination products.

## 2.4 EVALUATION MANAGEMENT

### 2.4.1 Quality Assurance Processes

As with the MTR phase, the IMC Project Manager coordinated IMC's standardised quality assurance (QA) process. Our QA aims to keep consistency with the Evaluation Quality Assurance and Learning Service (EQUALS) that was established by the DFID Evaluation Unit as DFID's external technical service providing independent technical support and QA for evaluations. The Evaluation Team passed the report to the Team Leader (TL), who conducted a first quality review on all sections. This step ensured that the report is up to the stringently high standards that IMC expects from its staff and partners. In addition to this, Professor Ruth Pearson worked closely with the Research Lead to assess the quality of the WW-VAWG outputs and the processes through which they are generated, including the ethical review. The Project Director also provided strategic oversight of the IE phase when any key issues arose.

Finally, the QA Lead, who provided key QA support on the evaluation questions and report outline, quality assured the final report according to EQUALS criteria. The final report was then reviewed and signed off by the Project Manager and Project Director ready for DFID and EQUALS submission. DFID and Component Leads had time for comments, feedback, and fact checking, which we have fed into the final version as much as possible. In cases where the evaluation team had differing opinions from DFID or the Component Leads, we have maintained our independence and made an appropriate call on which revision to take.

### 2.4.2 Ethical Approach and Data Protection

We conducted all IE activities in line with our ethical approach as detailed in **Annex 3**, and in line with the 'do no harm' protocol which is in adherence to international best practice and standards. This includes DFID's latest ethical approach as outlined in the 'DFID ethical guidance for research, evaluation and monitoring activities' (2019), and in accordance to DFID's new Supplier Code of Conduct. All processes and methods were reviewed and approved, prior to use, by the UoP Ethics Committee. All data collection, engagement, and management were conducted in accordance with IMC's Safeguarding Policy. In adherence with DFID's data protection policies, all data generated for

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<sup>90</sup> [Research Uptake: A guide for DFID-funded research programmes](#), April 2016



this IE has been anonymised and kept on a password protected online platform, to which only the core review team has access.

### 2.4.3 Risk Management

Throughout the entire IE process, the team have drawn upon the evaluation's risk matrix as a useful tool to identify and reflect upon key risks. Our Risk Management Strategy follows the guidance provided in the ISO 31000 Risk Management Systems and capitalises on IMC's experience in delivering complex programmes in challenging contexts. The Evaluation Manager was responsible for updating the risk register on a regular basis, working with the IE team to put in place appropriate mitigation strategies. This included reporting to the IMC Project Director monthly on any key emerging risks.

A simplified version of our risk matrix is found in **Figure 25** below, where the risks, challenges and mitigation strategies, applied for both contextual and methodological issues, are discussed. In recognition of the sensitive nature of VAWG, we identified the 'safeguarding' and 'do no harm' related risks to be of paramount importance and these have been comprehensively drawn out and addressed below. Further, due to the sensitive nature of the data that will be gathered, we have given specific attention to the mitigation measures applied to maximise security and confidentiality of such data.

**Figure 25: Risks, Challenges and Mitigations**

Risk and Challenge	Mitigation Strategies Applied
<b>Complexity and Time Lag:</b> As the Original ToR stated, full impact of the WW-VAWG is likely to extend beyond the lifetime of the programme.	The IE recognised this from the outset and focused on outputs and outcome level evidence and assessing trends <i>towards</i> impact. An ex-post evaluation, e.g. three-years after the close of WW-VAWG Phase 1, would serve to better identify RU and other impacts. This could combine with Phase 2 of the programme.
<b>Contribution vis-à-vis Attribution:</b> Ability to distinguish between contributions and attributions can be challenging given other interventions, changing contexts, and the fact that the programme coincided with a global shift of focus on gender equality.	The IE ensured to closely review and track WW-VAWG contributions through all deliverables, notably through its RUPR check-ins, and via the three Thematic Papers. At all stages, the IE Team examined evidence both within and outside of the WW-VAWG programme to help mitigate this issue. Interviewing non-programme stakeholders also assisted with this.
<b>Contextual Risks:</b> The contexts in which WW-VAWG is operating are complex, with nuanced social norms, gender realities, and political and moral economies which poses logistical, but also methodological challenges.	The IE team has a deep knowledge of evaluating gender and VAWG programming in challenging contexts. We used a realist evaluation lens throughout (as explained <b>Section 2</b> ). As part of this, it was crucial to carry out a PEA for each of our countries of focus, ahead of conducting KAIs to ensure context was taken into account for analysis of findings. In addition, from a logistical point of view, we capitalised upon our exiting in-country partnerships established through previous contracts to support our work, including use of local researchers to conduct KAIs where the IE team could not attend in person.
<b>Safeguarding Challenges Inherent in Evaluation of VAWG Programmes:</b> VAWG is a sensitive subject area, and there are challenges to 'do no harm' when conducting	The core IE team members have decades of experience applying such principles when working with vulnerable populations. The IE team applied the Ethical Approach outlined in <b>Section 2.5.2</b> , and adhered to University of Portsmouth's (UoP) Ethics Policy (see <b>Annex 3</b> ) in order to ensure no unintended harm occurs through the team's engagement. As

research, and avoid re-victimisation.	part of this, all research methods were scrutinised by the UoP Ethics Committee, and project participant engagement was cleared by SAMRC for our South Africa PIDGs. All key actors interviewed were required to give informed consent and were made fully aware of what the data would be used for. In addition, IMC Worldwide also required all team members and partners to sign an affidavit stating that they have read and will abide by IMC's Anti-Bribery & Corruption Policy, Safeguarding Policy and our Business Code of Ethics as part of our contractual documentation. We will also provide copies of our Safety, Health and Environmental Policy. Any team member or key actor reporting concerns, or complaints were protected by IMC's Whistleblowing Policy. No issues arose during the lifetime of our engagement.
<b>Data Security and Confidentiality:</b> As with any evaluation data security and confidentiality is key, especially when it comes to working with vulnerable populations.	As aforementioned, the IE Team adhered to the UoP Ethics Policy. All key actors interviewed were reminded that their inputs would remain confidential. All primary data was fully anonymised and remains securely stored on a password protected online platform. Data will not be held for longer than is necessary by IMC or any of the IE Team.
<b>Lack of Clear Communication between C1, C2 and C3, and C4:</b> Can pose a challenge to conducting the IE.	Although an independent evaluation, C4 was contracted as part of the overall programme, and utilised a 'critical friend' approach, which sought to alleviate lack of clarity and miscommunication through engagement with all components. The core IE team has regular contact with the Components throughout the evaluation, including participating in management committee meetings, engagement for RUPRs, and attending dissemination and learning events.

## 2.5 LIMITATIONS

A number of limitations have restricted our methodological approach, which should be understood when reviewing the findings and recommendations set out in this report, these span limitations centred on practicalities of researching social change, data gaps in our analysis, resourcing limitations, and potential for bias. These are outlined in more detail below:

- **Not All Change will be Visible:** We were limited by the fact that RU can be unpredictable (see **Section 3** and **5**). It can happen suddenly, and it can take time to influence policy and practice, which can be longer than the programme timeframe. This means that not all potential influence may yet have been realised and or identified. In addition, shifts in attitudes and increased appetite to use evidence in decision-making are neither easily seen, nor always acknowledged. Again, this means that all potential influence of the programme might not be captured.
- **Scant Data on National Level RU and Demand Activities:** We were limited as we do not have full data, at national level, of all the presentation and uptake activities carried out by organisations, nor a complete record of all demands made for information and evidence. It is a huge task to monitor these issues fully, and beyond the capacity of the programme in Phase 1. However, where, stakeholders/projects have been able to think back along uptake trajectories, we can see that closer monitoring could have been useful in identifying Positive Pathways to uptake and fulfilment of outcomes.
- **Final Evaluation Scale and Resourcing:** Similar to the impact resources had on our ability to undertake more case studies during the mid-term evaluation, there were also finite resources for the final evaluation. This has obviously meant that we have had to focus resources and not had the breadth that we would have liked to truly capture a multi-component programme with



WW-VAWG scale and ambition. For example, we were not able to plan for in-depth work in countries, and extensive training of research teams in-country. Our overall FE budget was 2.36% of the WW-VAWG Programme. In addition, the FE was only allowed the same number of days as the mid-term review, but there was far more content to review at endline. For the future, IEs of WW-VAWG Phase 2 should also allocate funding for the whole core team to attend the ASMs as this was a key point of information sharing where further interviews could have been gained (for this Phase only the TL could attend).

- **Availability of Key Interviewees:** Despite a number of attempts to ensure we engaged with all key partners and their team members, some were unavailable for interview. This may have had a (minor) impact on our ability to triangulate findings across evidence sources.
- **Potential for Bias:** The programme has fostered a strong and close community all of whom are committed to seeing funding to end VAWG sustained and increased. This unifying motivation may unintentionally bring bias into how key actors answer questions specifically around impact and legacy. There may be an element of over claiming the reach of results. The review team are aware of this and triangulation of the interview and document review findings has minimised this risk and allowed for verification of findings. The review team can also confirm they worked independently and free from interference. The review teams adviser also checked to ensure the findings reached were robust and well evidenced.
- **Participatory Enquiry:** The main gap in our analysis is that we were only able to carry out snap-shot, Participatory Enquiry in one area (Durban, South Africa). This was for a number of reasons: 1) we did not have resources for an extensive schedule of in-country visits, 2) we did not have time or budget to train our in-country colleagues, and 3) we did not have research clearance for formal, participatory research. In South Africa, we were cleared through the NGO (Project Empower) we were visiting.
- **Ghana Visit Cancellation:** We had intended to do snap-shot enquiry in Ghana. Owing to visa problems and the ill-health of the team member in charge of the Ghana analysis, the country visit had to be cancelled. We were fortunate to be able to set up a number of individual and group meetings with KAs in Ghana, which made up for, to a certain extent, the lack of field visits. We do not, however, underestimate how much more might have been gained with a fuller schedule of on-the-ground enquiry. We have had to make do, with the field-at-second-hand, through our discussions with NGO implementers and researchers.

## ANNEX 3 – ETHICS POLICY

There exists a dual concern with ethics for the performance evaluation. Consideration must be given to: (1) The ethical approach employed by the What Works research team, and; (2) The ethics of the evaluation process. This annex addresses both elements of ethical concern in turn.

### EVALUATING THE ETHICAL APPROACH OF WHAT WORKS' RESEARCH PROCESS

Whilst the language of evaluation tends to focus on relevance, efficiency and sustainability, a sound and rigorous ethical approach is recognized to be a central component of each. As such, ethical considerations must run as a continuous thread (i.e. be mainstreamed) throughout the multiple levels of any comprehensive evaluation process.

As noted in both the What Works Technical Tender and Inception Report, the What Works team has an exemplary grounding in ethical process in VAWG research. Core team members have been instrumental in the development of various key documents including, for example, Jewkes' ethical and safety guidelines for working with men on issues of violence perpetration. Further guidelines have been established during the life of the programme related to child abuse. Most notably, Heise contributed to the establishment of an in-depth WHO/PATH (2005) 'practical guide' to research on VAWG.

This wealth of experience perhaps explains the lack of detailed elucidation of What Works' ethical approach in its Inception Report, beyond acknowledgement of the need for research 'to be guided by the WHO guidelines for research on domestic violence, for interviewing trafficked women and for research on sexual violence in conflict settings' (WW 2014: 17). Nevertheless, this evaluation team opines that explicit presentation of a set of ethical guidelines is useful for procedural purposes.

#### 1. Mainstreaming Gender into Ethics

Our ethical review procedure embeds gender into all aspects of the process. Using a gender lens (see Bradley & Byrne, 2020), the four dimensions of which are access, agency, decision making and vulnerability, will encourage the differential impact, on groups of women and girls, men and boys, to be considered at every stage. As a foundation for doing this and ensuring ethical rigour, we will follow WHO (2016) guidelines for conducting research on Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG) (an update to the WHO 2001 guidelines). These guidelines provide a clear and distinct set of principles that can be used when reviewing the ethical rigour of all data collection.

#### WHO (2016) Ethical and Safety Recommendations for VAWG Research

- The safety of respondents and the research team is paramount, and should guide all project decisions.
- Intervention studies need to be methodologically sound and to build upon current evidence base of interventions and research experience about how to minimise the under-reporting of violence.
- Protecting confidentiality is essential to ensure both women's safety and data quality.
- All research team members should be carefully selected and receive specialized training and on-going support.
- The study design must include actions aimed at reducing any possible distress caused to the participants by the research.

- Fieldworkers should be trained to refer women requesting assistance to available local services and sources of support. Where few resources exist, it may be necessary for the study to create short-term support mechanisms.
- Researchers and donors have an ethical obligation to help ensure that their findings are properly interpreted and used to advance policy and intervention development.

The following section presents a summary of each recommendation's implications for the research process.

## 2. Safeguarding of Vulnerable Groups

Safeguarding will be ensured through the highest standards of ethics and inclusion being adhered to at all times. Considerations on safety, privacy and confidentiality, selection and training of the research team, approaches to minimising participant distress, and referrals for care and support have been developed and will be adopted by the team. These will need to be made contextually specific understanding the political, economic and social sensitivities of the contexts in question. The ongoing PEAs will help to inform and shape safeguarding measures, and ethical protocols, that will be adapted and reviewed throughout our work.

### Safety

No systematic studies have been conducted to address the likelihood of negative consequences of participating in studies of VAWG. However, researchers have reported adverse effects for women who participate in surveys that include questions on intimate partner violence (IPV). **While the safety concerns of interviewing may be less for existing participants of NGO programmes, potential concerns cannot be ruled out entirely.** The following WHO recommendations will therefore be taken into account where appropriate:

- Interview women (and men) in private settings (locate a neutral space to conduct interviews to enable participation of women who prefer not to talk at home – health centres, local NGOs etc.)
- Interviewers should have 'safe questions' that they can use if an interview is interrupted
- (e.g. questions about menstruation or other health topics)
- Ensure that the participant can reschedule/relocate the interview if they desire (work this into budget)
- Framing the research as a study of women's health/life experiences etc., enabling participants to explain the study safely to others
- Interview only one eligible woman per household
- Any interviews with men in the same house/nearby should not include questions about violence (to prevent them being alerted to the fact that women may have revealed information)
- Plan/budget for the safety of interviewers – they may need to travel in pairs, use mobile phones, take male escorts etc.

### Privacy And Confidentiality

Protecting privacy is an important aspect of safety. The WHO recommendations include:

- Interviewers must be trained in the importance of confidentiality
- Interviewers should not conduct interviews in their own communities
- No name on questionnaires (use unique codes)
- Inform participants of confidentiality as part of consent process
- If interviews are recorded, they must be stored securely. Participants must know who has access to recordings.

- Care must be taken during presentation of research findings that the information is sufficiently aggregated so as to prevent identification
- If case studies are presented, sufficient details should be changed to prevent identification
- Permission must be taken to take and use photographs

### Selection and Training of Research Team

**Research team members, including interviewers, must receive specialist training and support beyond that normally provided to research staff.**

- A basic introduction to VAWG issues
- Orientation to concepts of gender, gender discrimination and inequality
- Training must provide a way for fieldworkers to reflect on their own biases, fears and stereotypes about abused women (e.g. victim blaming)

**Research staff may need to address and come to terms with their own experiences of abuse.**

This may be distressing, cause internal conflict and may create tension in the home. Fieldwork staff may suffer emotionally from listening to distressing stories of abuse ('vicarious trauma'), even if they have never experienced violence personally. Unless this is addressed, high rates of staff attrition are likely. Our ethics policy recognises the need to ensure the safety of researchers, as well as research participants. To deal with these issues, the WHO and the SVRIVT (2015) guidelines suggest:

- Schedule regular debriefing sessions during fieldwork to allow research team to discuss what they are hearing, their feelings and how it is affecting them
- Give researchers the opportunity to discuss these things in private with study leaders if they wish
- Train researchers to recognise their own stress, how to manage it and how to access supportive supervision and counselling
- Some researchers may need to be given less emotionally taxing tasks / a break from the study
- It may be useful to rotate job responsibilities so that interviewers have a break from listening to victims' or perpetrators' stories (rotate with data entry/driving/admin tasks)
- It may also be helpful to cap the number of interviews researchers undertake per day, making sure they take adequate breaks between interviews etc.
- Ensure that interviewers understand their roles in relation to abused women. They should be open to offering assistance if asked, but should not tell women what to do or take on the personal burden of trying to "save" them
- Interviewers should understand that they must not act as counsellors, and any counselling offered as part of the study must be separate from data collection
- Connection to other projects working on violence-related issues may be helpful for researchers
- Being young and inexperienced may expose the researcher to greater personal distress because she/he has not yet developed mechanisms to cope with these new world views in their own life. Some possible questions to use during the recruitment process to explore if the individual is a good fit include:
  - What are their perceptions / understanding of violence against women?
  - How do they tolerate emotionally stressful situations?
  - Do they display the ability to adapt to and respect local culture?

### Minimising Participant Distress

All interactions must be conducted in a sensitive manner.

- Interviewers must be trained to be aware of effects that their questions may have on participants and how best to respond depending on distress level.

- Any questionnaires must be written in language that cannot be considered judgmental/stigmatising.
- Interviewers must be trained in how to terminate interviews if the impact of questioning becomes too negative
- All interviews should end in a positive manner, reinforcing the woman's coping strategies and reminding her that information she has shared will help other women
- Interviews should affirm that nobody should be abused and inform the participant of her legal rights

### Referrals For Care and Support

The WHO guidelines (2001) suggest that as a minimum requirement, researchers have an ethical obligation to provide participants with information or services that can respond to their situations. **In the case of What Works, consideration should be given to whether the existing implementation partner (NGO, research organisation) has suitable capacity**, or whether access to further support may be appropriate.

- Before beginning the research, researchers must meet with formal local support providers (health/ legal/ social services) and less formal ones (e.g. community representatives, religious figures, women's organisations and traditional healers).
- These providers' consent to offer assistance should be acquired, and a comprehensive list made of who can offer what.
- This list should be offered to all participants, whether they claim to have experienced VAWG or not. The list should be small enough to hide, or include a range of other services so as not to attract suspicion from others who may see it
- Where few resources exist, it may be necessary to engage a trained counsellor to meet with people at a set time/place – usually at a neutral location like a health centre/local organization

## ETHICAL APPROACH TO THE WHAT WORKS PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

We will use the UN Evaluation Group's (2008) 'Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation' and DFID's (2011) 'Ethics Principles for Research and Evaluation' as our fundamental ethical guidelines for the performance evaluation of What Works. In addition, we also have taken on-board the most recent ethical guidelines (DFID 2019) since their publication. The details of ethical evaluation standards are explored fully in those documents, but are well summed up as follows (UNEG 2016: 21):

### 1. Ethical Research and Evaluation Standards

- **Intentionality:** giving consideration to the utility and necessity of an evaluation at the outset;
- **Conflict of interest:** exercising the commitment to avoid conflicts of interest in all aspects of their work, thereby upholding the principles of independence, impartiality, credibility, honesty, integrity and accountability;
- **Interactions with participants:** engaging appropriately and respectfully with participants in evaluation processes, upholding the principles of confidentiality and anonymity and their limitations; dignity and diversity; human rights; gender equality; and the avoidance of harm;
- **Evaluation processes and products:** ensuring accuracy, completeness and reliability; inclusion and non-discrimination; transparency; and fair and balanced reporting that acknowledges different perspectives; and

- **Discovery of wrongdoing:** discreetly reporting the discovery of any apparent misconduct to a competent body.<sup>91</sup>

(adapted from UNEG 2016: 21)

DFID, in its most recent guidance, highlights the importance of sensitivity to context, beneficiary feedback and safeguarding. Given that a critical element of the evaluation process is likely to involve engagement with legal minors, we follow international guidelines<sup>92</sup> and consider any person, under the age of 18, to be a child. Researchers will work in accordance with guidelines set out by the Ethical Research Involving Children (ERIC) initiative, which stipulates that the most fundamental consideration is the potential impact research might have on children, in terms of both benefit and harm (Graham, Powell, Taylor, Anderson, & Fitzgerald 2013: 29). The principle of ‘non-maleficence’ (doing no harm), means that **in no way will the needs of the study take priority over the well-being of any children who take part in or are affected by it**. Where necessary, research managers will be required to have a child-protection background and context-appropriate experience in child-led research methods. All What Works Evaluation personnel adhere to our Child Safeguarding policy<sup>93</sup>.

## 2. Practical Measures

The following procedures will be adhered to during the evaluation process:

- **Informed consent** – all participants, as well as their parents/legal guardians, will have given their consent to participate. Methods of giving their informed consent will be tailored to the needs of the girls, taking into account factors such as literacy and level of education. Informed consent agreements will be renegotiable and girls will be able to withdraw from the research at any stage without repercussions, should they so wish.
- All members of the research team will undergo a **screening process** and background check as far as possible within the context of their operations (local researchers will be identified and trained during the next research phase, in accordance with final case study selection);
- Research preamble will be **child-friendly and transparent** (including appropriate written consent forms); if required, we will develop a specific Child’s Rights Policy for the programme
- The consortium will have **reporting mechanisms** and a process for dealing with the following eventualities:
  - If participants describe/are suspected to be at risk of harm, we have responsibility to ensure appropriate support and care can be given through reporting to local social welfare officer or other equivalent officer.
  - Consultants/staff that are suspected of violating ethics/protection principles
- All our staff and consultant contracts will include a statement on child protection.
- IMC will ensure that **all team members are briefed on protocols** when working with minors and vulnerable groups.
- Apply the USAID GBV toolkit and the UNWomen M&E toolkit. (UNWomen 2010; USAID 2014)

## 3. Procedural Principles

Reflecting best practice (UNWomen 2010), the evaluation will:

- Refer back [where possible] to existing baseline data;
- Be linked to the specific programme objectives that were defined through the appraisal and programme planning process;

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<sup>91</sup> As a part of our ‘critical friendship’ approach, we would seek first to explore any concerns regarding misconduct with the WW core team.

<sup>92</sup> The Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN 1989)

<sup>93</sup> Available on request

- Follow a specific methodology designed to gather information about programme success;
- Respect principles of participation and involve all programme stakeholders, including programme implementers, beneficiaries (programme users), women and girl survivors when appropriate and safe, local officials, and other observers such as related civil society groups;
- Respect and protect the rights, welfare, and confidentiality of all those involved in the programme.

#### 4. Ethical Review Process

The evaluation as a whole will be reviewed by the **Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences Ethics Committee of the University of Portsmouth (UoP)**, and the process adheres to the ethical principles and standards outlined in the University's Ethics Policy (UoP 2017). This will be with regard to adherence to ethical principles, and compliance with guidance promulgated by learned societies and professional organisations. It is anticipated that the overarching ethical framework will be applied to the evaluation in each of the participating countries. However, it is equally accepted that there will be contextual differences between countries, including matters of law, policy, procedure and research governance which might necessitate further review at country or organisation levels.

The University Strategy 2015-2020 outlines a commitment to “*act with integrity for the greater good*” and to “*insist on upholding the highest academic and professional standards*”. As a matter of social responsibility, the University reserves the right to work only with organisations that share its values, and therefore requires members of its community to ensure that any and all research conducted with partners upholds the same ethical commitments.

The procedure to facilitate this is divided into **five stages**. Each of these involves continuous communication between UoP and IMC in order to ensure that the process is effective and efficient. Procedure includes a preliminary clearance of the consortium's overarching data collection process, meaning that when proposals are made for specific fieldwork operations, only those aspects of the activity that are unique to the region, the context, the people participating, or the data collection tool will be reviewed, thus reducing the time and resources that will be required in order to gain ethical clearance.

**Figure 26: Ethical Review Stages**

Stage	Description
<b>1 – Design</b>	The design of fieldwork and data collection tools is the responsibility of all core team members, each core team member designing tools for their particular needs. Where necessary, UoP provides input and feedback regarding ethical concerns, or requirements that must be addressed, prior to the development of tools. The data tools will be assessed to ensure that all requirements are met and will be translated into a standardised proposal format for the UoP internal ethical review process.
<b>2 – Ethical Review</b>	The ethical review will be conducted by the HSS FEC, which is nested with the research ethics subcommittee, which is itself part of the overarching UoP Ethics Committee. Faculty committees are responsible for the review of research and innovation protocols. The committee meets regularly and is equipped with mechanisms for review of urgent or short-notice cases. Once the HSS FEC reaches a favourable conclusion, it provides assurance that if the research is conducted in line with the documents reviewed by the Committee, it will be deemed as ethical. The subcommittee directly supervises the HSS FEC and, when necessary, conducts reviews of appeals.



<b>2a – Recommendations</b>	Though every effort is made to ensure that proposals fulfil all ethical requirements, in some circumstances, it is possible that the HSS FEC will make recommendations for adjustments to the data tools or ask for clarification regarding operational aspects of the tools or the unique context in which the tool will be used.
<b>2b – Adjustments to the Design</b>	In most instances, this is dealt with internally, whereby the UoP team will provide clarification or minor adjustments to tools in order to pass ethical review. If necessary, for instance if a critical part of the tool must be adjusted, this will be conducted together with the relevant team. The HSS FEC reserves the right to refuse ethical clearance where standards are not met. In such instances, an application can be made to the Research Ethics Subcommittee who will implement a formal appeals process. The decision of the Research Ethics Subcommittee is final.
<b>3 – Ethical Clearance</b>	Provided all ethical requirements are met in the design and proposal of the tool, the request will be cleared by the HSS FEC. The favourable opinion of the Ethics Committee provides assurance that if the research is conducted in line with the documents reviewed, it will be deemed as ethical.
<b>4 – Ethics Checklist</b>	As part of the commitment to ensuring that the ethical review process translates to ethical practice in the field, a checklist has been developed as a tool that acts as a secondary check point (see the section below). Individual in-country researchers will be required to consider the ethical implications of the field work they are conducting. The aim of this is twofold. First, if a situation arises that means the checklist cannot be completed, it will mean that the research does not fulfil ethical requirements and therefore cannot be conducted, which will protect vulnerable groups from being put at risk or coerced into taking part. Second, the regular use of an ethics checklist (along with a Gender Lens) will contribute to embedding ethics into the daily practice of field work.
<b>5 – Fieldwork</b>	During fieldwork, it is the responsibility of IMC to ensure that research is conducted in line with the ethically clearance. Should adjustments be necessary, any and all changes to the tools, the context in which they are used, or any other operational adjustments, must be communicated to the output lead and referred to UoP for further review. If there are any substantial changes to the research protocol or to the information provided in the documents submitted for ethical review, these must be reported to the FHSS ERC committee for further consideration.

**The following ethics checklist must be adhered to by all researchers:**

- Has a safe place been secured to conduct the interviews?
- Has an enabling environment been created so that women can be referred if they suffer any trauma as a result of the interview?
- Have the context, aims and objectives of the research been fully and appropriately explained?
- Have the participants been assured of anonymity and do they understand how the data will be stored and used and who will see it?
- Have the participants been given the opportunity to hear the key findings?
- Has it been clearly communicated that the interview will be stopped if the participant requests it, or if the researcher feels the participant is in distress?
- Has consent been given?
- Have the questions been divided into sections to allow for check-in stopping points? Before moving into a new section has the researcher ensured the participant is OK and is still happy to proceed? Has the focus of the new section been explained, and has consent again been given?

- Did the researcher allow time at the end for any questions from the participant? Were these questions fully answered, either at the time or later?
- If the participant asked to hear/read the findings has this/will it be followed through?
- Is a mechanism for checking in with the participant in place?

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## ANNEX 4 – LIST OF KEY ACTORS INTERVIEWED

The below table contains a list of key actors interviewed for the final evaluation largely between August 2019 and January 2020. We have only included actors who were able to consult with us.

Key Non-Programme actors interviewed are a range of intermediaries/users, policy makers, academics and researchers.

**Figure 27: Key Actors Interviewed**

Name	Type / Component (if applicable)	Organisation / Job Title	KAI Date
<b>Emily Esplen and Tim Conway</b>	Donor – C1/C3 and C2	DFID, Senior Responsible Officers	22/01/2020
<b>Simon McNorton</b>	Donor – C1/C2/C3	DFID, Ex-WW Programme Manager	28/01/2020
<b>Prof. Rachel Jewkes</b>	Secretariat – C1	SA MRC, Director of WW	11/ 2019
<b>Nwabisa Shai</b>	Secretariat – C1	SA MRC Senior Researcher, Technical Support	11/2019
<b>Leane Ramsoomar, Nwabisa and Tirhani Manganyi</b>	Secretariat – C1	SA MRC, Research Manager	11/ 2019
<b>Samantha Willan</b>	Secretariat – C1	SA MRC Capacity Development Manager	11/2019
<b>Dr Lori Heise</b>	Secretariat – C1	Johns Hopkin; and Director of the Prevention Collaborative. IAB member	11/2019
<b>Alice Kerr-Wilson</b>	Secretariat – C1	Social Development Direct (SDD), Senior Associate	27/01/2020
<b>Rebecca Ladbury</b>	Secretariat – C1	Ladbury Communications, Media Lead for What Works	23/01/2020
<b>Mamun</b>	Implementer – C1	ICDDR, Bangladesh, Senior Researcher	11/2019
<b>Julienn Corboz</b>	Independent – C1	SA MRC Consultant, Afghanistan Researcher	11/2019
<b>Moragh Loose</b>	Non-Programme – C1	DFID, South Africa Regional Hub	16/01/2020
<b>Andy Gibbs</b>	Implementer – C1	Univ. Kwa-Zulu Natal, Lead Researcher	31/01/2020
<b>Laura Washington</b>	Implementer – C1	Project Empower, Director and Researcher	11/2019
<b>Sivuyile Khaula</b>	Implementer – C1	Project Empower, Senior Field Officer	11/2019
<b>2 Participatory Interest Groups</b>	Project Participants – C1	Stepping-Stones Creating Futures, ex-participants, 7 men, 7 women (+2), eThakwini, Durban	11/2019
<b>Tim Hess and Giorgia Franchi</b>	Implementer – C2	IRC, Programme Manager and Coordinator	28/01/2020

<b>Nata Duvvury and Stacey Scriver</b>	Implementer – C3	NUI Galway, Director and Senior Researcher	27/01/2020
<b>Neetu John</b>	Implementer – C3	ICRU, Researcher	23/01/2020
<b>Claudia Garcia Moreno Esteva</b>	Advisory Board	World Health Organization, Lead Specialist, Gender and SRPH Specialist and IAB Chair	24/01/2020
<b>Markus Goldstein</b>	Advisory Board	World Bank, Lead Economist	31/01/2020
<b>Kalliopi Mingeirou</b>	Advisory Board	UN Women, Chief, Ending Violence Against Women	04/02/2020
<b>Dr. Claudia Garcia-Moreno</b>	Advisory Board	WHO / Founder and a Coordinating Group member of SVRI; Chair IAB	23/01/2020
<b>Ghana Specific Stakeholders</b>			
<b>Susan Mensah</b>	Polymaker	DFID Ghana, Social Development Advisor	13/01/2020
<b>Jemima Gordon-Duff and Ama Blankson-Anaman</b>	Polymaker	DFID Ghana, Health Advisor and Economics Advisor	15/01/2020
<b>Adolphina Addo-Lartey and Deda Ogum Alangea</b>	Evaluator – C1	University of Ghana, School of Public Health, Co-Principal Investigator of COMBAT Evaluation	16/01/2020
<b>Dorcas Coker-Appiah</b>	Implementer – C1	COMBAT Project, Gender Studies and Human Rights Documentation Centre, Exec Director	20/01/2020
<b>Prof. Akosua Darkwah</b>	Non-Programme – C3	University of Ghana, Head of Sociology	16/01/2020
<b>Esther Armah</b>	Independent Media Expert	EAA Media Productions, Media Stakeholder in Ghana	15/01/2020
<b>Felix Asante</b>	Researcher – C3	Institute for Statistical Studies Evidence & Research (ISSER) University of Ghana, Lead Researcher	17/01/2020
<b>Sulemana Braimah</b>	Polymaker	Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA), Executive Director	14/01/2020
<b>Zambia Specific Stakeholders</b>			
<b>Annie Banda</b>	Non-Programme	World Vision Zambia, Associate Director of Grants Acquisition Management	30/09/2019
<b>Anonymous 1</b>	Non-Programme	National Federation of Women in Business, Zambia	05/10/2019
<b>Anonymous 2</b>	Non-Programme	YWCA National Office, Lusaka	05/10/2019
<b>Anonymous 3</b>	Non-Programme	Ministry of Gender, Rights and Protection, Assistant Director	06/10/2019
<b>Anonymous 4</b>	Non-Programme	Oxfam, Women's Rights Coordinator	02/10/2019
<b>Anonymous 5</b>	Non-Programme	Women Legal Support Association, Director	06/10/2019
<b>Anonymous 6</b>	Non-Programme	ZFAWIB Kadwe, Local Office Director	04/10/2019
<b>Anonymous 7</b>	Non-Programme	NGOCC Kadwe, Project Coordinator	04/10/2019
<b>Anonymous 8</b>	Non-Programme	YWCA, Kabwe, Local Office Director	04/10/2019
<b>Anonymous 9</b>	Non-Programme	World Visions Lusaka, Gender Coordinator	04/10/2019
<b>Anonymous 10</b>	Implementer – C1	SHARPZ	07/10/2019
<b>Nepal Specific Stakeholders</b>			
<b>Karuna Onta and Sangeeta Shrestha</b>	Donor – C1	DFID Nepal, Social Development Advisor and Programme Officer	23/01/2020
<b>Prabodh Acharya</b>	Data Collector – C1	FACTS Research and Analytics, Data Collector for VSO on One Community, One Family Project	23/01/2020

<b>Sudhindra Sharma</b>	Data Collector – C1	Interdisciplinary Analysts (IDA), Data Collector for Equal Access on Change Starts at Home Project	23/01/2020
<b>Binita Shrestha</b>	Implementer – C1	Equal Access, Change Starts at Home Project	21/01/2020
<b>Geeta Pradhan and Abhina Adhikari</b>	Implementer – C1	VSO, Programme Lead and Research Lead on One Community, One Family Project	16/01/2020
<b>Sumeera Shrestha</b>	Non-Programme – C1	Women for Human Rights (WHR), Executive Director and Founder	16/01/2020
<b>Renu Sijapati</b>	Non-Programme – C1	Feminists Dalit Organisation (FEDO), Member	27/01/2020
<b>Pakistan Specific Stakeholders</b>			
<b>Rozina Karmaliani</b>	Implementer – C1	Aga Khan University, Lead Researcher, on Right to Play	11/2019
<b>Marvi Memon</b>	Non-Programme – C3	Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP), Chairperson and State Minister	15/01/2020
<b>Atta Muhammad</b>	Implementer – C1	Right to Play Project, Project Coordinator then Manager	16/12/2019
<b>Iqbal Ali Jatoi</b>	Implementer – C1	Right to Play Project, Project Oversight	16/12/2019
<b>Abdul Sattar Babar</b>	Data Collector – C3	Ipsos MORI Pakistan, Country Director	04/12/2019
<b>Yasmin Zaidi</b>	National Advisory Board – C3	Centre of Gender and Policy Studies Islamabad, Director.	03/12/2019
<b>Khawar Mumtaz</b>	National Advisory Board – C3	GoP, National Commission on the Status of Women (NCSW), Ex-Chairperson	17/12/2019
<b>Asif Iqbal and Muhammad Sabir</b>	Implementer – C1	Right to Play Project	13/12/2019
<b>Dr. Kausar Khan</b>	National Advisory Board – C3	Aga Khan University, Member of NAB	31/01/2020
<b>South Sudan Specific Stakeholders</b>			
<b>Flora Aniku</b>	Non-Programme	OXFAM, Roving Gender and Protection Officer	21/01/2019
<b>Gune Annet</b>	Non-Programme	International Medical Corps (IMC). Acting GBV Coordinator	21/01/2020
<b>Connolly Butterfield</b>	Non-Programme	Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), GBV Lead	24/01/2020
<b>Margaret Chandiah</b>	Implementer – C2	CARE International (previously IRC), Gender and Protection Manager; Acting G&P Coordinator	21/01/2020
<b>Eva Kiongo</b>	Non-Programme	EVE Organization for Women Empowerment, GBV Programme Assistant	20/01/2020
<b>Alice Ochola and Glory Makena</b>	Non-Programme	IRC, GBV Sub Cluster Coordinator and Women Empowerment and Protection	21/01/2020
<b>Helen Ware</b>	Donor	DFID, Social Development Advisor	28/01/2020
<b>Clare Hollowell</b>	Lead Data Collector – C2	Forcier Consultants in South Sudan, Ex-Chief Data Collector	29/01/2020
<b>Dr. Mary Ellsberg</b>	Lead Researcher	Global Women's Institute at the George Washington University, Executive Director (and Lead Researcher for South Sudan)	16/01/2020
<b>Policy Makers</b>			
<b>Diana Arango</b>	Policymaker	World Bank, Senior GBV and Development Specialist	07/01/2020
<b>Chandre Gould</b>	Academics / Think Tanks	Institute for Security Studies / Senior Research Fellow; Justice and Crime Prevention Programme	04/2019
<b>Mayssam D. Zaaroura</b>	Practitioner Key Actor	Oxfam Canada / Women's Rights Knowledge Specialist	10/2017

<b>Suzi Chinnery</b>	Practitioner Key Actor	Care International	04/2019
<b>Nicola Jones</b>	Independently Secured Expert	Gender and Adolescence: Global Evidence / Director	04/2019
<b>Confidential Stakeholders</b>			
<b>PP1WWSTN</b>	Researcher	N/A	Aug 2019
<b>PP2WWHATCH</b>			
<b>PP3WWALN</b>			
<b>PP1NWWCKN</b>	Non-Programme	N/A	Aug 2019
<b>PP2NWWTEMM</b>			
<b>PP3NWWMUB</b>			
<b>PP4NWWCAMB</b>			
<b>PP5NWWGARC</b>			
<b>PP6NWWMUS</b>			
<b>PP7NWWNL</b>			

## ANNEX 5 – LIST OF KEY DOCUMENTS AUDITED

**Figure 28** below contains a list of key documents reviewed for the final evaluation between November 2019 and January 2020. This adds to the wider raft of literature reviewed for the Mid-Term Review, listed in **Figure 29** beneath this table. Please note that the Evaluation team have also conducted a systematic assessment of all WW-VAWG Academic Outputs (not listed in full here), this is currently being finalised (as of February 2020) and will be attached as an additional Annex in the final version of this report.

**Figure 28: Key Documents Reviewed for the Final Evaluation**

Source	Document Title
<b>WW Programme Documents, Meeting Agendas &amp; Minutes</b>	IMC – WW six monthly check in, October 2017
	IMC – WW research uptake progress report, October 2018
	IMC – WW research uptake progress report, April 2019
	Annual Review 2017
	Annual Review – post April 2018
	Independent Advisory Board Meeting, 7th July 2017 Minutes
	Progress on Actions from 07 July 2017 IAB
	Recommendations and Actions from the 2018 AR
	WW Independent Advisory Board Meeting – 01-02 November
	MC Meeting – Action Items and Recommendations June 2019
	Management Committee Meeting – 6th June 2019 Draft Minutes
	Management Committee Meeting – 5th Sept 2019
<b>Component 1</b>	Component 1 - Quarterly Report December 2017
	Component 1 - Quarterly Report - March 2018
	Component 1 - Quarterly Report - June 2018
	Component 1 - Quarterly Report - September 2018
	Component 1 - Quarterly Report - April 2019
	Component 1 - Quarterly Report - June 2019
	Component 1 - Quarterly Report - September 2019
	Component 1 - Programme Completion Report
	Component 1 - Monitoring Capacity Development - Sept 2018
	Component 1 - Capacity Development Workshop - Oct 2018
	Case Study Experiences of Capacity Development within the WW Programme
	End line data analysis and writing workshop Dushanbe, Tajikistan 3-11 March 2018
	Component 1 - Monitoring capacity development over time: quantitative data March 2018
	Component 1- Appendix Quarterly Report Dec 2017 - Quarterly TA and Progress Report on Innovation Grant
	What Works Media Coverage - 6th Sept - 5th Dec 2017
	What Works - Component 1 - Success Stories from the Field
	What Works - Component 1 - Monitoring Capacity Development over time - September 2017 Uptake
	What Works RCT Data Analysis Workshop, 13-17 November 2017
	What Works Technical Advisor Trip – Meeting



	What Works at SVRI 2017
<b>Component 2</b>	Component 2 - Annual Review Feb 2018
	Component 2 - WW South Sudan Prevalence Study Report Launches - Policy and Media Update
	Component 2- Annual Review, 2019
	Component 2 - Project Completion Report
	Component 2 - Grand Bargain Cash Work Stream Workshop Report
	Component 2 – Endline Data Gathering Report
<b>Component 3</b>	Component 3 - Annual Review, 2018
	Component 3 - Project Completion Review
	Milestone XI Report - Submission of Draft Country Reports
	Milestone XII Report - Reports on In-country workshops on findings: Ghana and South Sudan
	Economic and social costs of VAWG: Preliminary analysis from South Sudan, Draft 3.0
	Economic and social costs of VAWG in Pakistan
	Socio-Economic Costs of Violence

Figure 29: Key Documents Reviewed for the Mid-Term Evaluation

Source	Document Title
<b>WW Programme Document, Meeting Agendas &amp; Minutes</b>	WW Inception Phase Report – VAWG Research and Innovation Fund, Component 1: What Works for VAWG Prevention? Period covered by report 6th December 2013 to 6th June 2014, MRCSA (+23 annexes)
	2015 Annual Review docs
	What Works Annual Review 2015 FINAL 170415
	2016 Annual Review docs
	Cumulative publications of What Works component 1
	Recommendations and actions AR 2016
	What Works Annual Review 060416 Revised LogFrame with updated risk ratings
	What Works Annual Review Annex 3 Risk Register proposed changes FINAL
	What Works to Prevent Violence annual review 2016 FINAL
	2017 Annual Review
	WW Annual Review Feb 2017 FINAL
	What Works Component 2 Annual Report - Feb 2017
	Annual Review Final 2017 C3
	<b>Capacity Development Strategy and other docs</b>
	151002 Capacity Development Guidance V2 22 Oct 2015
	Annex N_Capcity Building Strategy
	EA Nepal Capacity Development_June 2016 FINAL 5 July 2016
	HERrespect Capacity Development Plan_Final
	Recomendations for WW CoP 29 Aug 2016 V2
	WW all three components updates 17 May 2016 FINAL
	WW Cap Dev Workshop agenda for participants Final 1 Sep V2
	WW CoP Programme revised 11 Jan 2017 V7- sent by S.Willan
	WW COP Research Uptake 29 Nov 2016 Video zoom_0
	Monitoring capacity development over time in What Works narrative Final 26 Nov 16
	WW Capacity development monitoring tool Final 9 March 2016
	WW Grantee survey Report 27 Sep 2016 FINAL

	WW Guidance on using the capacity development monitoring tool Final 9 March 2016
	<b>WW Programme Research Uptake</b>
	WW Draft Joint Research Uptake and Engagement Strategy
	WW Joint Research Uptake and Engagement Operational Plan- Draft 1 September 2016
	<b>Ethics</b>
	Ethics Guidance for What Works Partners June 2016
	<b>Meetings</b>
	Management Committee Meeting notes
	30 November 2016 MC Meeting Minutes TH.ss
	<b>Documents referenced in the Performance Evaluation ToR</b>
	What_Works_Inception_Report_June_2014_Annex_H_WG4_Paper_Response_mechanisms
	What_Works_Inception_Report_June_2014_Annex_I_Summary_response_Final
	What_Works_Inception_Report_June_2014_AnnexJ_WG5_Paper_Scale-up
	What_Works_Inception_Report_June_2014_AnnexK_Summary_Scalability_Final
	WW_Inception_Report_June_2014_AnnexC_summary_overview_of_component1
	WW_Inception_Report_June_2014_AnnexD_WG1_paper_State_of_the_field
	WW_Inception_Report_June_2014_AnnexE_Summary_State_of_the_Field_Final
	WW_Inception_Report_June_2014_AnnexF_WG23_paper_prevention_interventions
	WW_Inception_Report_June_2014_AnnexG_Summary_Prevention_interventions_Final
	<b>Documents Produced by DFID</b>
	<b>To Inform the Programme:</b> DFID Business Case WW VAWG Research and Innovation Fund
	<b>To Guide the Programme:</b> WW Business Case Theory of Change (DFID)
	<b>To Guide the Programme:</b> What Works Annual Review 060416 Annex 1 Revised LogFrame with updated risk ratings
	<b>To Guide the Programme:</b> WW Research and Innovation Programme - LogFrame_ Revised 02.2016. Devtracker
	<b>To Review the Programme:</b> EQUALS QA Inception v01-20161028
	<b>To Review the Programme:</b> Template_DFID Annual Review
	<b>To Review the Programme:</b> DFID 2016 AR WW Summary Sheet
	<b>To Review the Programme:</b> 61259-Raab_Stuppert_Report_VAWG_Evaluations_Review_DFID_20140626
<b>Documents Received from Dubai ASM</b>	<b>Dubai ASM Presentations</b>
	Challenges in measuring VAWG India_R Prakash
	Costs of VAWG in Egypt_Nata Duvvury
	Distribution of sexual assault burden M Baiocchi and C Sarnquist.pptx
	Evidence Review - VAWG in conflict and humanitarian crises_M Murphy Dubai Presentation
	Experiences of conducting research in conflict and humanitarian crises_M Ellsberg and A McAlpine
	Fielding Mixed Methods Research Rwanda_Kristin and Erin
	Intimate Partner Violence in Ghana_D Alangea (1)
	Intimate Partner Violence in Ghana_D Alangea
	Measuring gender attitudes in highly patriarchal settings_Jewkes ASM Aug 2016
	Methods in measuring social and economic costs of VAWG_J McLeary-Sills and K Elmusharaf

	Politicising masculinities_ R McBride
	Preliminary Findings from Dadaab case management research_A McAlpine and M Macrae
	Preliminary Findings from research in South Sudan_Manuel Contreras
	Preliminary Findings from the SHARPZ baseline study_S Munthali
	Prevalence and drivers of violence among children in Pakistan_Rozina
	Prevalence and district level differences in IPV in Nepal_ C Clark
	Prevalence and drivers of violence in informal settlements in South Africa_A Gibbs
	Preventing VAWG in Tajikistan_Zindagii Shoista – Living With DignityFormativeResearch
	Understanding the distribution of sexual assault burden in Kenya_Stanford Univ
	VSON Formative Research Presentation_ASM 2016 Dubai
	What works Dubai presentation Sept 7 2016
	<b>Dubai Annual Meetings Reports (ASM+ capacity development reports)</b>
	2016 Annual Scientific Meetings Sep 2016 Attendees Mailing List FINAL.xlsx
	ASM REPORT_FINAL.pdf
	Cap Dev Workshop Sep 2016 Report Final 26 Oct.pdf
	<b>Grantee Dubai Posters</b>
	ARiD_Poster Template_A1 Size.pub (EiC Uganda)
	Bangladesh AG.pub
	Dubai Poster_Equal Access_Submitted AG.pub (Change Starts at Home, Nepal)
	Ghana_Poster for Dubai meeting.pub
	HTAC Poster Template_A1 Size.pub (Preventing VAWG Afghanistan)
	International Alert_Poster WW Tajikistan.pub
	KHPT Dubai 23rd August 2016_Final.pub (Samvedana Plus, India)
	Maan Network_Poster Template_AG.pub (Occupied Palestinian Territories)
	Poster Right To Play -Re.pdf (Pakistan)
	Project Empower_Poster Template_A1 Size (002).pub (Stepping Stones, South Africa/various?)
	SHARPZ-JHU Poster _ SHARPZJHU Final.pub (RCT Zambia)
	Sonke CHANGE poster Dubai 24Aug16.pdf (South Africa)
	Tearfund Reformatted.pub (DRC)
	Ujamaa_Poster_Presentation_Dubai.pub (Kenya)
	VSO Poster Final.pdf (One Community One Family, Nepal)
<b>Component 1</b>	WW Theory of Change developed by Component 1
	What Works Publications Tracker_Inception To Date.xlsx
	Recommendations for WW CoP 29 Aug 2016 V2.pdf
	Revised ToR Component 1 (VAWG) Research and Innovation Fund May 2016
	Component 3 NUI Contract Amendment 2
	2016 March Quarterly Report
	2016 Mar Annex A-Project Update
	2016 Mar Annex B-Risk Registers
	2016 Mar Annex C-TA reports
	2016 Mar DFID Quarterly Report-Final
	2016 June Quarterly Report
	2016 Jun Annex A-Project Update
	2016 June Annex C WW TA Quarterly reports March - May 2016
	2016 June DFID Quarterly Report V5 27 June - V3
	Risk Register_Consolidated_June 2016

	2016 Sept Quarterly Report
	2016 Sep DFID Quarterly Report 300916
	Annexes_2016 Sept Quarterly Report
	Publications_2016 Sept DFID Quarterly Report
	2016 December Quarterly Report C1
	2016-12 MASTER COPY DFID Quarterly Report V2
	2016 What Works ASM REPORT_FINAL
	2016 What Works Cap Dev Workshop Report Final
	Annex A Projects Update
	Annex B Copy of 20122016 Sep-Nov 2016 Consolidated Risk Register
	Annex C 2016 Dec WW TA Quarterly reports Sep-Nov 2016
	Annex D 2016 Sep WW TA Visit Reports 2016
	Annex E Copy of Research uptake & engagement plans and activities by project_Dec 2016
	Annex F Success Stories Nov 2016
	<b>Approved Monitoring Plan Examples</b>
	BSR m plan SIGNED OFF
	Maan TV m plan SIGNED OFF
	SHARPZ m plan SIGNED OFF
	Tajikistan_Monitoring Plan
	Tearfund m plan SIGNED OFF 230816
	<b>C1 Research Uptake Examples</b>
	2017 Research Uptake Plan 2nd pass (Ujamaa)_Stanford_draft
	Final Research uptake plan_Ghana_v1.1
	HERrespect_DFID_Research_Uptake_Plan_Jan 2017_v 1.1
	Int Alert Research Uptake Plan_draft
	Ma'an Network Research Uptake Strategy_V1.1
	Research Uptake plan Pakistan_RTP_AKU_draft1
	Research Uptake Plan Project Empower HEARD Nov 2016 v2
	Research Uptake Strategy SHARPZ - Final edits_2.01.2017
	RU for Rwanda November 22 2016
	Tearfund WW_Draft RU plan
	VSO Nepal _Research Uptake Strategy V1.1
	What Works RU and communications Guidance
<b>Component 3</b>	<b>C3 Briefings/ Concept Notes</b>
	7321 NUIG Briefing Info Ghana HR_Final
	7321 NUIG Briefing Info Pakistan HR Final
	7559 NUIG Costs of VAW Report Newsletter HR (1)
	7567 NUIG Briefing Info SUDAN 1 (1)
	Conceptualising Violence
	costs of vaw infographic_SA_v2
	<b>C3 M&amp;E Framework</b>
	C3 Logframe_NO LONGER USED
	DFID-Action Aid ToC_used by C3
	<b>C3 Research Uptake</b>
	Research uptake Plans
	<b>C3 other</b>
	Operation Plan, 2016-2018

<b>Independent of, but related to the WW Programme</b>	milestone V report 2016
	milestone VI report 2016
	milestone VII report 2016
	DFID how-to-note-VAWG
	2015_metric_tide
	DFID ICAI VAWG, 2016 <a href="http://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/ICAI-Learning-Review-DFIDs-Efforts-to-Eliminate-Violence-Against-Wome....pdf">http://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/ICAI-Learning-Review-DFIDs-Efforts-to-Eliminate-Violence-Against-Wome....pdf</a>
	DFID Management Response to the Independent Commission for Aid Impact's Learning Review on: "DFID's efforts to eliminate violence against women and girls, May 2016"

## ANNEX 6 – FINAL EVALUATION TEAM

The Final Evaluation would not have been possible without the commitment and support from the following team members:

**Figure 30: Final Evaluation Team Members**

Name	Organisation	Role	Key Responsibilities
<b>Bryony Everett</b>	IMC Worldwide	Project Director	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide project direction and oversight to the evaluation team.</li> </ul>
<b>Sheena Crawford</b>	IMC (CR2 Associates)	Team Leader	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Design approach and leading the evaluation team's inputs</li> <li>Lead on evaluating the impact of innovation on the programme</li> <li>Cover South Africa KAIs</li> </ul>
<b>Tamsin Bradley</b>	University of Portsmouth	Research Lead	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lead on evaluating the impact of research, and support Team Leader on all outputs.</li> <li>Assist team in adhering to Ethics Policy</li> <li>Cover Zambia and Bangladesh KAIs</li> </ul>
<b>Megan Lloyd-Laney</b>	IMC (CommsConsult Ltd)	Research Uptake Lead	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lead on evaluating the impact of research uptake, and support Team Leader on all outputs.</li> <li>Design communications and dissemination strategy</li> <li>Cover Ghana KAIs</li> </ul>
<b>Lauren Atherton</b>	IMC Worldwide	Evaluation Manager and Research Support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Overall management of evaluation</li> <li>Research support as required</li> </ul>
<b>Research Assistants</b>			
<b>Ottis Mubaiwa</b>	University of Portsmouth	PEA Researcher	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Produce country-specific political economy analyses (PEAs)</li> </ul>
<b>Rebecca Gordon</b>	IMC (Independent)	Research Assistant	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Document review and coding</li> <li>Audit of the What Works website</li> </ul>
<b>Nyasha Musandu</b>	IMC (CommsConsult Ltd)	Research Assistant	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Audit of digital platforms</li> <li>Assessment of evidence and policy briefs</li> <li>Stakeholder analysis</li> </ul>
<b>George Byrne</b>	IMC (Independent)	Research Assistant	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Professionally copy-editing Final Report</li> <li>Supporting Research Lead on outputs</li> </ul>
<b>Anthony Ochan</b>	IMC (Independent)	Researcher (South Sudan)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coordinate, conduct, translate and transcribe KAIs in South Sudan</li> </ul>
<b>Salu Singh</b>	IMC (Independent)	Researcher (Nepal)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coordinate, conduct, translate and transcribe KAIs in Nepal</li> </ul>
<b>Katherine Liakos</b>	IMC Worldwide	Researcher (Pakistan)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coordinate, conduct, translate and transcribe KAIs in Pakistan</li> <li>Previous evaluation manager</li> </ul>
<b>Isha Abdulkadi</b>	IMC (Independent)	Researcher (Dadaab)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coordinate, conduct, translate and transcribe KAIs in Dadaab for MTR</li> <li>Support on qualitative analysis</li> </ul>
<b>Ben Walker</b>	IMC Worldwide	Graphic Designer	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Visualise and finalise all diagrams / covers</li> </ul>
<b>Sophie Collins</b>	IMC (Independent)	Research Assistant	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Final 'fresh-eyes' proofread and format of Final Report before Publication.</li> </ul>
<b>Technical Support</b>			
<b>Charlotte Maugham then Catherine Lowery</b>	IMC Worldwide	Quality Assurance Lead	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Quality assure all deliverables as part of IMC's internal QA process</li> </ul>
<b>Prof. Ruth Pearson</b>	University of Portsmouth	Independent Quality Assurance / Review Team's Adviser	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Professional, independent quality assurance at key points throughout</li> </ul>
<b>Kate Conroy</b>	IMC (Independent)	Evaluation Support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide technical support on the Final Evaluation</li> </ul>

## ANNEX 7 – RELEVANCE SECTION FROM MID-TERM REVIEW

The following section is taken from the WW-VAWG-VAWG Evaluation team's Mid-Term Review (revised May 2017)

### 1. RELEVANCE

In the following section we provide emerging findings related to the relevance of the WW-VAWG-VAWG programme. Our findings are guided by the agreed relevance related evaluation questions in **Box 10** below.

#### Box 10: Relevance Related Evaluation Questions

**MTR Q1:** Is the evidence generated by the programme relevant to the target audience? Is it appropriate to needs, and attractive to potential users?

- What evidence is there that the (programme-wide) Research Uptake strategy is a relevant and appropriate instrument which will facilitate uptake of research into policy?
- What evidence is there for the on-going demand for the research being undertaken?

**MTR Q2:** What evidence is there that the research undertaken by WW-VAWG will have relevance to policy and practice in developing countries?

### EARLY INDICATIONS THAT EVIDENCE GENERATED IS RELEVANT TO USERS (Q1)

Interviews with implementers, component leads and researchers, as well as with key stakeholders outside of the programme, show that the data and evidence that are being generated, and will be generated throughout the programme, are appropriate and in demand. As part of our political economy analysis we have interviewed, and will continue to interview, stakeholders outside the programme to gauge their knowledge and engagement with WW-VAWG-VAWG. Although on-going, stakeholders (for example, in Pakistan), have expressed their support and eagerness to receive the findings. However, caution has been expressed as to how the findings are communicated because of context.

There is a wide range of potential users (see tables on Research Uptake): from community-level organisations, women's organisations, local and national governments through to international donors and development organisations and women's movements.

MTR interviews with those involved in the Dadaab research have shown examples of the research already feeding back into improved case management practices. These include, for example, a more robust follow up procedure with survivors and closer concern around how to support the refugee case workers in their very important, yet high risk, work. Factors of success may be picked up by the cohort and staged nature of the research. Later data collection may evidence the improvements of more intervention, but this has yet to be published. C2 need to push to see if they can evidence improvement as a result of changed practice.

There is appetite amongst funding agencies (specifically DFID) and INGOs (for example, Population Council) for evidence that task-sharing might offer a VFM approach to delivering results in similar conflict settings, both in Kenya and the region more broadly.



A number of C1 projects have shared experiences and learning and this adds to the CoP based on WW-VAWG-VAWG innovation and research. There is good evidence to suggest that the experience of being part of the programme is relevant not only to each organisation generating the evidence, but to other organisations also involved in C1 innovation and evaluation/research. For example, learning and evidence gained by R2P in Hyderabad, Pakistan is already influencing design and implementation of their other programmes in Pakistan, and is set to influence the organisation more widely<sup>94</sup>.

## **RELEVANCE TO POLICY AND PRACTICE DEVELOPMENT (Q2)**

Globally, until WW-VAWG, approaches to VAWG have tended to be piecemeal and fractured. The WW-VAWG programme represents a significant, heavy investment in addressing particular aspects of the well-being and health of girls and women. It is intended and likely that results from the programme, and the evidence it generates, will have great influence on shaping investment for women and girls of the coming decade.

There is already strong evidence to show that the programme is generating evidence relevant to practice across the VAWG agenda, and to development of policy and strategy at all levels: for example, the processes through which the Secretariat supports the development of partnerships between implementation and evaluation organisations, helping them to refine ways of working together, developing capacity etc.. To date, this influence has largely been with stakeholders already involved in the programme, or close to it (implementation agencies and research / evaluation organisations and their peers). As more evidence is generated and shared, through a wide range of products and communication means, the influence of the programme is set to spread to a wider audience of decision-makers and practitioners.

Each component has a different focus. C3 is not yet in a position to influence practice and policy directly, but as it develops evidence, it will open up new policy debates, and new programming directions, on the effect of VAWG. This change discourse aims to support the kind of practice and policy changes targeted by C1 and C3.

To ensure the greatest relevance of WW-VAWG to future development of policy and practice, there needs to be even greater synergy between the three programme components than that which exists presently.

## **RESEARCH DEMAND (Q2)**

Efforts are needed to generate appetite for evidence, amongst all potential audiences. It is highly likely that, when people know about the work, good-quality evidence will be taken up by a range of stakeholders, at all levels. Evidence of this can already be seen at the project level. For example, in Pakistan, despite the challenging environment, the R2P curriculum is being used by a number of government schools, beyond the immediate WW-VAWG target schools in Hyderabad, Sindh.

## **STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT (Q2)**

There is recognition in most of the RU strategies, that national governments and national-level influence is critically important, alongside ambitions at the global level. A key challenge is to take learning from projects and draw out statements which resonate and are felt to be relevant, at a global level.<sup>95</sup> This is a challenge that has not yet been explicitly addressed

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<sup>94</sup> Pers. communication. Component 1, during MTR fieldwork in South Africa

<sup>95</sup> Notes from ASM, September 2016

There is less detailed analysis at this early stage, of the 'piggy-backing' that can be done onto other sector-based and thematic debates. These include, for example, using the relationship with the SVRI more effectively for disseminating information. SVRI has 4500 members and sends out weekly updates, has the bi-annual Forum, and has huge reach in the VAWG sector.<sup>18</sup> Stakeholder analysis and horizon scanning for events and policy debates that could be targeted with the emerging WW-VAWG evidence will become increasingly important in the second half of the programme life.

## **BROKERAGE: USING DFID AND PARTNER ORGANISATIONS (Q2)**

There are more than 50 organisations involved in the direct delivery, or providing technical and advisory support to the programme. Together, they represent many different stakeholder groups, from development and humanitarian sectors, at local, national, regional and global levels. The potential of this group to identify and articulate the 'demand side' of evidence use,

what solutions/answers people are looking for and what knowledge gaps are impeding their good decisions, is large. This potential can be actively used by, for example, asking DFID country offices and IAB / TAG members what they need to know. The convening power of these organisations can be used to showcase WW at a country level.

One specific opportunity suggested by programme staff, is for DFID to advocate for the next big global summit to be focused on IPV, as previous summits have been on FGM/C, sexual violence in conflict and child marriage.

# ANNEX 8 – POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS OF WW-VAWG PROGRAMMING

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this Annex is to map the context of WW-VAWG in order to compare and contrast the different political and economic environments in which WW-VAWG programming takes place. The PEA is positioned alongside the main evaluation report in order to support the evaluation team in situating their assessment of WW-VAWG activities in the focus countries. It provides general background information, as well as country specific circumstances that are important but may not have been highlighted elsewhere, and that shape the way in which violence appears, as well as how it can be addressed, in different contexts.

Together with the data and observations detailed in the main report, this Annex helps to provide a clear picture of the size of the problem and its causes in specific countries. It identifies key strengths and weaknesses of the existing political and economic contexts, and the existing efforts at transformation. It also points towards the barriers to change that still need to be overcome.

This enables us to further reflect on where the most significant gaps in evidence and the barriers to change lie, and where the greatest opportunities exist. This then contributes to better understanding of how WW-VAWG can be best positioned in relation to them as the programme moves into its next phase. As such, rather than providing information that is entirely new to WW-VAWG, the PEA instead synthesises what we already know in order to point toward key approaches to change that we might expect to become the focus for WW-VAWG activities in future.

In our methodology, we selected six countries in which to conduct a deep dive (see **Annex 2** for selection criteria). The countries selected are **Nepal, Pakistan, Ghana, South Africa, Zambia, and South Sudan**. As well as providing insights into the unique opportunities and challenges encountered in each context, this PEA allows comparisons to be made that help us understand why a specific type of intervention might work well in one place but not in others.

In all country contexts studied, levels of VAWG are high. What differs, however, is the strength of the wider enabling environment (e.g., the existence of a robust set of legislative measures, a capacity to implement prevention activities, and a responsive transparent justice system), internal cultural and ethnic diversity, and the size of the national economy. In all contexts, legislation to promote gender equality and reduce some (but not all) forms of violence does exist in some form. However, the political will to implement this legislation and the comparative visibility and strength of civil society actors working on VAWG differs considerably from one country to the next. A further dimension is the level of ethnic, religious and cultural diversity, which shapes gendered values and beliefs, and which in turn will impact upon the likely effectiveness of an intervention.

In light of this, the PEA is structured as follows.

- First, a summary of some of the unique features of the **Legal and Regulatory Environments** that relate to VAWG in the selected countries is provided.
- This is followed by a brief summary of how **Attitudes** toward VAWG and **Commitment** to tackling it at the national level can affect the context of WW-VAWG programming in different countries.
- Finally, the PEA offers a summary of the **Key Learning** from the observations presented.

## 2. LEGAL AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENTS

Reviewing the different legal and regulatory environments across the WW-VAWG programme reveals very different operating contexts, each of which has unique and significant implications for the likely uptake of evidence on what works to end VAWG.

Though **Ghana** and **Zambia** are classed as lower middle-income countries and are considered to be successful democracies, albeit with notable levels of political corruption, both also have very high levels of normalised violence, particularly intimate partner violence (IPV). In **Ghana**, the Government, in response to the calls for action on VAWG by activists, Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the global community, has passed and/or amended several laws that protect the rights of women and girls. These include laws that criminalise particular practices, such as female genital mutilation (FGM), provide a legal framework for widowhood rights, and prohibit discrimination based on sex, and specifically prohibit gendered violence, including the Domestic Violence Act (Act 732) (2007). In 1998, the Women and Juveniles Unit (WAJU) – which is now named the Domestic Violence and Victim Support Unit (DOVVSU) – of the **Ghana** Police Service was created to respond to domestic violence. Then, following the 2007 Domestic Violence Act, the National Policy and Plan of Work (2008) was established and coordinated by the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection (MoGCSP) in order to implement the Act. Since then, although reporting of domestic violence cases has increased, it has not correlated with an increase in prosecutions and convictions<sup>96</sup>. In October 2014, an NGO shadow report noted that prosecutors have “inadequate” skills to properly convict perpetrators of domestic violence.<sup>97</sup> A 2011 Voluntary Services Overseas (VSO), report also noted that the “state’s provision for access to justice is insufficient and ineffective in the key areas of prosecution, punishment and attrition”<sup>98</sup> and other sources indicate that an inadequately resourced formal justice system and lack of logistical capacity continue to undermine access to justice.<sup>99</sup>

In **Zambia**, there is an Anti-Gender-Based Violence Act (Anti-GBV Act), which was passed in 2010, revised in 2011. Fast track courts that focused on cases of gender-based violence were launched as part of the UNDP Joint Programme on GBV (March 2012 – January 2016). Fifteen were created in 2016 in Kabwe, Central Province, and in Lusaka. According to the Zambian Government, the courts were established in order to increase access to justice for victims and deal with them speedily. Kishor and Johnson (2004) stated that results from a multi-country study put Zambia as the highest prevalence country for ever-married women experiencing IPV: 48% reported having experiencing physical or sexual violence perpetrated by their current or most recent cohabiting partner. Yet, for various personal, economic, and social reasons, especially fear of stigma, less than half of abused women and girls (46%) seek help. Underpinning these high levels of VAWG are very high levels of gender inequality. According to the World Economic Forum (WEF) Global Gender Gap (GGG) Index,<sup>100</sup> Zambia is ranked 116 out of 145 countries. From 2007, CARE Zambia, USAID and the European Union (EU) expanded efforts to tackle this through the Coordinated Response to Sexual and Gender Based Violence in Zambia project, which ran from September 2007 to December 2011. The project, *A Safer Zambia* (ASAZA), sought to reduce the incidence of VAWG through greater understanding of the types and triggers, and offered support for survivors including stronger justice mechanisms. This included eight one-stop Coordinated Response Centers (CRCs) in seven districts<sup>101</sup>. In contrast, Ghana only began to take steps to launch a one-stop centre system in late 2018. The DOVVSU of the Ghana Police Service, Accra, will be the location of the first centre.

<sup>96</sup> Adu-Gyamfi 2014, 84. <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ccab/563407c54cf8fee5cfff3f21ea3a2dfe5e1a.pdf>

<sup>97</sup> CSO 2014, 21. [http://internet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/GHA/INT\\_CEDAW\\_NGO\\_GHA\\_18396\\_E.pdf](http://internet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/GHA/INT_CEDAW_NGO_GHA_18396_E.pdf)

<sup>98</sup> *ibid*

<sup>99</sup> Adu-Gyamfi 2014. <https://www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/JLPG/article/view/14358>

<sup>100</sup> <https://www.weforum.org/reports/gender-gap-2020-report-100-years-pay-equality>

<sup>101</sup> Care 2013, 2-3. <https://www.care.org/sites/default/files/documents/GBV-2013-ZMB-CARE-ASAZA-OSC-Case-Study.pdf>

The Constitution of **South Africa** recognises that gender equality can only be achieved through dismantling patriarchal ideologies that perpetuate women's oppression, and the country's legislative and policy framework is aligned to the various international conventions to which it is a signatory. The Domestic Violence Act No 116 of 1998 (DVA) and the Criminal Law Sexual Offences and Related Matters Act No 32 of 2007 (SOA) are two prominent laws relating specifically to VAWG, and the National Gender Policy Framework, the Employment Equity Act (EEA), Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA), concern gender equality more generally (House 2017). South Africa's legal system guarantees equality to all people, which contributes to the country ranking as one of the top twenty countries in the world (in 19<sup>th</sup> place, according to the WEF, 2018) for gender equality. In sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa ranks third highest for gender equality, behind Rwanda and Namibia (WEF, 2018)<sup>102</sup>. But these statistics hide huge internal levels of inequalities which disproportionately impact on women and girls.<sup>103</sup> As with Ghana and Zambia, high levels of corruption and failings to implement gender legislation means that levels of VAWG remain high. These three contexts point to the reality that even when a strong legislative framework and gender inclusion policies exist, little will change unless the political will and capacity exists to implement them.

Contexts in which conflict is ongoing or that have experienced sustained periods of conflict in the recent past (including three of the study countries: **Nepal**, **Pakistan**, and **South Sudan**) represent complex and unique contexts in terms of VAWG programming. In **Nepal** multiparty democracy was established relatively recently; it emerged as a result of decades of political struggle that ended with the people's movement in 1992. But following this, ten-years of Maoist insurgency (1996-2006), thought to have been fuelled by slow economic progress, left the country unstable, and during this time GBV remained common place. Acknowledging the deeply rooted problem of IPV in Nepal, the Nepali government passed the Domestic Violence Act in 2009. Since then, a few cases of IPV have been brought into courts or into the public domain. KAs interviewed for this evaluation commented that significant steps towards ending VAWG have been taken, but in 2018, the still had a Gender Inequality Index (GII) value of 0.476, with a ranking 115 out of 162 countries in the 2018.<sup>104</sup> Within the country, the caste system creates differences in levels of vulnerability, with Dalit women significantly more likely to suffer from multiple forms of violence. It is estimated that around 66% of women who have experienced physical or sexual violence choose not to seek help,<sup>105</sup> partly due to insufficient safe shelters and lack of awareness among women regarding their rights, which has contributed to very low conviction rates. The main challenge in this context is to ensure that the laws and policies that do exist are fully implemented and that access to justice is strengthened. The limited capacity to guarantee full and effective investigation of cases remains a serious problem in preventing cases of violence against women in Nepal, meaning there is little to discourage perpetrators.<sup>106</sup> However there is little global evidence that even when legislation is implemented reductions in VAWG occur. Legislation on its own is not enough and needs to feed into process of behavioural and norm change.

Since **Pakistan's** independence in 1947, successive governments have approached poverty reduction through seeking rapid Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates. The country adopted Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) and later neo-liberal economic policies, which together are thought to have fuelled a wealth gap, increasing the economic vulnerability of many.<sup>107</sup> Alongside this, the 1970s and 80s saw a regression in women's rights in the country, and despite some success in recent years in passing policies and laws (many of which were introduced by women parliamentarians) to

<sup>102</sup> See WEF 2018, 10. [http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF\\_GGGR\\_2018.pdf](http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf)

<sup>103</sup> Dimitrova-Grajzl, & Obasanjo 2019. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10602-018-09272-0>

<sup>104</sup> Kathmandu Post 2019. <https://kathmandupost.com/national/2019/12/11/nepal-moves-up-in-human-development-index-but-is-still-ranked-second-to-last-in-south-asia>

<sup>105</sup> Nepal DHS 2016. <https://dhsprogram.com/what-we-do/survey/survey-display-472.cfm>

<sup>106</sup> Robins 2011. <https://academic.oup.com/ijt/article-abstract/5/1/75/2356984>

<sup>107</sup> Mustafa 2016. <https://www.dw.com/en/why-is-the-gender-gap-widening-in-pakistan/a-36245560>

prevent practices such as early age marriages, 'honour' killings, sexual harassment, domestic violence, and rape<sup>108</sup>, Pakistan is still ranked 151 out of 153 countries on the 2019 GGG Index Report.<sup>109</sup> In particular provinces, some action has been taken to tackle this. For example, in 2015 the state of Punjab passed a law criminalising all forms of violence against women, including domestic, emotional, psychological, economic, or sexual violence. This Act established a toll-free hotline for women to report abuse or violence, and it provided shelters for women and children. The parliamentary assembly plans to investigate reports of abuse through panels, and it will also deploy Global Positioning System (GPS) bracelets to track perpetrators. Albeit positive, this move by one state needs to be contextualised against the reality of VAWG in Pakistan more generally. Though Punjab is viewed as having taken the most significant action against VAWG, it also accounts for far more incidences of violence than the other provinces of Pakistan (Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Sindh) combined, in part because its population is by far the largest. For example, a Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) report found that of the 620 incidences of kidnapping women in 2018, 587 were in Punjab, as were 57 of 68 acid attacks, and 153 of 254 'honour crimes'.<sup>110</sup>

The same HRCP report found that, in 2018, no discernible improvement had been made in the status of women in the country, and that VAWG remains pervasive in all provinces. The country is currently ranked sixth on the list of the world's most dangerous countries for women, including being the country with the fourth highest prevalence of violence associated with harmful cultural practices and beliefs, such as acid attacks, FGM, child marriage, forced marriage, stoning, physical abuse or mutilation as a form of punishment/retribution, and female infanticide<sup>111</sup>. White Ribbon Campaign Pakistan (citing HRCP data)<sup>112</sup>, reported 4,734 instances of sexual violence, over 15,000 cases of 'honour' crime, more than 1,800 cases of domestic violence, and over 5,500 kidnappings of women between 2004 and 2016. According to widely reported police figures<sup>113</sup>, as many as 51,241 cases of VAWG were registered between January 2011 and June 2017, with the highest number, 15,461, being for 'domestic abuse' or IPV. Conviction rates, meanwhile, remain low, with only 2.5% of all reported cases ending in conviction. This is partly because the legislative environment remains discriminatory against women, including discriminatory laws that pertain to marriage, divorce, custody rights and inheritance. For example, women are required to request permission for a divorce from an Islamic family court, whereas men are not<sup>114</sup>. But in addition to this, the history of legal, cultural, and social discrimination leaves women in fear of persecution and, therefore, less likely to report crimes, meaning the figures alone tell only part of the story. As summarised in a 2020 Home Office report on Women's Fears of GBV in Pakistan: "Although the Constitution provides for equality of all citizens and numerous legislation has been enacted to protect women's rights, in practice this is not systematically enforced because of deep-rooted social, cultural and economic barriers and prejudices."<sup>115</sup>

**South Sudan** is the world's most recently established country, having gained its independence after fifty years of civil war with what is now Sudan. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) signed the first Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, providing the foundation for the arrangements for South Sudan's independence, which was established in July 2011. But peace in the newly independent nation was short lived, and in December 2013 a new wave of conflict, this time internal to South Sudan, broke out between the supporters of the President, Salva Kiir Mayarditt, and those people aligned with the Vice President at the time, Riek Machar. The dispute opened up along ethnic lines as the ruling presidential party was made up of the Dinka ethnic majority, while the

<sup>108</sup> D'Lima & Quresh 2017. <https://blogs.worldbank.org/endpovertyinsouthasia/addressing-violence-against-women-pakistan-time-act-now>

<sup>109</sup> WEF 2019 <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/06/accelerating-gender-gap-parity-equality-globalization-4/>

<sup>110</sup> HRCP 2018. <http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/State-of-Human-Rights-in-2018-English-1.pdf>

<sup>111</sup> Thomson Reuters Foundation 2018. <https://poll2018.trust.org/>

<sup>112</sup> White Ribbon 2020. <http://www.whiteribbon.org.pk/understand-domestic-violence/statistics-of-vaw/>

<sup>113</sup> E.g., Pakistan Today 2017. <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/12/17/police-registers-51241-cases-of-violence-against-women-from-2011/>

<sup>114</sup> EU Parliament 2019. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2019-001104\\_EN.html](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2019-001104_EN.html)

<sup>115</sup> Home Office 2020. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/pakistan-country-policy-and-information-notes>



opposition consisted primarily of the second largest grouping, the Nuer. The conflict that unfolded saw tens of thousands killed and three million people displaced, both to neighbouring countries and also internally, with around 200,000 people being forced to move into UN 'Protection of Civilian Camps' (PoCs), which were set up within South Sudan's borders.

In August 2015, a new peace agreement was signed but was short lived, with violence breaking out again within a year. The July 2016 conflict saw Riek Machar flee the country, opening up an oppositional power vacuum, and this was followed by the installation of a new Vice President, Taban Deng Gai, in August 2016 from the Juba based faction of the SPLM In Opposition (SPLM IO). A further peace agreement was later signed in Khartoum in June 2018. In addition to political conflict the country is plagued by inter communal tensions primarily fuelled by cattle wealth, or rather the drive to accumulate wealth through cattle. This economic reality sees violence erupt through cattle raiding that, in parallel, results in women and girls being abducted for marriage. Though the prevalence of VAWG is difficult to ascertain in such circumstances, it is estimated that 65% of women and girls report having experienced some form of sexual violence, and approximately 33% of the sexual violence that is reported is said to be the result of non-partner abduction that is linked to cattle raiding and displacement. Women and girls are also subjected to a number of other cultural practices that are in themselves violent or that lead to violence, including bride-price, child marriage, polygamy, and wife inheritance.<sup>116</sup> The laws of South Sudan prohibit rape and other sexual based violence, but marital rape is not recognised by the legislation, and convictions are very low, hindered by a judicial system that barely functions. There is an ATJ programme funded by the EU that has explored the use of para legal and mobile courts, but such programmes struggle to make inroads due to the sheer scale of the problem. The main INGO response to VAWG is psycho-social support and livelihood programmes.<sup>117</sup>

Research for the WW-VAWG programme has already provided many critical insights into the context of violence in South Sudan. IPV has been identified as the most prevalent form of violence, which new data suggests is experienced by up to 77% of women in some regions of the country. Women and girls are also often subject to sexual violence by armed actors, and they are left vulnerable by conflict in a number of other ways, including displacement, the breakdown of rule of law, increases in crime and the overall normalisation of violence. The summary report produced for WW-VAWG in 2017, *No Safe Place: A Lifetime of Violence for Conflict-Affected Women and Girls in South Sudan*, noted that very few women and girls report these experiences to authorities. This is partly due to stigma, shame, and a general culture of silence, and partly to a breakdown in the rule of law, which has resulted in an legal environment characterised by virtual impunity for perpetrators. The report states that: "To reduce violence against women and girls in these areas of South Sudan, humanitarian efforts need to address the root causes and drivers of VAWG as well as provide direct service delivery to these communities"<sup>118</sup>.

### 3. ATTITUDES

**The link between traditional values and beliefs and VAWG.** The intersection of traditional and cultural practices that embed and normalise gender inequalities present a major to ending or even reducing the prevalence of VAWG. These attitudes permeate every level of society, influencing the political will of key stakeholders to implement legislation. In other words, it is unrealistic to think that the prevailing patriarchal norms underpinning in-country gendered relations are not also shared by the

<sup>116</sup> Longman & Bradley 2016. <https://www.routledge.com/Interrogating-Harmful-Cultural-Practices-Gender-Culture-and-Coercion/Longman-Bradley/p/book/9781472428882>

<sup>117</sup> Samuel, Jones, & Abu Hamad 2017. [https://academic.oup.com/heapol/article/32/suppl\\_5/v40/4718142](https://academic.oup.com/heapol/article/32/suppl_5/v40/4718142)

<sup>118</sup> See WW-VAWG 2017, 12.

<https://www.rescue-uk.org/sites/default/files/document/1580/southsudangsummaryreportonline.pdf>



political elite. Shifting and/or reversing these norms is clearly urgent, and, in order to do so, understanding the entry points for change is critical.

**The challenge of internal diversity.** Global campaigns such as the #MeToo movement and 16 Days of Activism have undoubtedly helped to highlight the realities that the normalisation of violence needs to end. But across contexts the visibility and impact of these campaigns varies considerably. For example, in South Sudan, VAWG campaigning is concentrated in Juba (the capital city), which acts as the urban hub of the humanitarian response, a relatively small, tight-knit, and coordinated VAWG network exists, consisting of practitioners working on protection and GBV. Global campaigns are responded to at this level. But, in a conflict-ridden context, with enormous internal diversity, they fail to reach far outside of Juba. Though Zambia does not suffer from the instability and associated patterns of violence that come with internal conflict, and in fact has been described as “an island of peace”<sup>119</sup> in an otherwise conflict ridden region, it also has high levels of internal diversity and inequality. Rural regions have far less access to resources and infrastructure, and reaching isolated rural communities that do not have internet connectivity is challenging. This makes the reach of both global and national campaigning on VAWG very limited outside of the main urban areas.

**Security risks limit the reach of VAWG campaigning and programming.** In Pakistan, campaigning is muted by the tensions and security risks associated with the dominance of ultra-conservative religious views on gender that make it dangerous for activists to speak out on issues of VAWG.<sup>120</sup> In South Africa and Ghana, campaigns have greater traction, but political will has still, until relatively recently, been weak. Nepal, with its new federal system and growing women’s movement is beginning to see higher levels of mobilisation and campaigning on issues of VAWG, and social mobilisers and women’s organisations have helped to bring campaigns to vulnerable groups. The impact of such campaigns are limited by the lack of an enabling environment (see sub-section above), and even when visibility for VAWG as a human rights issue is achieved through media and community campaigns, without political will, accompanied by sufficient resourcing and in-country practitioner capacity, little sustainable change will occur.

## 4. GOVERNMENT COMMITMENT

In the contexts explored above, there are varied degrees of national government commitment to support interventions that are donor funded. In all contexts apart from South Africa, governments have supported the implementation of national gender action plans that are often coordinated by departments with a gender/women remit. In reality, these plans tend to be driven by UN agencies and INGOs, rather than by government Civil Servants at the national level. In many cases, UN employees will work inside gender ministries to support and strengthen capacity of civil servants (e.g., Zambia and South Sudan) to deliver the action plans. In countries where there is significant distrust of the foreign aid sector, such as Pakistan, implementation, even with donor funding, remains challenging. This picture then reveals a disconnect between global campaigns and the realities of making things happen on the ground. Moreover, despite a lack of meaningful political will, national governments may agree to endorse global declarations on ending VAWG, and even accept national action plans, because they come with the promise of donor funding.

South Africa, then, is an important context to explore and learn from. How has it been possible to see such growth in the level of government commitment?<sup>121</sup> The levels of campaigning across the country are arguably greater, and are more coordinated and better funded, than in the other WW-VAWG contexts. The data on levels and prevalence of VAWG are also robust. Concern over growing inequalities fuelling more civil unrest has also created a moment in which pressuring the South African

<sup>119</sup> UN 2012. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sqsm14125.doc.htm>

<sup>120</sup> Bradley & Kirmani 2015. <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9780203694442/chapters/10.4324/9780203694442-26>

<sup>121</sup> For more detail, see the findings section of the main report.

government to take action on VAWG is finally working. But in general, a lack of political will across WW-VAWG contexts is evident in the poorly resourced government ministries that are tasked with addressing gender and VAWG. Arguably, Departments of Gender only exist at all in some of these countries as a result of the pressure brought to bear by global conventions such as CEDAW and SDG5. Often, these departments receive significantly less funding than other areas of government and, as such, strengthening capacity at this level and connecting with strong civil society groups and other government departments, such as the judiciary, represent critical factors in the drive to end VAWG.

## 5. KEY LEARNING FROM THIS PEA FOR VAWG PROGRAMMING

This Annex supplements the data and observations detailed in the main report, and in doing so helps to provide a clearer picture of the size of the problem and its causes in the study countries. It contributes to developing a better understanding of how WW-VAWG can be best positioned to overcome potential barriers as the programme moves into its next phase. As such, rather than providing information that is entirely new to WW-VAWG, the PEA instead synthesises what we already know in order to point toward key considerations and approaches to change that we might expect to become the focus for WW-VAWG activities in future.

The overarching observation is **that efforts need to address both the root causes and drivers of VAWG, while simultaneously providing direct service delivery that is context appropriate to women and girls in all communities, particularly those who are most at risk of violence.**

The key learning from this PEA of VAWG in the study countries are as follows:

1. Behavioural change interventions must identify how and where traditional and cultural practices embed and normalise gender inequalities and intersect with gendered discrimination, and must seek to disconnect the values and beliefs that entrench and legitimise VAWG;
2. Internal diversity, including cultural or religious diversity as well as economic equality, must be mapped in order to effectively design behavioural change interventions that can respond to the specific beliefs and practices that support VAWG in different communities and different parts of a country;
3. The realities of security risks for activists in conservative contexts that make it dangerous for activists to speak out on issues of VAWG (in Pakistan, for example) need to be responded to in VAWG programming. This will require activities that seek to strengthen political will and contribute to building a positive enabling environment for VAWG activism;
4. The unique challenges posed by ongoing or recent conflict (especially in the case of South Sudan) must be taken into consideration, particularly the ways in which women and girls are made vulnerable in the context of conflict and/or a weak state, and the increased risk of violence that they face. These contexts, though particularly complex, are also environments in which the need for action is most urgent and where the greatest potential for positive impact can be seen.

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